【摘要】：“物化”概念一直以來在批判理論的傳統(tǒng)中扮演著重要的角色。但是馬克思的“物化”概念因?yàn)樵诘抡Z中存在著兩個(gè)不同的概念,即物化(Verdinglichung)和事物化(Versachlichung)而變得復(fù)雜起來。為了理解物化和事物化,我們必須回到思想史之中,對物(Ding)和事物(Sache)進(jìn)行一個(gè)梳理。在康德那里,物的概念最集中體現(xiàn)在了“物自身”(Ding an sich)之上�？档聦ΜF(xiàn)象界和物自身的劃分,使得經(jīng)驗(yàn)之中的物僅僅歸屬于經(jīng)驗(yàn)的范疇,而將物自身放置入了不可知的領(lǐng)域。康德盡管在道德形而上學(xué)體系中論述到了事物概念,但它還不是一個(gè)作為哲學(xué)反思的概念而出現(xiàn)。費(fèi)希特針對康德的物自身設(shè)定,以“自我設(shè)定非我”的原則消解了物。黑格爾的哲學(xué)體系最為全面地批判了康德“物自身”的預(yù)設(shè),并最早對物與事物概念進(jìn)行了區(qū)分,進(jìn)而以“物性”和“事物自身”來把握世界進(jìn)程的兩重特征。 黑格爾因此成為馬克思在物與事物問題上批判與超越的對象。在《德意志意識形態(tài)》中,物與事物的話語雖然有所浮現(xiàn),但總體看來《德意志意識形態(tài)》時(shí)期以及之前的馬克思那里,物與事物這一概念還沒有真正進(jìn)入到馬克思的視域之中。物與事物的討論只有在《1857-1858年經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)手稿》中才真正成為明確區(qū)分的概念呈現(xiàn)出來：物作為經(jīng)驗(yàn)表象的直接性,而事物則指涉了人與人之間的關(guān)系性。這同馬克思政治經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)的研究有著非常密切的關(guān)系。它們在馬克思?xì)v史現(xiàn)象學(xué)的理論之中扮演的重要的角色,正是在《1857-1858年手稿》中,事物化概念第一次出現(xiàn)。在《資本論》中,馬克思對物和事物概念的區(qū)別進(jìn)一步深入的同時(shí),物化和事物化概念也隨之在《資本論》中登場。盡管出場次數(shù)不多,我們?nèi)钥梢园l(fā)現(xiàn)物化和事物化作為分析三大拜物教的理論環(huán)節(jié)所扮演的重要地位。它們對于我們理解把握資本主義的本質(zhì)結(jié)構(gòu)具有著重要的幫助。 在馬克思之后,韋伯、盧卡奇、海德格爾和以廣松涉為代表的日本學(xué)者都曾從不同角度,在不同的歷史情境之中對物化和事物化的討論作出了貢獻(xiàn),然而他們都未能從根基上達(dá)到馬克思在這一問題上的水平。物化和事物化必須被聯(lián)系起來加以看待,人類社會歷史在今天所呈現(xiàn)出來的物性特征,必須回到客觀的社會歷史生產(chǎn)過程之中,通過分析特定的生產(chǎn)關(guān)系和社會關(guān)系才能夠加以破解。
[Abstract]:The concept of materialization has always played an important role in the tradition of critical theory. But Marx's concept of materialization is complicated by the existence of two different concepts in German, that is, materialized (Verdinglichung) and materialized (Versachlichung). In order to understand materialization and materialization, we must go back to the history of thought and sort out (Ding) and (Sache). In Kant's view, the concept of things is most concentrated on the "thing itself" (Ding an sich). Kant's division of the phenomenal boundary and the object itself makes the object in the experience belong to the category of experience and put the object itself into the unknown field. Although Kant discussed the concept of things in the system of moral metaphysics, it was not a concept of philosophical reflection. Fichte dispels things with the principle of "self-setting non-self" in view of Kant's self-setting. Hegel's philosophy system criticizes the presupposition of Kant's "thing itself" in a comprehensive way, and distinguishes the concept of thing from thing at first, and then grasps the dual characteristics of the world process by "materiality" and "thing itself". Hegel therefore became the object of Marx's criticism and transcendence on matter and matter. In "German ideology", the discourse of things and things appears, but generally speaking, the period of "German ideology" and Marx before, The concept of things and things has not really entered Marx's horizon. Only in the economic manuscripts of 1857-1858 did the discussion of things really become the concept of clear distinction: things are the direct representation of experience, while things refer to the relationship between people. This is closely related to the study of Marx's political economy. They played an important role in Marx's theory of historical phenomenology. It was in the manuscript of 1857-1858 that the concept of materialization of events first appeared. In "Capital", Marx's difference between the concept of things and things is further deepened, at the same time, materialization and materialization also appear in Capital. Although the number of appearances is not many, we can still find that materialization and materialization play an important role in the theoretical analysis of the three fetishism. They have important help for us to understand and grasp the essential structure of capitalism. After Marx, Weber, Lukacs, Heidegger and the Japanese scholars represented by Hirosuzawa all contributed to the discussion of materialization and materialization from different perspectives and in different historical contexts. However, they all failed to reach Marx's level on this issue from the foundation. Materialization and materialization must be linked to each other, and the physical characteristics of human social history today must be returned to the objective process of social and historical production. Through the analysis of specific relations of production and social relations can be cracked.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：南京大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2013
【分類號】：A811;B023

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