【摘要】： 文章首先對(duì)現(xiàn)代模態(tài)邏輯做了概述性的介紹,從而為后文的討論搭建了一個(gè)技術(shù)性平臺(tái)。隨后,通過對(duì)三類主要的模態(tài)邏輯哲學(xué)問題的討論,文章認(rèn)為本質(zhì)主義是模態(tài)邏輯哲學(xué)問題的關(guān)鍵所在。據(jù)此,文章從兩個(gè)主要的方面討論了模態(tài)邏輯中的本質(zhì)主義問題,即可能世界學(xué)說和本質(zhì)主義方案。 文章認(rèn)為,極端實(shí)在論和極端唯名論的可能世界學(xué)說都是錯(cuò)誤的,真正具有可行性的可能世界學(xué)說應(yīng)是溫和的實(shí)在論。由此,文章建構(gòu)了一種新的溫和模態(tài)實(shí)在論方案:可能世界是所有事物的共存方式,它是一種客觀的存在,它的存在不依賴于人們的主觀意識(shí),它不是人為的規(guī)定�？赡苁澜缡且栏接诳陀^事物的存在,因而它的客觀性來源于客觀事物。作為一種客觀的存在,可能世界是先于性質(zhì)、關(guān)系等其它依附性存在的,它并不是事實(shí)或事態(tài)的某種構(gòu)造或定義。由于概念上的在先性,對(duì)可能世界的說明就不會(huì)有循環(huán)的可能。另外,由于可能世界的這一特殊本體地位,新的溫和模態(tài)實(shí)在論并不存在區(qū)分可能世界與不可能世界的問題。對(duì)于同一者不可分辨原則的失效問題,文章認(rèn)為這是無中生有的,因?yàn)槿R布尼茲律的使用是限制在可能世界內(nèi)部的。而所謂不可分辨者同一原則和同一關(guān)系的傳遞性遭到破壞,乃是因?yàn)椴粎^(qū)分本質(zhì)屬性和非本質(zhì)屬性。文章認(rèn)為,溫和模態(tài)實(shí)在論的完善需要以一個(gè)可行的本質(zhì)主義方案來補(bǔ)充。 通過考察亞里士多德的本質(zhì)主義思想,分析、借鑒其他一些哲學(xué)家對(duì)模態(tài)邏輯和本質(zhì)主義關(guān)系的論述,文章提出了亞里士多德本質(zhì)主義在模態(tài)邏輯中的形式表征,并指出模態(tài)邏輯是在下列意義上承諾了本質(zhì)主義:模態(tài)邏輯認(rèn)可了本質(zhì)主義句子的有意義性。文章認(rèn)為,自然種類確實(shí)有自己的本質(zhì),即它的成員共有的內(nèi)部結(jié)構(gòu),支持克里普克、普特南的這一觀點(diǎn),并對(duì)它做了充分的辯護(hù)。而在個(gè)體本質(zhì)上,文章針對(duì)生物體提出了一個(gè)嶄新的方案——個(gè)體起源和遺傳物質(zhì)說。文章認(rèn)為,雖然個(gè)體起源說滿足成為個(gè)體本質(zhì)的必要條件,但已有的相關(guān)論證是錯(cuò)誤的。為此,文章設(shè)計(jì)了另一種策略來辯護(hù)它,即反證法。然而,文章同時(shí)指出,個(gè)體起源并不滿足成為個(gè)體本質(zhì)的充分條件,這是由于遺傳密碼的改變而導(dǎo)致不同生物個(gè)體的生成。通過對(duì)個(gè)體起源說做適當(dāng)?shù)男拚a(bǔ)充,文章建構(gòu)了“個(gè)體起源和遺傳物質(zhì)說”,以遺傳物質(zhì)來補(bǔ)充個(gè)體起源,就可以個(gè)體化生物個(gè)體。文章認(rèn)為,遺傳物質(zhì)決定著生物個(gè)體外在性狀的有無,以及它們的顯著程度,而生物個(gè)體的外在性狀正是內(nèi)在遺傳物質(zhì)的表現(xiàn)形式,因而遺傳物質(zhì)是生物個(gè)體的本質(zhì)屬性。另外,通過分析本質(zhì)和存在這兩個(gè)哲學(xué)概念,文章論證了生物個(gè)體最初遺傳物質(zhì)的必然性。如此一來,文章指出,通過遺傳物質(zhì)來限定個(gè)體起源,就可以得到生物的個(gè)體本質(zhì)。
[Abstract]:In this paper, a brief introduction of modern modal logic is given, and a technical platform is built for the later discussion. Then, through the discussion of three main types of philosophy of modal logic, this paper holds that essentialism is the key to the philosophy of modal logic. Based on this, this paper discusses the essentialism in modal logic from two main aspects, that is, the possible world theory and the essentialism scheme. The paper holds that the possible world theory of extreme realism and extreme nominalism is wrong, and the possible world theory of real feasibility should be moderate realism. Therefore, this paper constructs a new mild modal realism scheme: the possible world is the coexistence of all things, it is an objective existence, its existence does not depend on people's subjective consciousness, it is not man-made regulation. Perhaps the world is attached to the existence of objective things, so its objectivity comes from objective things. As an objective existence, it is possible that the world is prior to other dependent existence, such as nature, relation and so on. It is not a kind of structure or definition of fact or state of affairs. Because of the preeminence of the concept, there is no possibility of circulation in the explanation of the possible world. In addition, due to the special ontological status of the possible world, the new mild modal realism does not exist the problem of distinguishing the possible world from the impossible world. For the invalidation of the indistinguishable principle of the same person, this paper considers that this is false because the use of Leibniz's law is restricted to the possible world. The transmissibility of the same principle and the same relation of the indistinguishable person is destroyed because the essential attribute and the non-essential attribute are not distinguished. This paper argues that the perfection of mild modal realism needs to be supplemented by a feasible essentialism scheme. By examining Aristotle's thought of essentialism, analyzing and drawing lessons from other philosophers' discussion on the relationship between modal logic and essentialism, this paper puts forward the formal representation of Aristotle's essentialism in modal logic. It is pointed out that modal logic promises essentialism in the following sense: modal logic recognizes the meaning of essentialist sentences. This paper argues that natural species do have their own essence, that is, the internal structure shared by its members, which supports Kripk and Putnam's view, and fully justifies it. In the essence of individual, this paper puts forward a brand-new scheme for organism-the theory of individual origin and genetic material. This paper holds that although the theory of individual origin satisfies the essential condition of individual essence, the related arguments are wrong. Therefore, this paper designs another strategy to defend it, that is, counterproof. However, at the same time, it is pointed out that the origin of individuals is not satisfied with the sufficient conditions to become the essence of individuals, which is due to the change of genetic codes resulting in the formation of individuals in different organisms. By making appropriate corrections to the theory of individual origin, the article constructs the theory of individual origin and genetic material, in which genetic material is used to supplement the individual origin, and the individual can be individualized. In this paper, it is considered that genetic material determines whether or not the external traits of biological individuals and their saliency, and the external characters of biological individuals are just the manifestation of internal genetic material, so genetic material is the essential attribute of biological individuals. In addition, by analyzing the two philosophical concepts of essence and existence, this paper demonstrates the inevitability of the original genetic material of biological individuals. In this way, it is pointed out that by limiting the origin of individuals through genetic material, the individual nature of living things can be obtained.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：北京大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級(jí)別】：博士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2004
【分類號(hào)】：B815

【引證文獻(xiàn)】

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1 張力鋒;;模態(tài)與本質(zhì)[J];哲學(xué)研究;2011年03期

相關(guān)博士學(xué)位論文 前2條

1 龍小平;可能世界中的名稱和同一性[D];西南大學(xué);2007年

2 何朝安;涵義的形而上學(xué)研究[D];復(fù)旦大學(xué);2012年

相關(guān)碩士學(xué)位論文 前1條

1 魯珊;生成語(yǔ)法框架下標(biāo)句詞的再研究[D];四川外語(yǔ)學(xué)院;2011年

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本文編號(hào)：2443988