【摘要】： 克里普克是當(dāng)今美國著名的哲學(xué)家和邏輯學(xué)家,他在1979年發(fā)表的《關(guān)于信念的疑難》一文中,提出了信念之謎,在使用去引號原則、去引號原則的雙條件形式以及翻譯原則的前提下,克里普克把信念之謎表述為:皮埃爾究竟相信還是不相信倫敦是美麗的?這個謎題不僅涉及了同一替換律、信念、意向性等重要理論,還涉及了語言學(xué)、哲學(xué)、心理學(xué)、邏輯學(xué)等重要領(lǐng)域。 信念之謎提出后,在國外哲學(xué)界引起了極大的震動,雖然克里普克本人一直強調(diào)在現(xiàn)有的知識條件下無法解決這一難題,但還是有許多學(xué)者對這一問題進行了分析探討,并從不同角度提出了各自的解謎方案,例如有福格林的“分離的信念系統(tǒng)”、索薩的“解釋原則”、普特南的“等同描述”、蓋若特的“識別性知識”概念以及費特的“強意義和弱意義理論”等,他們的觀點雖然都有一定的合理性或者為我們提供了一個解決問題的視角,但是他們的方案都無法從根本上解決信念之謎。因為他們忽視了對信念之謎的理論背景的深層次探討以及對信念本身特點的分析。 本文在借鑒國外最新解謎方案的基礎(chǔ)上,對信念之謎作了重新思考。首先,在信念之謎是否有解決方案這一問題上,筆者通過對克里普克的專名理論即他和其他學(xué)者分歧的根源的探討,駁斥了克里普克所謂的“信念之謎無解”的觀點,而肯定了信念之謎是有解決方案的。同時在對克里普克的專名理論的分析過程中,筆者找到了解決信念之謎的關(guān)鍵,即:專名本身可以沒有涵義,但是說話者卻可以后天賦予專名以相關(guān)聯(lián)的描述性信息,這也在一定程度上融合了克里普克和其他學(xué)者的觀點。其次,筆者通過對信念理論、意向性理論以及專名的語義學(xué)語用學(xué)理論的分析,對上述觀點的可能性和合理性進行了論證,并得出結(jié)論:在信念之謎問題上,雖然專名本身沒有涵義,但是說話者卻可以根據(jù)自身的意向性內(nèi)容而賦予專名以涵義,不過需要指出的是,這種涵義不是專名本身所固有的,而是后天被賦予的。由此,筆者通過將信念理論、意向性理論、專名的指稱理論相融合,對信念之謎作了一次嘗試性解答。 這種解答也表明了筆者的專名理論觀點。即,專名只有指稱而沒有涵義,在如何實現(xiàn)指稱的問題上,筆者認(rèn)為,說話者是根據(jù)自身的意向性內(nèi)容而賦予專名以涵義的。這本質(zhì)上也是描述理論和直接指稱理論的融合。實際上,也有很多學(xué)者討論過這個問題,如林斯基、陳波等。
[Abstract]:Kripke, a famous philosopher and logician in the United States today, put forward the riddle of belief in his 1979 article on the problem of Faith, using the principle of quotation marks. On the premise of the double conditional form of the quoted principle and the principle of translation, Kripke describes the riddle of belief as: does Pierre believe or do not believe that London is beautiful? This puzzle involves not only the same substitution law, belief, intentionality and other important theories, but also the important fields of linguistics, philosophy, psychology, logic and so on. After the riddle of belief was put forward, it caused a great shock in foreign philosophy circles. Although Kripke himself has always stressed that the problem cannot be solved under the existing knowledge, many scholars have made an analysis and discussion of this problem. And they put forward their own solutions from different angles, such as the Faith system of Separation by Fogling, the principle of interpretation by Souza, and the equivalent description by Putnam. Galot's concept of "discernible knowledge" and Fett's "theory of strong and weak meaning", although their views are reasonable or provide us with a perspective to solve the problem. But none of their solutions can solve the riddle of faith at all. Because they ignore the deep discussion of the theoretical background of the riddle of belief and the analysis of the characteristics of the belief itself. This paper reconsiders the riddle of belief on the basis of drawing lessons from the latest foreign puzzles. First of all, on the question of whether there is a solution to the riddle of belief, the author refutes Kripke's point of view that "the riddle of belief has no solution" by discussing the origin of Kripke's theory of proper name, that is, the difference between him and other scholars. And affirmed that the riddle of faith has a solution. At the same time, in the process of analyzing Kripke's theory of proper name, the author finds the key to solve the riddle of belief, that is, the proper name itself can have no meaning, but the speaker can assign the proper name with associated descriptive information. This, in part, combines the views of Kripke and other scholars. Secondly, through the analysis of belief theory, intentionality theory and semantic pragmatics theory of proper name, the author demonstrates the possibility and rationality of the above views, and draws a conclusion: in the problem of the riddle of belief, Although the proper name itself has no meaning, the speaker can assign the proper name with the meaning according to his intended content. However, it should be pointed out that this meaning is not inherent in the proper name itself, but is given by the day after tomorrow. Therefore, the author makes a tentative solution to the riddle of belief by combining belief theory, intentionality theory and reference theory of proper name. This solution also shows the author's theory of proper name. That is to say, the proper name has only the reference but no meaning. On how to realize the reference, the author thinks that the speaker gives the proper name the meaning according to his intention content. In essence, it is the fusion of descriptive theory and direct reference theory. In fact, many scholars have discussed this issue, such as Linsky, Chen Bo and so on.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：湘潭大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2009
【分類號】：B812

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