本文關(guān)鍵詞：克里普克論對同一性陳述的模態(tài)認(rèn)知，由筆耕文化傳播整理發(fā)布。

克里普克論對同一性陳述的模態(tài)認(rèn)知

     2009-7-22 2:47:37     來源：     

　　論文標(biāo)題克里普克論對同一性陳述的模態(tài)認(rèn)知
Kripke on the Modal Knowledge of Identity Statements
論文作者
論文導(dǎo)師韓林合,論文學(xué)位碩士,論文專業(yè)外國哲學(xué)
論文單位北京大學(xué),點擊次數(shù)0,論文頁數(shù)29頁File Size466K
2008-05-01
Conceivability;; Identity;; Modal Epistemology;; Necessary A Posteriori Truth
在《命名與必然性》一書中,克里普克基于其“固定指示語”理論,依靠“可設(shè)想性論證”對身心同一論作出了先天的反駁。本文即以此論證為線索,探討對“可設(shè)想性”的各種刻畫方式,力圖揭示在克里普克的體系下,難以對這個概念作出確切的刻畫使得它能滿足“可設(shè)想性論證”的要求,從而他并不能在此基礎(chǔ)上反駁身心同一論并建立對形而上學(xué)模態(tài)的認(rèn)知。全文共分為六個部分。第一部分介紹克里普克的論證并指出其中用到的一個重要原則:由“可設(shè)想性”推導(dǎo)出“可能性”的“休謨原則”。第二部分討論一種通常的對“可設(shè)想性”的理解——認(rèn)知可能性,指出這種理解并不能使休謨原則成立。第三部分通過分析克里普克對“后天必然真理”的模態(tài)地位的說明,指出對“可設(shè)想性”的理解必須排除一種與之相伴隨的模態(tài)幻覺。在此基礎(chǔ)上,第四部分論證因為休謨原則總是面臨著模態(tài)懷疑論的挑戰(zhàn),從而試圖通過可設(shè)想性這一先天的方式來論證形而上學(xué)可能性最終是失敗的。第五部分則著重討論由專名構(gòu)成的同一性陳述,指出因為克里普克難以對這類“后天必然真理”的后天性作出合理的說明,從而試圖通過后天的方式來認(rèn)知同一性陳述的模態(tài)地位也是不成功的。本文最終的結(jié)論是,在克里普克的體系下,不管是通過先天的方式,還是通過后天的方式,都不能對同一性陳述1的模態(tài)認(rèn)知作出合理的解釋,如何對形而上學(xué)模態(tài)建立適當(dāng)?shù)恼J(rèn)識論從而成為他的模態(tài)語義學(xué)的一大難題。
In his book Naming and Necessity, based on the semantics of‘Rigid Designators’, Kripke constructs a‘conceivability argument’to argue that we can know a priori that the identity thesis about body and mind is false. This paper aims to argue that Kripke’s strategy is not persuasive, for he cannot form an appropriate characterization of the core concept he employs: conceivability. The paper is consisted of six parts. The first one introduces Kripke’s argument, from which I’ll draw an important principle (Hume’s Principle) which claims that conceivability entails possibility. Part two examines a prevalent understanding of‘conceivability’in literature, and argues that this kind of characterization cannot bring Hume’s principle through. Part three aims to clarify some qualification which is implicit in Kripke’s discussion of‘necessary a posteriori truths’. Based on these, Part four continues to argue that since such qualification will lead to modal skepticism, Kripke’s conceivability approach to metaphysical possibility fails. Part five examines whether the a posteriori approach could be a good guide to metaphysical modality of identity statements. My final conclusion will be that neither the a priori strategy nor the a posteriori method could be treated as successful explanation of our modal knowledge, thus how to know metaphysical modality is a serious problem within Kripke’s framework.

  本文關(guān)鍵詞：克里普克論對同一性陳述的模態(tài)認(rèn)知，，由筆耕文化傳播整理發(fā)布。

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