發(fā)布時(shí)間：2018-03-21 19:41

  本文選題：真之理論語義學(xué)　切入點(diǎn)：新證實(shí)主義　出處：《湖北大學(xué)學(xué)報(bào)(哲學(xué)社會(huì)科學(xué)版)》2017年05期 　論文類型：期刊論文

【摘要】：20世紀(jì)70年代,達(dá)米特與普拉維茨提出新證實(shí)主義的意義理論,主張基于語句的證明來分析語言的使用乃至意義,以此克服真之理論語義學(xué)的超越認(rèn)知性問題。同時(shí),為了擺脫舊證實(shí)主義的困境,他們還主張區(qū)分典范證明與間接證明以及只有前者才構(gòu)成語句的意義。由于總是過分強(qiáng)調(diào)語言使用的一個(gè)方面而忽視另外一個(gè)方面,并賦予引入和消去規(guī)則中的一者以優(yōu)先性,新證實(shí)主義者定義的典范證明概念不足以恰當(dāng)?shù)乜坍嬚Z句的意義。這阻礙了新證實(shí)主義的意義理論發(fā)展成為與真之理論語義學(xué)相媲美的嚴(yán)格的形式語義學(xué)。
[Abstract]:In the 1970s, Damit and Pravitz put forward the meaning theory of neo-confirmationism, and advocated analyzing the use and meaning of language based on the proof of sentence, so as to overcome the transcendental cognitive problem of the semantics of truth theory. In order to get rid of the dilemma of the old confirmatism, they also advocated the distinction between exemplary proof and indirect proof, and only the former form the meaning of the sentence. And give priority to one of the rules of introduction and elimination, The concept of canonical proof defined by the new confirmationist is not sufficient to describe the meaning of the sentence, which hinders the development of the meaning theory of neo-confirmationism into a strict formal semantics comparable to that of the true theoretical semantics.
【作者單位】： 中南財(cái)經(jīng)政法大學(xué)哲學(xué)院;
【基金】：國家社會(huì)科學(xué)基金青年資助項(xiàng)目:16CZX052
【分類號(hào)】：B81-095
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本文編號(hào)：1645268