本文選題：法人治理結(jié)構(gòu) + 體制性腐敗�。� 參考：《金融研究》2002年06期

【摘要】：本文通過對新疆自治區(qū)喀什地區(qū) 2 0 0 1年金融貪污腐敗案件的個案分析 ,發(fā)現(xiàn)案件具有集中于地方性金融法人機構(gòu)的特點。通過深入研究 ,本文的結(jié)論如下。第一 ,當(dāng)前地方性金融法人機構(gòu)案件頻發(fā)是治理結(jié)構(gòu)缺陷的體現(xiàn) ,而治理結(jié)構(gòu)缺陷直接表現(xiàn)為所有者與管理者因信息與知識不對稱導(dǎo)致的預(yù)算約束軟化和監(jiān)督失效問題。第二 ,由于法人治理結(jié)構(gòu)存在缺陷 ,因此由此導(dǎo)致的腐敗問題所可以引發(fā)的并非單純的刑事犯罪層面的思考 ,制度和機制設(shè)計是應(yīng)該充分考慮的。第三 ,考慮到所有者信息和素質(zhì)無法在短期內(nèi)得到提高 ,依靠外部監(jiān)管力量 ,實行二層次委托代理機制是相對合理的選擇 ,可以在一定程度上硬化預(yù)算約束。第四 ,外部監(jiān)督是降低小型地方性法人機構(gòu)不規(guī)范行為的充分必要條件。
[Abstract]:Based on the analysis of the financial corruption cases in Kashi region of Xinjiang Autonomous region in 2001, it is found that the cases are concentrated in the local financial legal bodies. Through in-depth study, the conclusion of this paper is as follows. Firstly, the frequent occurrence of local financial corporation cases is the embodiment of the defects of governance structure, and the defects of governance structure are directly reflected in the softening of budget constraints and the failure of supervision caused by asymmetric information and knowledge between owners and managers. Second, due to the defects of the corporate governance structure, the resulting corruption problem can lead to not only the criminal level of thinking, system and mechanism design should be fully considered. Thirdly, considering that the owner's information and quality can not be improved in the short term, relying on the external supervision force, the implementation of the two-level principal-agent mechanism is a relatively reasonable choice, and can harden the budget constraints to a certain extent. Fourth, external supervision is a necessary and sufficient condition to reduce the non-standard behavior of small local legal institutions.
【作者單位】： 中國人民銀行喀什地區(qū)中心支行 中國人民銀行喀什地區(qū)中心支行
【分類號】：D917

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本文編號：2017655