【摘要】：企業(yè)高管腐敗及其治理是反腐敗的重要領(lǐng)域。由于腐敗行為本身的隱蔽性,導(dǎo)致很難對(duì)其特征精確把握,治理政策容易失據(jù)。通過(guò)手工收集2013~2015年被媒體報(bào)道的152個(gè)高管腐敗案例,總結(jié)其特征、分析其成因,結(jié)果發(fā)現(xiàn),企業(yè)高管腐敗具有國(guó)企高發(fā)、壟斷行業(yè)集中、集權(quán)過(guò)度等特征,而企業(yè)高管腐敗是資源配置機(jī)制扭曲等原因?qū)е碌�。為�?應(yīng)該加強(qiáng)對(duì)壟斷性行業(yè)高管的事前、主動(dòng)性監(jiān)管,強(qiáng)化權(quán)力制衡機(jī)制,避免權(quán)力過(guò)度集中,同時(shí)將外部監(jiān)督與內(nèi)部控制相結(jié)合,形成內(nèi)外一體、結(jié)構(gòu)嚴(yán)密的監(jiān)控體系。
[Abstract]:Corporate executives corruption and its governance is an important area of anti-corruption. Because of the concealment of corruption itself, it is difficult to accurately grasp its characteristics, and the governance policy is easy to lose. Through collecting 152 cases of executive corruption reported by the media from 2013 to 2015, summarizing its characteristics and analyzing its causes, it is found that the corruption of enterprise executives is characterized by high incidence of state-owned enterprises, concentration of monopoly industries, excessive centralization of power, and so on. The corruption of enterprise executives is caused by the distortion of resource allocation mechanism. Therefore, we should strengthen the supervision in advance, strengthen the power balance mechanism, avoid excessive concentration of power, and combine external supervision with internal control to form an internal and external monitoring system with a tight structure.
【作者單位】： 浙江財(cái)經(jīng)大學(xué)會(huì)計(jì)學(xué)院;
【基金】：國(guó)家社會(huì)科學(xué)基金重點(diǎn)項(xiàng)目“基于內(nèi)部控制視角的腐敗防控機(jī)制與實(shí)現(xiàn)路徑研究”(項(xiàng)目編號(hào):15AJY002)
【分類號(hào)】：D262.6;F272.91

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