本文選題：廳局級(jí)官員腐敗 + 演化機(jī)理　； 參考：《蘭州大學(xué)》2017年碩士論文

【摘要】：腐敗是公共權(quán)力遭到俘獲的結(jié)果,不僅嚴(yán)重破壞社會(huì)公平正義,吞噬經(jīng)濟(jì)發(fā)展成果,而且極易損害黨和政府執(zhí)政威信,令其陷落“塔西佗陷阱”。十八大后,大批“老虎”級(jí)貪官在持續(xù)高壓式反腐中應(yīng)聲落馬,這一駭人事實(shí)表明,高級(jí)別官員腐敗因其示范效應(yīng)強(qiáng)、負(fù)面影響廣、治理難度大等特點(diǎn),正日益成為轉(zhuǎn)型期中國(guó)亟需切除的政治“毒瘤”。作為高級(jí)官員的重要構(gòu)成群體,廳局級(jí)官員是國(guó)家宏觀政策的重要執(zhí)行者,他們?cè)谛袡?quán)中能否保持清正廉潔,不僅關(guān)乎所轄領(lǐng)域的風(fēng)氣形成,而且事關(guān)更高級(jí)別官員隊(duì)伍的純潔度,是故,深入探討廳局級(jí)官員腐敗的演化機(jī)理,摸清其演化路徑中各個(gè)關(guān)鍵環(huán)節(jié),不僅有助于防治機(jī)關(guān)實(shí)施精準(zhǔn)高效化反腐,而且為治理其他級(jí)別官員貪腐提供經(jīng)驗(yàn)與思路借鑒,同時(shí),對(duì)構(gòu)建科學(xué)高效的反腐體系也具有重要理論支撐意義。依據(jù)十八大后被查處的928個(gè)腐敗樣本所建立的案例庫(kù),文章首先從貪官分布、涉案金額、貪腐持續(xù)期、涉案緣由等多個(gè)方面對(duì)廳局級(jí)官員貪腐現(xiàn)狀進(jìn)行了統(tǒng)計(jì)分析,在對(duì)廳官腐敗特點(diǎn)予以初步歸納的同時(shí),也為進(jìn)一步開展質(zhì)性探討奠定了基礎(chǔ)。結(jié)合從案例庫(kù)中挑選的50個(gè)典型腐敗樣本,運(yùn)用扎根理論研究技術(shù)對(duì)所選案例進(jìn)行了三級(jí)編碼,最終構(gòu)建了由權(quán)力獲取、貪欲滋生、底線失守、權(quán)力俘獲等4個(gè)主范疇組成的廳官腐敗演化機(jī)理模型,其中,權(quán)力是廳官腐敗的總源頭,貪欲是內(nèi)在思想動(dòng)機(jī),底線失守是權(quán)力與貪欲共同作用下的貪腐開端,權(quán)力俘獲意味著廳官?gòu)氐紫萋涓�。基于所�?gòu)建模型,對(duì)推動(dòng)廳官腐敗演化的內(nèi)生和外源動(dòng)因進(jìn)行了系統(tǒng)闡釋,全面揭示了各影響因素間的深度關(guān)聯(lián)。文章最后對(duì)廳官腐敗提出針對(duì)性防治建議。
[Abstract]:Corruption is the result of the capture of public power, which not only seriously destroys social fairness and justice, devours the fruits of economic development, but also easily damages the ruling authority of the Party and the government and makes it fall into the "Tacitus trap".After the 18th National Congress, a large number of corrupt officials at the "tiger" level fell in response to the persistent high-pressure anti-corruption campaign. This appalling fact shows that the corruption of high-level officials is characterized by its strong demonstration effect, wide negative impact, and great difficulty in governing, and so on.China is increasingly becoming a political cancer that needs to be excised.As an important group of senior officials, officials at the departmental and bureau levels are important executors of the state's macro policies. Whether they can maintain integrity in the exercise of their power is not only related to the formation of the ethos in the areas under their jurisdiction.And it is related to the purity of the higher level officials. Therefore, it is for this reason that it is not only helpful for the prevention and control organs to carry out accurate and high efficiency anti-corruption, but also to explore in depth the evolution mechanism of the corruption of officials at the bureau level and to find out the key links in its evolution path.It also provides experience and ideas for the management of corruption at other levels, and also has important theoretical support significance for the construction of a scientific and efficient anti-corruption system.According to the case base established by 928 corruption samples investigated and dealt with after the 18th National Congress, the article first makes a statistical analysis of the current situation of corruption among officials at the departmental and bureau levels from the distribution of corrupt officials, the amount of money involved, the duration of corruption, the reasons for the corruption involved, and so on.At the same time, it lays a foundation for further qualitative discussion.Combined with 50 typical corruption samples selected from the case base, the third level coding of the selected cases was carried out by using the rooted theory research technology. Finally, the power acquisition, greed breeding, and lost bottom line were constructed.There are four main categories of power capture, including the evolution mechanism model of official corruption. Among them, power is the total source of corruption, greed is the internal motivation, and the bottom line is the beginning of corruption under the joint action of power and greed.The capture of power means the complete fall of the hall.Based on the established model, this paper systematically explains the internal and external causes of promoting the evolution of official corruption, and comprehensively reveals the deep correlation among the influencing factors.Finally, the article puts forward some suggestions on the prevention and cure of official corruption.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：蘭州大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級(jí)別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2017
【分類號(hào)】：D262.6

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