本文選題：合作競(jìng)爭(zhēng) + 伙伴關(guān)系�。� 參考：《東北大學(xué)》2012年碩士論文

【摘要】：隨著經(jīng)濟(jì)全球化和知識(shí)經(jīng)濟(jì)的到來(lái),市場(chǎng)環(huán)境瞬息萬(wàn)變,企業(yè)面臨著成本降低、交貨期的縮短、提高質(zhì)量以及改進(jìn)客戶(hù)服務(wù)等壓力。然而,由于資源的有限性,只有獲取外部資源為我所用,取長(zhǎng)補(bǔ)短,優(yōu)勢(shì)互補(bǔ),才能增強(qiáng)企業(yè)的競(jìng)爭(zhēng)力。在這種前提下,供應(yīng)鏈聯(lián)盟應(yīng)運(yùn)而生。供應(yīng)鏈戰(zhàn)略聯(lián)盟是借助于信息技術(shù),在保持各自獨(dú)立的前提下,整合供應(yīng)鏈當(dāng)中兩個(gè)或兩個(gè)以上的企業(yè),以實(shí)現(xiàn)風(fēng)險(xiǎn)共擔(dān)、優(yōu)勢(shì)與補(bǔ),進(jìn)而降低整個(gè)供應(yīng)的總成本、降低庫(kù)存水平、提高顧客響應(yīng)性和顧客服務(wù)水平,以產(chǎn)生更大的競(jìng)爭(zhēng)優(yōu)勢(shì)。在激烈的市場(chǎng)競(jìng)爭(zhēng)環(huán)境中,供應(yīng)鏈聯(lián)盟可以使成員企業(yè)產(chǎn)生協(xié)同效應(yīng),解決競(jìng)爭(zhēng)沖突,可以促進(jìn)企業(yè)的相互學(xué)習(xí),提高企業(yè)技能、提高企業(yè)的創(chuàng)新能力,可以使企業(yè)更好地應(yīng)對(duì)市場(chǎng)的動(dòng)蕩和不確定性,從而取得更大的競(jìng)爭(zhēng)優(yōu)勢(shì)。供應(yīng)鏈中相互競(jìng)爭(zhēng)的公司,也可以通過(guò)合同的約定形成一個(gè)新的戰(zhàn)略聯(lián)盟,以滿(mǎn)足諸如擴(kuò)大市場(chǎng)份額,提高效率等戰(zhàn)略目標(biāo)。 但是為什么兩家相互競(jìng)爭(zhēng)的公司結(jié)盟,但仍然在市場(chǎng)上相互競(jìng)爭(zhēng)?比如雅虎與微軟組成聯(lián)盟,這使得雅虎可以使用微軟的搜索引擎BING做自己的搜索服務(wù),但同時(shí)他們也相互競(jìng)爭(zhēng)來(lái)推銷(xiāo)自己的搜索業(yè)務(wù)。在本文中,我們用動(dòng)態(tài)多期博弈模型來(lái)研究相在市場(chǎng)上互競(jìng)爭(zhēng)的企業(yè)之間的動(dòng)態(tài)聯(lián)盟的形成。在每一期的博弈中,都由兩個(gè)競(jìng)合博弈的階段組成。在第一階段,兩家相互競(jìng)爭(zhēng)的公司通過(guò)對(duì)合作競(jìng)爭(zhēng)聯(lián)盟的具體協(xié)議進(jìn)行談判來(lái)決定是否組成聯(lián)盟；在第二階段,市場(chǎng)當(dāng)中的所有公司都將產(chǎn)品或者是服務(wù)投入到市場(chǎng)中進(jìn)行價(jià)格競(jìng)爭(zhēng)。本文推導(dǎo)出了合作競(jìng)爭(zhēng)聯(lián)盟形成的經(jīng)濟(jì)誘因以及締約成本,提出了最優(yōu)的合作競(jìng)爭(zhēng)聯(lián)盟協(xié)議,并且討論了臨時(shí)合作競(jìng)爭(zhēng)聯(lián)盟以及延遲的合作競(jìng)爭(zhēng)聯(lián)盟這兩種聯(lián)盟策略的深層原因。 本文揭示了企業(yè)間進(jìn)行合作競(jìng)爭(zhēng)聯(lián)盟戰(zhàn)略的決策意圖,并為戰(zhàn)略決策的制定者提供了相應(yīng)的決策支持。
[Abstract]:With the arrival of economic globalization and knowledge economy, the market environment is changing rapidly. Enterprises are facing the pressure of reducing cost, shortening delivery time, improving quality and improving customer service. However, due to the limitation of resources, only to obtain external resources for our use, learn from each other and complement each other, can enhance the competitiveness of enterprises. Under this premise, supply chain alliance arises at the historic moment. With the aid of information technology, the strategic alliance of supply chain integrates two or more enterprises in the supply chain under the premise of maintaining their own independence, in order to realize the risk sharing, advantage and compensation, and then reduce the total cost of the whole supply chain. Reduce inventory level, improve customer responsiveness and customer service level, in order to create a greater competitive advantage. In the fierce market competition environment, the supply chain alliance can make the member enterprises produce synergy effect, resolve the competition conflict, promote the enterprises to learn from each other, improve the enterprise skill, improve the innovation ability of the enterprise. Enterprises can better deal with the market turbulence and uncertainty, so as to obtain a greater competitive advantage. Competing companies in the supply chain can also form a new strategic alliance through contract agreement to meet such strategic objectives as expanding market share and improving efficiency. But why are two competing companies still competing against each other in the market? Yahoo's alliance with Microsoft, for example, allows Yahoo to use Microsoft search engine ing as its own search service, but it also competes with each other to promote its search business. In this paper, we use the dynamic multi-period game model to study the formation of dynamic alliance among competing enterprises in the market. In each game, it consists of two competing stages. In the first stage, the two competing companies decide whether to form an alliance by negotiating a specific agreement on a cooperative competition alliance; in the second stage, All companies in the market put their products or services into the market for price competition. In this paper, the economic inducement and contracting cost of cooperative competition alliance are deduced, and the optimal cooperative competition alliance agreement is put forward. The paper also discusses the deep reasons of the temporary cooperative competition alliance and the delayed cooperative competition alliance. This paper reveals the decision intention of cooperation and competition alliance strategy among enterprises, and provides corresponding decision support for the decision makers.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：東北大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級(jí)別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2012
【分類(lèi)號(hào)】：F274;F273.7

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