本文選題：總承包模式 + 收益激勵(lì)�。� 參考：《南京大學(xué)》2013年碩士論文

【摘要】：工程建設(shè)項(xiàng)目是推動(dòng)國民經(jīng)濟(jì)往更高層次發(fā)展的重要源泉和動(dòng)力,深深影響著國家經(jīng)濟(jì)未來的發(fā)展速度與質(zhì)量,而工程供應(yīng)鏈上關(guān)于總包商與分包商之間的收益分配問題以及多項(xiàng)任務(wù)問協(xié)調(diào)均衡問題,是影響工程項(xiàng)目順利、高效運(yùn)行的重要因素,亟待解決。因此,建立一個(gè)高效的、能真正激勵(lì)各利益相關(guān)方的多任務(wù)收益激勵(lì)模型,從而解決工程供應(yīng)鏈上總包商與分包商之間的利益沖突關(guān)系,是十分迫切且有必要的。在國內(nèi)外有關(guān)文獻(xiàn)梳理、總結(jié)的基礎(chǔ)上,對我國當(dāng)前總承包供應(yīng)鏈上總包商與分包商合作狀況進(jìn)行深入分析,從協(xié)調(diào)均衡與收益激勵(lì)的研究角度出發(fā),以總承包工程供應(yīng)鏈上總包商與分包商為主要研究對象,利用委托代理理論及博弈論的思想,研究了工程供應(yīng)鏈上總包商與分包商之間有關(guān)利益分配以及激勵(lì)協(xié)調(diào)等問題,最終建立總承包供應(yīng)鏈上總包商對分包商關(guān)于工期和質(zhì)量的多任務(wù)激勵(lì)優(yōu)化模型。并對模型結(jié)果進(jìn)行分析,指出總包商與分包商之間多任務(wù)的收益激勵(lì)最優(yōu)合同與任務(wù)觀測結(jié)果波動(dòng)性成反比關(guān)系、與分包商的風(fēng)險(xiǎn)規(guī)避度負(fù)相關(guān)、與各自的邊際成本變化率負(fù)相關(guān),且是各項(xiàng)任務(wù)邊際成本替代率的遞減函數(shù)。委托人在得知影響因素是如何影響最優(yōu)激勵(lì)合同的基礎(chǔ)上,便可針對分包商在工期和質(zhì)量任務(wù)上設(shè)計(jì)和分配合理的激勵(lì)強(qiáng)度,使得分包商在此激勵(lì)水平下調(diào)整自身努力水平,從而可以實(shí)現(xiàn)多項(xiàng)任務(wù)之間的均衡改善,最終實(shí)現(xiàn)總承包供應(yīng)鏈上總收益的最大化。研究結(jié)果從實(shí)踐和理論上對我國建筑業(yè)以及建筑企業(yè)的健康、全面、協(xié)調(diào)及可持續(xù)發(fā)展起到了一定的指導(dǎo)作用。
[Abstract]:Engineering construction project is an important source and motive force to promote the development of the national economy to a higher level, which deeply affects the development speed and quality of the national economy in the future. In the engineering supply chain, the problem of profit distribution between the contractor and the subcontractor and the problem of coordination and equilibrium of many tasks are the important factors affecting the smooth and efficient operation of the project, which need to be solved urgently. Therefore, it is very urgent and necessary to establish an efficient multi-task income incentive model that can really motivate all stakeholders to solve the conflict of interest between the contractor and the subcontractor in the engineering supply chain. On the basis of combing and summing up the relevant literature at home and abroad, this paper makes a deep analysis of the cooperation between the general contractor and the subcontractor in our country's current general contracting supply chain, starting from the angle of coordinating equilibrium and income incentive. Taking the general contractor and subcontractor as the main research object, using the principal-agent theory and game theory, this paper studies the distribution of benefits and incentive coordination between the contractor and the subcontractor in the engineering supply chain. Finally, the multi-task incentive optimization model for duration and quality of contractor to subcontractor in general contract supply chain is established. Based on the analysis of the model results, it is pointed out that the multi-task income incentive optimal contract between the contractor and the subcontractor is inversely proportional to the volatility of the observed results, and negatively related to the risk aversion of the subcontractor. It is negatively correlated with the rate of marginal cost change and is a decreasing function of the marginal cost substitution rate of each task. On the basis of knowing how the influencing factors affect the optimal incentive contract, the principal can design and allocate reasonable incentive intensity for the subcontractor on the time limit and quality task, so that the subcontractor can adjust its level of effort under this incentive level. Thus, the equilibrium between multiple tasks can be improved, and the total income in the general contract supply chain can be maximized. The research results play a guiding role in practice and theory for the healthy, comprehensive, coordinated and sustainable development of the construction industry and construction enterprises in China.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：南京大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2013
【分類號】：F426.92
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本文編號：1825096