【摘要】：中國是世界上最大的煤炭生產(chǎn)國和煤炭消費國,同時也是煤礦安全事故死亡率最高的國家。近年來在中央政府出臺一系列煤礦安全生產(chǎn)法律法規(guī)政策的背景下,中國煤礦安全事故發(fā)生率和死亡率雖有所下降,但仍遠(yuǎn)高于世界主要產(chǎn)煤國家的礦難傷亡水平,并且重特大安全事故依然時有發(fā)生,中國煤礦安全生產(chǎn)形勢不容樂觀。同時,規(guī)制俘獲現(xiàn)象在煤礦安全規(guī)制實踐中普遍存在,是導(dǎo)致國家煤礦安全法律法規(guī)難以有效落實進(jìn)而礦難頻發(fā)的重要原因。因此立足我國具體國情,系統(tǒng)深入地研究煤礦安全規(guī)制俘獲問題,剖析其形成機(jī)理、實證研究其影響并探析其治理路徑對于防范煤礦安全規(guī)制俘獲發(fā)生,提高煤礦安全規(guī)制效果,扭轉(zhuǎn)我國嚴(yán)峻的煤礦安全生產(chǎn)形勢,促進(jìn)煤炭行業(yè)健康發(fā)展具有重要意義,這也是本文研究的根本出發(fā)點和落腳點。本文對中國煤礦安全規(guī)制俘獲問題的研究主要包括四個組成部分:第一,系統(tǒng)闡釋中國煤礦安全規(guī)制俘獲的形成機(jī)理;第二,安全規(guī)制俘獲對煤礦安全水平的影響機(jī)理與實證研究;第三,衡量和評價安全規(guī)制俘獲對煤炭行業(yè)TFP增長的影響并進(jìn)一步探討煤炭行業(yè)發(fā)展方式轉(zhuǎn)變;第四,煤礦安全規(guī)制俘獲問題的治理研究。以上四部分內(nèi)容構(gòu)成了本文四個核心章節(jié),各核心章節(jié)的主要內(nèi)容和研究結(jié)論如下:第3章借鑒Tirole(1986)提出的PSA分析框架,構(gòu)建并系統(tǒng)論述了中國煤礦安全規(guī)制實踐中存在的"中央政府(委托人)-地方政府(監(jiān)督者)-煤礦企業(yè)(代理人)"雙層委托代理結(jié)構(gòu)框架。在此基礎(chǔ)上詳細(xì)剖析了中國煤礦安全規(guī)制俘獲形成的理論機(jī)制:一方面,為了提高煤炭產(chǎn)出和增加利潤,煤礦企業(yè)缺乏激勵遵從安全規(guī)制;另一方面,在現(xiàn)有的財政分權(quán)體制和政治升遷機(jī)制下,追求經(jīng)濟(jì)利益和政治晉升利益的地方政府為了避免安全規(guī)制對地區(qū)經(jīng)濟(jì)增長、財政收入、就業(yè)人口產(chǎn)生負(fù)面沖擊,往往缺乏充分的激勵嚴(yán)格執(zhí)行煤礦安全規(guī)制。由于煤礦安全事故具有偶發(fā)性、中央與地方之間存在廣泛信息不對稱問題,加上中央政府懲罰機(jī)制不完善、新聞媒體輿論監(jiān)督乏力、礦工監(jiān)督機(jī)制缺失等外在約束弱化,于是煤礦企業(yè)與地方政府有激勵進(jìn)行合謀。煤礦企業(yè)積極進(jìn)行規(guī)制俘獲活動,向地方政府官員直接提供賄賂資金、煤礦干股等經(jīng)濟(jì)利益輸送或者利用其承擔(dān)的政策性負(fù)擔(dān)(例如促進(jìn)當(dāng)?shù)谿DP增長、貢獻(xiàn)財稅收入、吸納就業(yè)等)游說地方政府。地方政府則放松對煤礦企業(yè)開采的行政許可審批和安全生產(chǎn)日常監(jiān)管,默許縱容企業(yè)安全投入不足、進(jìn)行超設(shè)計能力和安全保障能力開采等違法違規(guī)行為,甚至在發(fā)生礦難后幫助企業(yè)隱瞞礦工傷亡情況,導(dǎo)致規(guī)制俘獲發(fā)生,各類煤礦安全事故難以有效杜絕。第4章系統(tǒng)剖析了煤礦安全規(guī)制俘獲對煤礦安全水平的影響機(jī)理,在此基礎(chǔ)上通過搜集2001-2011年中國25個主要產(chǎn)煤地區(qū)的各類礦難死亡人數(shù)數(shù)據(jù),使用專門分析非負(fù)離散型計數(shù)數(shù)據(jù)的負(fù)二項回歸方法實證研究了安全規(guī)制俘獲對礦難傷亡水平的影響,同時也檢驗了地方政府財權(quán)事權(quán)不匹配度、煤礦安全投入、礦工素質(zhì)、產(chǎn)權(quán)結(jié)構(gòu)、媒體監(jiān)督、煤礦安全監(jiān)察機(jī)構(gòu)獨立性等因素對礦難傷亡水平的影響。研究結(jié)果表明,規(guī)制俘獲對煤礦安全生產(chǎn)形勢造成了顯著負(fù)面影響,且該負(fù)面影響在煤炭產(chǎn)值占GDP比重較高的地區(qū)更加突出,而在體制環(huán)境較完善的地區(qū)得以減弱。此外,研究還發(fā)現(xiàn),縮小地方政府財權(quán)事權(quán)不匹配程度、加大煤礦安全投入、提高礦工素質(zhì)、增強(qiáng)安全監(jiān)察機(jī)構(gòu)的獨立性等均對于遏制礦難具有一定作用,而媒體輿論監(jiān)督的作用并不顯著。第5章基于方向性距離函數(shù)構(gòu)建了 Malmquist-Luenburger生產(chǎn)率指數(shù),分別對安全規(guī)制和規(guī)制俘獲兩種情形下各地區(qū)煤炭行業(yè)的TFP增長率進(jìn)行了測算和評價,并通過將生產(chǎn)率指數(shù)進(jìn)一步分解為技術(shù)進(jìn)步指數(shù)和技術(shù)效率變化指數(shù)考察推動TFP增長的主要源泉,在此基礎(chǔ)上分析了規(guī)制俘獲對煤炭行業(yè)TFP增長的影響。研究結(jié)果顯示:兩種情形下煤炭行業(yè)TFP增長均由技術(shù)進(jìn)步推動,技術(shù)效率則出現(xiàn)不同程度的惡化,利用技術(shù)效率改善來提升TFP增長率存在著較大改進(jìn)空間。東部地區(qū)煤炭行業(yè)TFP增長率普遍高于中西部地區(qū),技術(shù)進(jìn)步率的差異是導(dǎo)致區(qū)域間TFP增長差異的主要原因。與安全規(guī)制情形下TFP增長相比,規(guī)制俘獲使得煤炭行業(yè)技術(shù)進(jìn)步率提高的同時技術(shù)效率增長率下降,由于技術(shù)進(jìn)步率提高幅度大于技術(shù)效率增長率下降幅度,于是在規(guī)制俘獲情形下煤炭行業(yè)能夠?qū)崿F(xiàn)更高的TFP增長率,并且規(guī)制俘獲對中西部地區(qū)煤炭行業(yè)TFP增長的影響更大。這從宏觀層面上解釋了煤炭行業(yè)以犧牲煤礦安全換取快速發(fā)展的原因。此外,本章將TFP增長對煤炭行業(yè)增長的貢獻(xiàn)份額作為煤炭行業(yè)發(fā)展方式的衡量指標(biāo)并進(jìn)行系統(tǒng)評價,發(fā)現(xiàn)TFP增長對煤炭行業(yè)增長的貢獻(xiàn)份額平均僅有33.41%,遠(yuǎn)低于資本和勞動投入的貢獻(xiàn)份額。表明煤炭行業(yè)發(fā)展過分依賴資本、勞動等要素投入,TFP增長的作用十分有限,煤炭行業(yè)發(fā)展方式呈現(xiàn)出"高投入、高事故率、低效率"的粗放和外延型特征,煤炭行業(yè)轉(zhuǎn)變發(fā)展方式、提升發(fā)展質(zhì)量勢在必行。據(jù)此本章進(jìn)一步探析了煤炭行業(yè)轉(zhuǎn)變發(fā)展方式的實現(xiàn)路徑,為煤炭行業(yè)實現(xiàn)安全高效可持續(xù)發(fā)展提出具有針對性的政策建議。第6章分析了煤礦安全監(jiān)察機(jī)構(gòu)獨立性提高和安全規(guī)制周期對煤礦安全規(guī)制俘獲的影響機(jī)理并提出研究假說,基于2001年1月至2010年8月期間的相關(guān)月度數(shù)據(jù),使用馬爾科夫區(qū)制轉(zhuǎn)換向量自回歸模型(MS-VAR)進(jìn)行實證研究發(fā)現(xiàn):(1)煤礦安全監(jiān)察機(jī)構(gòu)獨立性增強(qiáng)有助于降低規(guī)制俘獲發(fā)生概率,表現(xiàn)為規(guī)制波動水平出現(xiàn)了結(jié)構(gòu)性變化,由高規(guī)制波動狀態(tài)向低規(guī)制波動狀態(tài)轉(zhuǎn)變,波動幅度明顯下降,在一定程度上提高了煤礦安全規(guī)制效果。(2)安全規(guī)制周期對煤礦安全生產(chǎn)水平產(chǎn)生了周期性影響,表現(xiàn)在全國"兩會"、黨代會、春節(jié)等對安全事故較為敏感的特殊時期,礦難發(fā)生起數(shù)和傷亡人數(shù)顯著下降。煤礦安全水平的提高并非通過減少煤炭產(chǎn)量實現(xiàn),而是地方政府強(qiáng)化安全規(guī)制執(zhí)法的結(jié)果,表明安全規(guī)制周期能夠周期性地影響規(guī)制俘獲發(fā)生概率。最后借鑒美國煤礦安全規(guī)制經(jīng)驗,從安全規(guī)制職能重配與機(jī)構(gòu)調(diào)整、安全規(guī)制機(jī)構(gòu)人員異地交流、安全規(guī)制信息公開、安全規(guī)制模式轉(zhuǎn)變四個方面進(jìn)一步探尋防范煤礦安全規(guī)制俘獲問題、促進(jìn)煤礦安全水平提高的長效機(jī)制。本文可能的創(chuàng)新點主要體現(xiàn)在:(1)以新規(guī)制經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)的規(guī)制俘獲理論為理論基礎(chǔ),結(jié)合轉(zhuǎn)型期中國具體國情,對中國煤礦安全規(guī)制俘獲的形成機(jī)理、影響與治理展開了系統(tǒng)研究,在一定程度上豐富了發(fā)展中國家社會性規(guī)制領(lǐng)域中規(guī)制俘獲問題研究。(2)根據(jù)國家安全生產(chǎn)監(jiān)督管理局網(wǎng)站手工搜集整理了主要產(chǎn)煤地區(qū)的礦難死亡人數(shù)(含失蹤人數(shù))數(shù)據(jù),實證研究了規(guī)制俘獲對煤礦安全水平產(chǎn)生的影響,并進(jìn)一步探討了這一影響在煤炭產(chǎn)值占GDP比重不同的地區(qū)以及制度環(huán)境不同地區(qū)之間存在的差異情況。此外檢驗了已有文獻(xiàn)關(guān)于礦難頻發(fā)的多個理論假說,為解答中國礦難頻發(fā)之謎提供了實證依據(jù)。(3)嘗試將Malmquist-Luenberger生產(chǎn)率指數(shù)應(yīng)用于煤炭行業(yè)TFP增長研究,通過設(shè)定不同方向性距離函數(shù)構(gòu)建Malmquist-Luenberger生產(chǎn)率指數(shù),測算和評價了安全規(guī)制和規(guī)制俘獲兩種情形下各地區(qū)煤炭行業(yè)的TFP增長率以及技術(shù)進(jìn)步率和技術(shù)效率增長率,并對煤炭行業(yè)發(fā)展方式進(jìn)行了考察。(4)使用MS-VAR模型刻畫了中國煤礦安全規(guī)制體制改革背景下規(guī)制波動存在的結(jié)構(gòu)性變化,檢驗了煤礦安全監(jiān)察機(jī)構(gòu)獨立性提高對于防范規(guī)制俘獲的作用,同時分析了安全規(guī)制周期對規(guī)制俘獲產(chǎn)生的周期性影響。此外,本文提出了一套規(guī)制俘獲治理方案,包括規(guī)制職能重配與機(jī)構(gòu)調(diào)整、規(guī)制機(jī)構(gòu)人員異地交流、規(guī)制信息公開、規(guī)制模式轉(zhuǎn)變四個方面。
[Abstract]:China is the largest coal producer and consumer country in the world, and it is also the country with the highest mortality rate in coal mine safety accidents. In recent years, in the context of a series of coal mine safety laws and regulations issued by the central government, the incidence and mortality of coal mine safety accidents in China have declined, but it is still far higher than the main coal production in the world. The level of casualties in the country and the serious accidents still occur. The situation of the safety production in China's coal mines is not optimistic. At the same time, the phenomenon of regulation capture is common in the practice of coal mine safety regulation, which is an important reason that causes the national coal mine safety laws and regulations to be difficult to be effectively implemented in the coal mine. Therefore, it is based on our country. It is of great significance to systematically study the capture of coal mine safety regulation, analyze its formation mechanism, and study its influence and explore its management path to prevent the coal mine safety regulation capture, improve the effect of coal mine safety regulation, reverse the serious production potential of coal mine and promote the healthy development of the coal industry. This is also the fundamental starting point and the foothold of this paper. The research on the capture of coal mine safety regulation in China mainly consists of four parts: first, it systematically explains the formation mechanism of the capture of coal mine safety regulation in China; second, the mechanism and Empirical Study of the impact of the safety regulation capture on the safety of coal mine; third, measurement and evaluation. The impact of the price safety regulation capture on the TFP growth of the coal industry and further discuss the transformation of the coal industry development mode; fourth, the research on the governance of the coal mine safety regulation capture problem. The above four parts constitute the four core chapters of this paper, the main contents of the core chapters and the research conclusions are as follows: the third chapter draws on the PS proposed by (1986). A analysis framework, construction and systematic exposition of the Chinese coal mine safety regulation practice in the practice of "central government (principal) - local government (supervisor) - coal mine enterprise (agent)" double decker agency framework. On this basis, the theoretical mechanism of the formation of coal mine safety rules in China is analyzed in detail: on the one hand, in order to improve coal production On the other hand, under the existing fiscal decentralization system and political promotion mechanism, local governments, in the current fiscal decentralization and political promotion mechanism, have a negative impact on regional economic growth, financial income and employment, and often lack full excitation. Because of the occasional occurrence of coal mine safety accidents, there is a widespread information asymmetry between the central and local areas, the central government's punishment mechanism is not perfect, the supervision of the press media is weak, the miner supervision mechanism is weak, and the coal mining enterprises and local governments are encouraged to cooperate. Coal mining enterprises actively regulate capture activities, direct local government officials to provide direct bribery funds, coal mine dry stocks and other economic benefits to transport or use the policy burden (such as promoting local GDP growth, contributing financial and tax revenue, absorbing employment, etc.) to lobby local governments. Local governments relax the administration of mining enterprises. License approval and daily safety production supervision, acquiesce to indulge inadequacy of enterprise safety input, carry out illegal activities such as super design ability and safety protection ability, and even help enterprises to hide miners' casualties after the occurrence of mine disaster, which leads to the occurrence of regulation capture, and the fourth chapters are systematically dissecting. The influence mechanism of coal mine safety regulation capture on the safety level of coal mine is carried out. On this basis, by collecting data of all kinds of mine disaster deaths in 25 major coal producing areas in China for 2001-2011 years, the influence of safety regulation capture on the casualty level of mine disaster is empirically studied by using the negative two regression methods that specializes in the analysis of non negative discrete count data. The influence of local government financial power mismatch, coal mine safety input, miner quality, property right structure, media supervision, and the independence of coal mine safety supervision organization on the casualty level of mine disaster. The results show that the regulation capture has a significant negative impact on the coal mine safety production situation, and the negative effect is in coal production. The areas with higher proportion of GDP are more prominent, and the areas with more perfect institutional environment have been weakened. In addition, the study also found that reducing the degree of mismatch between the power of the local government, increasing the safety input of the coal mine, improving the quality of the miners, and strengthening the independence of the safety supervision organization have a certain effect on the containment of the mine disaster, and the media public opinion The role of supervision is not significant. In the fifth chapter, the Malmquist-Luenburger productivity index is constructed based on the directional distance function, and the TFP growth rate of the coal industry in each region is calculated and evaluated respectively under the two situations of safety regulation and regulation capture, and the productivity index is decomposed into technical progress index and technical efficiency by one step. The main source of TFP growth is examined by the change index. On this basis, the effect of regulation capture on the growth of TFP in the coal industry is analyzed. The results show that the growth of TFP in the coal industry is promoted by the technological progress in the two cases, and the technical efficiency is deteriorated in different degrees. The improvement of the technology efficiency improves the growth rate of the TFP. The TFP growth rate of the coal industry in the eastern region is generally higher than that in the central and western regions. The difference in the rate of technological progress is the main reason for the difference in the growth of TFP between regions. Compared with the TFP growth under the safety regulation, the regulation capture makes the technological progress rate of the coal industry improve at the same time, and the technological progress is reduced, because of the technological progress. The rate of increase is greater than the decline in the growth rate of technical efficiency, so the coal industry can achieve a higher TFP growth rate under the regulation of capture, and the regulation capture has a greater impact on the TFP growth of the coal industry in the central and western regions. This explains the reasons for the rapid development of coal industry in exchange for coal mine safety. In addition, this chapter takes the contribution share of TFP growth to the coal industry growth as a measure index of the coal industry development mode and carries out systematic evaluation. It is found that the share of the contribution of TFP growth to the coal industry growth is only 33.41%, far below the contribution share of capital and labor input. The role of TFP growth is very limited. The development mode of coal industry presents the extensive and extensive features of "high investment, high accident rate and low efficiency". It is imperative for the coal industry to change the way of development and improve the quality of development. Accordingly, this chapter further probes into the way to realize the transformation of the coal industry and realize the safety of the coal industry. The sixth chapter analyzes the influence mechanism of the independent improvement of the coal mine safety supervision organization and the safety regulation cycle on the capture of the coal mine safety regulation and puts forward the research hypothesis. Based on the relative monthly degree of the period from January 2001 to August 2010, the Markoff region system is used to transform the vector self back. The empirical study of the return model (MS-VAR) shows that: (1) the enhancement of the independence of the coal mine safety supervision organization helps to reduce the probability of the regulation capture, showing the structural changes in the regulation fluctuation level, the change from the high regulation fluctuation to the low regulation and the fluctuation range, and to a certain extent, the coal mine safety regulations have been improved. (2) the cycle of safety regulation has a periodic effect on the safety production level of coal mine, which is manifested in the special period of "two meetings", the Party Congress, the Spring Festival and other sensitive accidents. The number of mine accidents and the number of casualties have decreased significantly. The elevation of the safety level of the coal mine is not realized by reducing the coal production, but the local government. The result of strengthening the law enforcement of safety regulation indicates that the cycle of safety regulation can affect the probability of regulation capture periodically. In the end, we learn from the experience of the coal mine safety regulation in the United States, from four aspects: the redistribution of the safety regulation function and the institutional adjustment, the exchange of the personnel in the safety regulation institution, the disclosure of safety regulation and the change of the safety regulation mode. The possible innovation points of this paper are as follows: (1) based on the theory of regulation capture of new regulation economics and the specific national conditions in China, the formation mechanism of coal mine safety regulation, influence and governance of coal mine safety regulation are carried out. Systematic research, to a certain extent, enriches the study of regulation capture in the field of social regulation in developing countries. (2) according to the website of the national safety production supervision and Administration Bureau, the data of the number of dead people (including the missing persons) in the main coal producing areas are collected and collated, and the shadow of the regulation capture to the safety level of the coal mines is studied. Sound, and further discuss the difference between the areas with different coal production value in GDP proportion and the different areas of the system environment. In addition, the existing literature on the multiple theoretical hypotheses about the frequent occurrence of mine disaster has been tested to provide evidence for solving the riddle of China's frequent mining difficulties. (3) try to produce Malmquist-Luenberger. The rate index is applied to the TFP growth research in the coal industry. By setting up the different directional distance function to construct the Malmquist-Luenberger productivity index, the TFP growth rate, the technological progress rate and the technological efficiency growth rate of the coal industry in each area under the two situations of safety regulation and regulation capture are calculated and evaluated, and the development mode of the coal industry is also made. (4) (4) using the model to describe the structural changes of regulation fluctuation in the background of the reform of China's coal mine safety regulation system, the role of the independent improvement of the coal mine safety supervision institution to prevent the capture of regulation is examined, and the periodic effect of the safety regulation cycle on the regulation capture is also analyzed. A set of regulations on the regulation of captive governance has been developed, including four aspects: regulation function redistribution and institutional adjustment, regulatory agency personnel exchange, regulation information disclosure, and regulation mode transformation.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：東北財經(jīng)大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級別】：博士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2016
【分類號】：TD79

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