【摘要】：我國非煤礦山事故量雖然穩(wěn)中有降,但重大事故時有發(fā)生,安全生產(chǎn)形勢依然嚴峻。安全生產(chǎn)監(jiān)管的低能效是重要原因之一。造成這種狀況的主要原因在于非煤礦山安全生產(chǎn)監(jiān)管體制涉及的相關方之間的利益目標不一致,導致利益沖突。各相關方為了各自的利益相互博弈,這不免會對安全生產(chǎn)監(jiān)管產(chǎn)生消極的影響�；诖吮尘�,本文以博弈論和演化博弈論作為分析工具針對非煤礦山安全監(jiān)管問題進行研究討論,旨在揭示非煤礦山安全監(jiān)管低效率的原因,為提高非煤礦山安全監(jiān)管能效提供有效的對策。 本文首先分析我國非煤礦山安全監(jiān)管現(xiàn)狀,提出目前我國安全監(jiān)管體制存在的問題。論證安全監(jiān)管的理論依據(jù)：外部性,信息不對稱,社會責任缺失等。其次根據(jù)我國現(xiàn)行的非煤礦山安全監(jiān)管體制的實際情況構建了政府-非煤礦山企業(yè)的博弈和演化博弈模型,并分別討論了一般和存在尋租的情況。通過求解納什均衡,復制動態(tài)方程和演化博弈均衡對結果進行了討論和分析。然后對礦山企業(yè)內部的安全激勵措施構建了博弈模型,對礦山職工之間的安全行為進行了博弈仿真。最后提出了提高我國非煤礦山安全監(jiān)管體制的若干對策和建議。 本文提供了解決目前非煤礦山安全監(jiān)管問題的一種思路,探尋適用于我國非煤礦山安全監(jiān)管體系的機制。 本文的主要創(chuàng)新在于：運用博弈論和演化博弈論討論了存在尋租條件下的政府和礦山企業(yè)安全監(jiān)管博弈；運用博弈論,結合委托代理理論對礦山企業(yè)內部安全激勵進行分析；運用多主體仿真軟件對礦山職工的安全生產(chǎn)行為的演化進行仿真。
[Abstract]:Although the number of accidents in non-coal mines in China is decreasing steadily, major accidents occur from time to time, and the situation of safety in production is still grim. Low energy efficiency in production safety regulation is one of the important reasons. The main reason for this situation lies in the conflict of interest between the related parties involved in the supervision system of non-coal mine safety production. The parties play games for their own interests, which will inevitably have a negative impact on the supervision of production safety. Based on this background, this paper uses game theory and evolutionary game theory as analysis tools to study and discuss the safety supervision of non-coal mines, in order to reveal the reasons for the low efficiency of safety supervision in non-coal mines. It provides effective countermeasures for improving safety supervision and energy efficiency of non-coal mines. This paper first analyzes the present situation of safety supervision in non-coal mines in China, and puts forward the problems existing in the safety supervision system of our country at present. Demonstrate the theoretical basis of safety supervision: externality, information asymmetry, lack of social responsibility and so on. Secondly, according to the actual situation of the current safety supervision system of non-coal mines in China, the game and evolution game models of government-non-coal mining enterprises are constructed, and the general and existing rent-seeking situations are discussed respectively. The results are discussed and analyzed by solving Nash equilibrium, replicating dynamic equation and evolutionary game equilibrium. Then the game model is constructed for the safety incentive measures in the mine enterprises, and the game simulation of the safety behavior among the mine workers is carried out. Finally, some countermeasures and suggestions for improving the safety supervision system of non-coal mines in China are put forward. This paper provides a way to solve the problem of safety supervision in non-coal mines at present and explores the mechanism suitable for the safety supervision system of non-coal mines in China. The main innovations of this paper are as follows: the game theory and evolutionary game theory are used to discuss the safety supervision game between government and mine enterprise under the condition of rent-seeking, and the internal safety incentive of mine enterprise is analyzed by using game theory and principal-agent theory. The multi-agent simulation software is used to simulate the evolution of safety production behavior of mine workers.
【學位授予單位】：昆明理工大學
【學位級別】：碩士
【學位授予年份】：2013
【分類號】：TD77

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相關期刊論文 前1條

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本文編號：2284619