【摘要】：政府在政府主導(dǎo)型產(chǎn)業(yè)集群的形成與演變過程中處于主導(dǎo)地位，其政策扶持是產(chǎn)業(yè)集群發(fā)展的制度保障，可彌補產(chǎn)業(yè)集群的市場失靈和制度失效，使其發(fā)展步入正軌。研究政府在此類型產(chǎn)業(yè)集群中的定位與角色就十分重要。論文采用理論與實證研究相結(jié)合的方法，從政府主導(dǎo)的視角探索其形成動力與演進機理與作用，以及輔助集群發(fā)展等方面，分析與揭示了產(chǎn)業(yè)集群的發(fā)展的關(guān)鍵性問題，以期建立新的產(chǎn)業(yè)集群理論，豐富相關(guān)學(xué)科理論，為區(qū)域經(jīng)濟及地方產(chǎn)業(yè)集群的生態(tài)化發(fā)展提供理論支持與實踐參考。 在相關(guān)理論分析基礎(chǔ)上，探討了政府主導(dǎo)型產(chǎn)業(yè)集群的形成機理，重點從成本效益視角分析了政府主導(dǎo)型產(chǎn)業(yè)集群形成動力，建立了政府主導(dǎo)型產(chǎn)業(yè)集群形成的理論模型。博弈模型分析研究表明，政府對產(chǎn)業(yè)集群的形成應(yīng)采取適度的支持力度，政府對傳統(tǒng)企業(yè)征收的額外稅率應(yīng)當小于傳統(tǒng)企業(yè)從產(chǎn)業(yè)集群產(chǎn)生的外部經(jīng)濟所帶來的額外收益率，借此實現(xiàn)產(chǎn)業(yè)集群企業(yè)、傳統(tǒng)企業(yè)和政府“三贏”局面。 基于自組織理論分析了政府主導(dǎo)型產(chǎn)業(yè)集群演進機理。通過自組織演進模型分析表明，政府主導(dǎo)型產(chǎn)業(yè)集群系統(tǒng)，其演進方向存在多種可能性，是一種復(fù)雜的非線性關(guān)系，存在協(xié)同效應(yīng)。同時借鑒Logistic模型，研究了政府主導(dǎo)型產(chǎn)業(yè)集群內(nèi)共生的穩(wěn)定性，討論了政府主導(dǎo)型產(chǎn)業(yè)集群的結(jié)構(gòu)模式的穩(wěn)定性，以及政府主導(dǎo)型產(chǎn)業(yè)集群演進模式的穩(wěn)定性條件。 最后，基于GEMS模型對政府主導(dǎo)型產(chǎn)業(yè)集群演進影響因素進行識別，通過構(gòu)建相互關(guān)聯(lián)的因素對，運用數(shù)學(xué)手段，對績效水平進行量化。政府主導(dǎo)型產(chǎn)業(yè)集群演進影響因素的識別研究成果，將為后文的評價與實證研究提供基礎(chǔ)，擴展與改進原來的GEM模型，使其更加能夠全面、準確地解析政府主導(dǎo)型產(chǎn)業(yè)集群演進的影響因素。 論文提出了政府主導(dǎo)型產(chǎn)業(yè)集群的績效評價體系。在國內(nèi)外文獻資料分析的基礎(chǔ)上，通過專家咨詢，剔除部分高度相關(guān)的指標，經(jīng)過系列的優(yōu)化篩選，確定了指標體系�；贕EMS模型的4個因素，篩選了頻率較高、影響較大的36個影響指標，構(gòu)成了政府主導(dǎo)型產(chǎn)業(yè)集群的績效評價指標體系。提出并且構(gòu)建政府主導(dǎo)型產(chǎn)業(yè)集群的評價模型，，分析基于G1-離差最大化的組合賦權(quán)法和GEMS模型的量化評價過程。 在實證研究中，探討了政府主導(dǎo)對湖南工程機械產(chǎn)業(yè)集群的影響。湖南工程機械產(chǎn)業(yè)集群的研究結(jié)果表明，其產(chǎn)業(yè)集群得分386分，說明湖南省工程機械產(chǎn)業(yè)集群處于全國上游水平，并且對影響集群的四大要素進行具體分析。通過分析湖南省2003年至2010年支持產(chǎn)業(yè)集群發(fā)展的稅費優(yōu)惠實證狀況，說明政府對產(chǎn)業(yè)集群采取的支持政策的確能夠促進產(chǎn)業(yè)集群的發(fā)展，即政府對產(chǎn)業(yè)集群所采取的支持策略是可行的。 提出了優(yōu)化政府主導(dǎo)型產(chǎn)業(yè)集群發(fā)展的對策。基于政府在產(chǎn)業(yè)集群發(fā)展中的角色定位，提出了基于演進階段的政府主導(dǎo)型產(chǎn)業(yè)集群政策措施，探討了優(yōu)化政府主導(dǎo)型產(chǎn)業(yè)集群發(fā)展的路徑選擇，豐富對分工協(xié)作制的理解，并提出促使產(chǎn)業(yè)集群更好發(fā)展的路徑。 論文參考了產(chǎn)業(yè)集聚理論和系統(tǒng)動力學(xué)理論等理論，通過博弈模型的分析，對政府支持產(chǎn)業(yè)集群力度有了清晰的解析，有助于政府采取適當?shù)拇胧�，積極有效地消除市場失靈的影響，增進各方面利益，促進產(chǎn)業(yè)集群健康發(fā)展，為經(jīng)濟又好又快發(fā)展服務(wù)。這些學(xué)科的交叉融合與綜合研究與應(yīng)用，系統(tǒng)地研究了我國產(chǎn)業(yè)集群的演進動力機制。研究工作有助于豐富和發(fā)展產(chǎn)業(yè)集群理論，促進其與相關(guān)學(xué)科的交叉融合。
[Abstract]:Government plays a leading role in the formation and evolution of government-led industrial clusters. Its policy support is the institutional guarantee for the development of industrial clusters. It can make up for the market failure and institutional failure of industrial clusters and make their development on the right track. Combining theory with empirical research, this paper analyzes and reveals the key problems in the development of industrial clusters from the perspective of government-led and explores the formation and evolution mechanism and function, as well as the auxiliary cluster development, in order to establish a new theory of industrial clusters, enrich the theory of related disciplines, and serve as regional economic and local industrial clusters. It provides theoretical support and practical reference for ecological development.
On the basis of relevant theoretical analysis, this paper probes into the formation mechanism of government-led industrial clusters, emphatically analyzes the formation motivation of government-led industrial clusters from the perspective of cost-effectiveness, and establishes a theoretical model for the formation of government-led industrial clusters. In order to achieve the "win-win" situation of industrial cluster enterprises, traditional enterprises and the government, the extra tax rate imposed by the government on traditional enterprises should be less than the extra rate of return brought by the external economy generated by traditional enterprises from industrial clusters.
The evolution mechanism of government-led industrial clusters is analyzed based on the self-organization theory. The analysis of self-organization evolution model shows that there are many possibilities for the evolution direction of government-led industrial clusters, which is a complex nonlinear relationship and has synergistic effect. The stability of internal symbiosis is discussed. The stability of the structural model of government-led industrial clusters and the stability conditions of the evolution model of government-led industrial clusters are discussed.
Finally, based on the GEMS model, this paper identifies the influencing factors of the evolution of the government-led industrial clusters, and quantifies the performance level by constructing interrelated factors and using mathematical methods. The original GEM model makes it more comprehensive and accurate to analyze the influencing factors of the evolution of government-led industrial clusters.
Based on the analysis of domestic and foreign literatures, some highly relevant indexes are eliminated through expert consultation, and the index system is determined through a series of optimization and screening. The performance evaluation index system of government-led industrial clusters is established. The evaluation model of government-led industrial clusters is proposed and constructed. The quantitative evaluation process based on G1-deviation maximization combination weighting method and GEMS model is analyzed.
In the empirical study, this paper discusses the influence of government-led on Hunan construction machinery industrial cluster. The result of Hunan construction machinery industrial cluster shows that the industrial cluster scores 386 points, which indicates that Hunan construction machinery industrial cluster is in the upstream level of the whole country, and makes a concrete analysis of the four major factors affecting the cluster. The empirical results of tax preferences for supporting the development of industrial clusters in Southern China from 2003 to 2010 show that the government's supporting policies can promote the development of industrial clusters, that is, the government's supporting strategies for industrial clusters are feasible.
Based on the role of government in the development of industrial clusters, this paper puts forward the policy measures of government-led industrial clusters based on the evolutionary stage, explores the path selection of optimizing the development of government-led industrial clusters, enriches the understanding of division of labor and cooperation system, and advances the suggestion of promoting industry. The path of better development of clusters.
This paper refers to the theories of industrial agglomeration and system dynamics, and makes a clear analysis of the strength of government support for industrial clusters through the analysis of game model. It is helpful for the government to take appropriate measures to eliminate the impact of market failure actively and effectively, to enhance the interests of all aspects, to promote the healthy development of industrial clusters, and to make the economy better. The interdisciplinary integration and comprehensive research and application of these disciplines have systematically studied the dynamic mechanism of the evolution of industrial clusters in China.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：湖南大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級別】：博士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2013
【分類號】：F279.2;F124

【參考文獻】

相關(guān)期刊論文 前10條

1 王雷;中國產(chǎn)業(yè)集群理論研究評述[J];重慶工商大學(xué)學(xué)報(社會科學(xué)版);2004年02期

2 竇虎;;基于產(chǎn)業(yè)集群發(fā)展的政府政策研究[J];東岳論叢;2005年05期

3 胡宇橙;王慶生;;基于GEM模型的旅游產(chǎn)業(yè)集群競爭力研究——以天津濱海新區(qū)為例[J];地域研究與開發(fā);2010年05期

4 魏守華,石碧華;論企業(yè)集群的競爭優(yōu)勢[J];中國工業(yè)經(jīng)濟;2002年01期

5 王緝慈;地方產(chǎn)業(yè)群戰(zhàn)略[J];中國工業(yè)經(jīng)濟;2002年03期

6 蔡寧,吳結(jié)兵;企業(yè)集群的競爭優(yōu)勢:資源的結(jié)構(gòu)性整合[J];中國工業(yè)經(jīng)濟;2002年07期

7 符正平;論企業(yè)集群的產(chǎn)生條件與形成機制[J];中國工業(yè)經(jīng)濟;2002年10期

8 金碚;企業(yè)競爭力測評的理論與方法[J];中國工業(yè)經(jīng)濟;2003年03期

9 陳佳貴,王欽;中國產(chǎn)業(yè)集群可持續(xù)發(fā)展與公共政策選擇[J];中國工業(yè)經(jīng)濟;2005年09期

10 綦良群;高新技術(shù)產(chǎn)業(yè)及其產(chǎn)業(yè)化系統(tǒng)的特征分析[J];工業(yè)技術(shù)經(jīng)濟;2005年02期

本文編號：2244661