【摘要】：本文使用1998-2007年中國工業(yè)企業(yè)數(shù)據(jù)庫和地級市宏觀數(shù)據(jù)考察地方政府競爭對資源配置效率的影響。為此，本文首先比較了4種不同的生產(chǎn)率分解方法，，并從中選擇了動態(tài)OP分解法將資源配置效率從總生產(chǎn)率中分解出來。分解結(jié)果表明,盡管各層面總生產(chǎn)率都在持續(xù)提高，但中西部地區(qū)的資源配置效率的變動從2003開始一直為負(fù)，其幅度足以導(dǎo)致全國總資源配置效率降低。此外，2002年以后，相比于非國有企業(yè)，國有企業(yè)的資源配置效率下降得更快，特別是中西部地區(qū)；而一直不出口企業(yè)的配置效率下降則要快于出口企業(yè)。接下來,本文參考傅勇和張晏（2007）選取了外資企業(yè)的相對稅率作為地方政府競爭指標(biāo),以考察地方政府競爭對企業(yè)資源配置效率的影響。全樣本回歸表明，地方政府競爭有利于提高資源配置效率。為了尋找地方政府競爭與市場競爭的關(guān)系，本文將樣本分為高市場化組和低市場化組，并分別進行回歸。結(jié)果表明，在低市場化組地方政府競爭更強，且對資源配置效率的作用更大；而高市場化組中兩者關(guān)系不顯著。因此，本文認(rèn)為，中央政府有必要更加細致地在放權(quán)和集權(quán)中權(quán)衡。較為理想的方式是對東部適當(dāng)收回財權(quán)，而對中西部仍以放權(quán)和鼓勵競爭為主。這樣既可以提高資源配置效率，也有利于通過二次分配縮小貧富差距。
[Abstract]:In this paper, the effects of local government competition on the efficiency of resource allocation are investigated by using the database of Chinese industrial enterprises and macro-data of prefecture-level cities from 1998 to 2007. Therefore, this paper first compares four different methods of productivity decomposition, and chooses dynamic OP decomposition method to decompose resource allocation efficiency from total productivity. The results of decomposition show that although the total productivity of all levels is increasing continuously, the change of resource allocation efficiency in the central and western regions has been negative since 2003, which is enough to reduce the total resource allocation efficiency of the whole country. In addition, after 2002, compared with the non-state-owned enterprises, the resource allocation efficiency of state-owned enterprises declined more rapidly, especially in the central and western regions, while the allocation efficiency of non-export enterprises declined faster than that of export enterprises. Then, referring to Fu Yong and Zhang Yan (2007), this paper selects the relative tax rate of foreign-funded enterprises as the index of local government competition, in order to investigate the influence of local government competition on the efficiency of enterprise resource allocation. The whole sample regression shows that local government competition is beneficial to improve the efficiency of resource allocation. In order to find out the relationship between local government competition and market competition, the sample is divided into high marketization group and low market-oriented group, and regression is carried out respectively. The results show that the competition of local government is stronger and the effect on resource allocation efficiency is greater in the low marketization group, but the relationship between the two is not significant in the high marketization group. Therefore, it is necessary for the central government to balance decentralization and centralization more carefully. The ideal way is to recover the right to finance in the east, while to give priority to the central and western regions by devolving power and encouraging competition. This can not only improve the efficiency of resource allocation, but also help to narrow the gap between rich and poor through secondary distribution.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：湘潭大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2013
【分類號】：D630;F127;F205

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