本文選題：國有壟斷行業(yè) + 利潤共享�。� 參考：《山東大學》2013年博士論文

【摘要】：目前我國的國民收入分配問題,已成為改革進程中亟待解決的問題之一。收入分配不僅關(guān)乎公眾的個人生活,同時與社會穩(wěn)定和國家的命運前途,有著密切的關(guān)聯(lián),因而受到經(jīng)濟學家的高度重視和社會公眾的普遍關(guān)注。 在目前存在的我國國民收入分配的諸多問題中,國有壟斷行業(yè)因其壟斷性質(zhì)所獲得遠遠高于社會平均水平的高收入,成為人們對于國民收入分配問題關(guān)注的焦點。部分國有壟斷行業(yè)憑借國家賦予的壟斷地位,通過無償或低價使用國家資源、獨家壟斷經(jīng)營等方式,獲得了巨額的壟斷利潤。具有全民所有制性質(zhì)的國有壟斷行業(yè)的企業(yè)并沒有將這部分巨額壟斷利潤惠及全民,用以改善全體人民的社會福利,而是“內(nèi)部人所得而私”,將本應屬于全民的財富內(nèi)化為企業(yè)內(nèi)部的私利,引發(fā)了社會對國有壟斷行業(yè)收入分配制度的強烈不滿。 這一現(xiàn)象的存在所涉及到的核心問題--是我國國有壟斷行業(yè)的收入分配的機制問題。從目前的研究現(xiàn)狀看,對部分國有壟斷行業(yè)收入畸高問題的研究,主要以實證分析為主,研究停留在表層,沒有融入系統(tǒng)的理論框架�！八姓呷蔽弧�、“缺乏政府監(jiān)管”等因素雖然可以部分地解釋壟斷行業(yè)高收入的現(xiàn)象,但這樣的分析沒有真正觸及這一問題的內(nèi)部根源和內(nèi)部形成機制,由于缺乏規(guī)范的分析框架和深入的理論基礎(chǔ),因而研究中存在著缺乏理論性、系統(tǒng)性的不足。 本文以我國國有壟斷行業(yè)收入分配機制作為主要研究對象。我們首先考慮到將壟斷行業(yè)收入分配問題的形成過程稱之為一種“機制”,這就表明這一問題的研究是一個由眾多相互因素共同作用的系統(tǒng)工程。而同時,這種“機制”并不是靜態(tài)不變的,而是呈現(xiàn)出不斷動態(tài)變化和發(fā)展的趨勢。這種“機制”涉及到相互聯(lián)系的方方面面,呈現(xiàn)出復雜的相互制約、相互作用的關(guān)系。因此本文的研究著力于對于這種“機制”的全面剖析和把握,因而與以往重“實證”的研究方法相比,具有方法論上的創(chuàng)新意義。 作為一個“機制”研究,我們有意識、有目的地將研究的觸角深入到“國有壟斷行業(yè)(企業(yè))”這種經(jīng)濟運行方式深層關(guān)系中的方方面面。為實現(xiàn)這個目的,我們首先建立了一個區(qū)分國有經(jīng)濟-非國有經(jīng)濟,以及壟斷-非壟斷的理論框架模型；在上述框架的基礎(chǔ)上,通過比較研究的方式,系統(tǒng)地闡述了壟斷行業(yè)內(nèi)部的收入分配機制。在我們的模型中,包含了影響壟斷行業(yè)內(nèi)部收入分配的各種因素及其對壟斷收入所起作用的比重,這些因素在所有制分割和市場結(jié)構(gòu)分割的大背景下,會通過不同的方式對最后的分配結(jié)果產(chǎn)生影響。在對壟斷行業(yè)收入分配產(chǎn)生影響的因素中,我們重點研究了行業(yè)壟斷因索和所有制因素對行業(yè)收入的決定作用,特別是二者的交互作用,這在以往的研究中是被忽視的。為了證明我們的結(jié)論,論文建立了一個包含勞動力特征、企業(yè)特征、市場特征等控制變量的工資方程,利用個體微觀數(shù)據(jù)考察各種因素對于企業(yè)職工收入的綜合影響作用和它們對收入的交互作用。 為了更加深刻和透徹地展現(xiàn)這一問題,在理論分析的基礎(chǔ)上,我們采用了多種數(shù)理模型和討量實證方法。為了區(qū)分國有經(jīng)濟和非國有經(jīng)濟的不同的分配機制,論文分別對其建立了“利潤共享模型”和“勞資談判模型”,利用前者,可以揭示國有壟斷企業(yè)勞動者、經(jīng)理人以及政府共同分享企業(yè)利潤的過程,三者均可以按照一定的比例實現(xiàn)對于企業(yè)利潤的分享；利用后者,可以全面地模擬在非國有企業(yè)中勞資之問相互博弈過程,博弈過程將會形成市場均衡工資。另外,論文通過分位數(shù)回歸和Blinder-Oaxaca分解測算了壟斷行業(yè)和其他行業(yè)收入差距中不合理因素的比例,按照我們的計算,兩者之間的收入差距至少有55%是是不合理的。最后,論文利用目前較為前沿的時變彈性生產(chǎn)函數(shù)模型和Profile半?yún)?shù)估計方法建立了一個測算企業(yè)分紅比例的模型,并通過模型對部分壟斷企業(yè)應繳的紅利進行測算,測算出不同企業(yè)在不同盈利狀況下的應繳紅利的比例和數(shù)額。通過數(shù)理模型和實證分析的方法,實現(xiàn)在系統(tǒng)的理論框架內(nèi),全面研究和清晰揭示影響壟斷行業(yè)內(nèi)部分配的系統(tǒng)“機制”,不僅具有對問題展示的直觀性,而且具有科學性。 同樣作為一個“機制”研究,我們宏觀地注意到,國有壟斷行業(yè)高收入不僅僅是一個經(jīng)濟學領(lǐng)域的問題,還是一個歷史問題,同時也是一個政治問題。因此,對于這一問題的研究,需要從多個學科角度、多個維度上可以把握,并將它們有機地聯(lián)系在一起。本文盡力在多種因素的歷時性和共時性的復雜聯(lián)系中,細致地、有分寸地探析和把握多種因索的作用及具體比重,以期從該經(jīng)濟現(xiàn)象的發(fā)展和運行機理上,對其做出準確的、符合實際的展現(xiàn)和論析。首先,本文回顧了國有壟斷行業(yè)的歷史演變和分配制度變遷歷程,從歷史演變的角度分析了國有壟斷與當今國有經(jīng)濟之間的關(guān)系,以及由原來的計劃經(jīng)濟體制控制的資源配置權(quán)力逐漸轉(zhuǎn)化為壟斷權(quán)力的過程；詳細闡述了目前國有壟斷企業(yè)“數(shù)量越來越少,壟斷程度越來越高,壟斷勢力越來越大”的形成路徑。同時,我們還探討了在分配制度上,現(xiàn)有國有壟斷行業(yè)的企業(yè)對計劃經(jīng)濟時期國營企業(yè)的平均主義的“共享式”分配方式的繼承。其次,探討了國有壟斷行業(yè)收入問題的政治背景和政治因素,從新政治經(jīng)濟學的視角重新審視了國有壟斷行業(yè)高收入問題的背景、現(xiàn)狀和解決的困難性,認識到作為既得利益集團的壟斷企業(yè)集團依賴其與政府的“共容性”關(guān)系和強大的政治活動能力,阻撓改革的進行,這也使得國有壟斷行業(yè)收入分配改革遲遲難以推進�？傊�,本文力圖在政治與經(jīng)濟相互作用的聯(lián)系中,在國有壟斷行業(yè)的企業(yè)發(fā)展歷史與現(xiàn)實的連接點上,盡可能詳細深入地揭示造成國有壟斷行業(yè)高收入分配現(xiàn)象的帶有“機理”性質(zhì)原因,以期為這個方面的改革提供理論上特別是實際操作層面上的借鑒依據(jù)。 對于國有壟斷行業(yè)高收入問題的解決,本文提出了完善壟斷國企分紅制度的政策建議。分紅制度可以減少壟斷企業(yè)集團內(nèi)部大量的留存資金,對壟斷企業(yè)的盲目投資和內(nèi)部分利起到約束作用。雖然國家于2007年開始對國有企業(yè)收繳紅利,但通過我們的研究發(fā)現(xiàn),目前的效果并不理想,一方面的原因是絕大部分紅利又通過財政支出的形式返回到了企業(yè),而用于民生建設(shè)、公共需求和社會保障的比例極低；另一方面,國家對于國有壟斷行業(yè)的企業(yè)收繳分紅的比例偏低,也是一個極為重要的因素。 論文的主要結(jié)論是：作為一種“機制”研究,國有壟斷行業(yè)高收入問題是一個由眾多相互因素共同作用的系統(tǒng)工程。從歷史演進角度上看,脫胎于國營企業(yè)的國有壟斷企業(yè)“繼承”了傳統(tǒng)國有企業(yè)的“分享式”的利潤共享模式,在巨額壟斷利潤的保障下,壟斷行業(yè)內(nèi)部“平均水平”的高收入成為可能。從分配形式上看,國有壟斷行業(yè)的分配具有更強的向內(nèi)部人傾斜的傾向,由于國有壟斷行業(yè)的企業(yè)是以國有經(jīng)濟為主體的經(jīng)濟形式,勞動者是以主人的身份而不是僅僅作為勞動要素提供者的身份參與公有制經(jīng)濟中的生產(chǎn)與分配的,國有壟斷企業(yè)的資本所有者、經(jīng)營者和勞動者之間具有內(nèi)生的一致性和非對抗性。企業(yè)職工與企業(yè)所有者共同分享了企業(yè)的利潤,獲得了部分壟斷租金。從新政治經(jīng)濟學的角度分析,國有壟斷行業(yè)收入分配改革之所以難以推進,是包括少數(shù)壟斷國企高管在內(nèi)的既得利益集團強勢阻撓的結(jié)果,壟斷企業(yè)集團由于存在與政府規(guī)制集團利益的“共容性”關(guān)系,以及強大的經(jīng)濟實力和政治話語權(quán),在與其他利益集團的博弈中占據(jù)優(yōu)勢。最后我們指出,國有企業(yè)的分紅制度的完善是目前解決國有壟斷行業(yè)高收入問題的有效途徑。但由于目前壟斷國企分紅過程中存在的諸多問題,分紅的成效沒有顯現(xiàn)出來,這是國企分紅政策急需完善的地方。 論文的框架安排如下： 第1章,首先根據(jù)我國國有壟斷行業(yè)高收入的現(xiàn)象提出了本文的研究命題,然后對本文的研究思路、研究方法、主要內(nèi)容、技術(shù)路線以及主要創(chuàng)新點和不足進行了簡要說明。同時,對本文中出現(xiàn)的重要的相關(guān)概念進行了界定。 第2章,相關(guān)理論介紹和文獻評述。首先對本文所使用的相關(guān)理論進行闡述；然后系統(tǒng)描述了目前國內(nèi)外對該領(lǐng)域的研究狀況,對重要的研究文獻進行梳理。目前對該領(lǐng)域的文獻的系統(tǒng)整理和深入挖掘的工作還比較欠缺,因而本章依據(jù)研究的定位,從兩個維度對相關(guān)文獻進行了歸納和評述,既包含了我國國有壟斷行業(yè)現(xiàn)狀描述、成因分析、改革建議等方面的文獻的匯總,又包含對文獻中理論模型和實證分析方法的使用的歸納和總結(jié)。 第3章,對國有經(jīng)濟和國有壟斷行業(yè)的歷史沿革和分配制度的歷史演變進行回顧和探析。通過研究我們發(fā)現(xiàn),國有壟斷行業(yè)所凸顯的種種問題,在很大程度上是傳統(tǒng)的計劃經(jīng)濟體制在轉(zhuǎn)型時期所表現(xiàn)出的某些殘留形式,同時,在市場經(jīng)濟改革過程中,國有壟斷行業(yè)又出現(xiàn)了新的變化并展現(xiàn)出新的特點。因此,我國國有壟斷行業(yè)存在的很多問題,都能從歷史的變革和演化中找到根源。本文注重對與國有壟斷行業(yè)收入分配機制相關(guān)的基本制度及其變遷規(guī)律的研究,分析闡述了新中國成立以來一直到現(xiàn)階段,影響國有壟斷行業(yè)收入分配機制的各種制度,并對各個時間段所呈現(xiàn)的不同狀況進行比較分析和原因探究。 第4章,理論分析部分。目前能夠解釋收入分配和收入差距問題的經(jīng)濟學原理很多,但并不是每個理論都能夠?qū)ΜF(xiàn)有問題進行完美的解釋。因此,我們首先嘗試利用不同理論對所研究的問題進行分析解釋,然后建立了一個區(qū)分國有經(jīng)濟—非國有經(jīng)濟及壟斷—非壟斷的理論框架模型,并以框架模型為基礎(chǔ)比較研究了國有壟斷行業(yè)和非國有行業(yè)的內(nèi)部分配機制的差異,運用利潤分享理論、要素分配理論和勞資談判理論等,分析了不同所有制之間、不同市場結(jié)構(gòu)之間的工資決定機制的不同。并在此基礎(chǔ)上,建立了“利潤共享模型”和“勞資談判模型”,對我國壟斷行業(yè)的收入機制進行數(shù)理推導。最后,運用實證分析對我們的理論模型進行了模擬和驗證。第5章,對國有壟斷行業(yè)收入分配問題進行更深入地探討。國有壟斷行業(yè)的高收入并非完全的不合理,而是有其合理的因素和不合理的因素,我們分別對它們進行了探討和研究,并利用實證方法對合理因素和不合理因素進行了分解。同時,探討了國有壟斷企業(yè)內(nèi)部的隱性福利、高管薪酬激勵過度、高額在職公務(wù)消費等問題。 第6章,主要考察國有壟斷行業(yè)高收入背后的政治因素。我們利用新政治經(jīng)濟學的利益集團理論,從利益集團博弈的視角闡述壟斷行業(yè)改革的艱巨性。我們區(qū)分了壟斷行業(yè)改革中可能涉及到的四個利益集團：政府規(guī)制集團、消費者利益集團、壟斷企業(yè)集團以及潛在競爭廠商集團,并描述了它們之間相互博弈的過程。證明壟斷企業(yè)集團作為既得利益集團,會通過其強大的政治影響力和話語權(quán)阻礙改革的進行。 第7章,提出了當前改變國有壟斷行業(yè)高收入的現(xiàn)狀的可行路徑——完善壟斷國企分紅制度。主要闡述了壟斷國企分紅的理論基礎(chǔ)、國內(nèi)和海外分紅的現(xiàn)狀、分紅的必要性和緊迫性,以及實行分紅制度的效果研究等。同時,本章通過一個數(shù)學模型估算了部分行業(yè)的合理的分紅比例,以期起到拋磚引玉的作用。 第8章,主要結(jié)論、和未來的研究展望。
[Abstract]:At present, the issue of national income distribution in our country has become one of the problems to be solved in the process of reform. Income distribution is not only related to the personal life of the public, but also closely related to social stability and the fate of the country. Therefore, it is highly valued by economists and the general public concern.
Among the existing problems of national income distribution in China, the state-owned monopoly industry has gained much higher income than the social average because of its monopoly nature. It has become the focus of people's attention to the issue of national income distribution. The enterprises of state-owned monopoly industries with the nature of the ownership of the whole people have not benefited the whole people of this huge monopoly profit, which is used to improve the social welfare of all the people, but "the private income and private", and internalize the wealth which should belong to the whole people. The private interests of the Ministry aroused strong dissatisfaction with the income distribution system of the state-owned monopoly industries.
The core problem involved in the existence of this phenomenon is the mechanism of income distribution in the state-owned monopoly industry in China. From the current research status, the research on the abnormal high income of some state-owned monopoly industries is mainly based on the empirical analysis, and the theoretical framework that stays in the surface and does not integrate into the system. "The absence of owners", Although the "lack of government supervision" and other factors can partly explain the phenomenon of high income in the monopoly industry, this analysis does not really touch the internal root and internal formation mechanism of this problem. Because of the lack of normative analysis framework and in-depth theoretical basis, there are lack of theoretical and systematic deficiencies in the study.
This paper takes the income distribution mechanism of China's state-owned monopoly industry as the main research object. We first consider the formation process of the distribution of income distribution in the monopoly industry as a "mechanism", which indicates that the research is a systematic project with many mutual factors. At the same time, this "mechanism" is not a "mechanism". It is static, but presents a trend of continuous dynamic change and development. This "mechanism" involves various interrelated aspects, and presents complex interaction and interaction. Therefore, the study of this paper focuses on the comprehensive analysis and grasp of this "mechanism", and therefore the study of the previous heavy "empirical" research. Compared with the method, it has the innovative meaning in methodology.
As a "mechanism" study, we consciously and purposefully deep the research tentacles into the deep relationship of the economic operation mode of "state-owned monopoly industry". In order to achieve this goal, we first set up a theoretical framework to distinguish the state-owned economy from the non state economy and the monopoly and non monopoly. On the basis of the above framework, this paper systematically expounds the income distribution mechanism within the monopoly industry through comparative study. In our model, it contains various factors affecting the distribution of internal revenue in the monopoly industry and its role in the role of monopoly income, which are divided into the division of ownership and the segmentation of the market structure. In a large background, it will affect the final results in different ways. Among the factors that affect the income distribution in the monopoly industry, we focus on the determinant role of industry monopoly and ownership factors on industry income, especially the interaction of the two. In our conclusion, the paper establishes a wage equation with control variables such as labor characteristics, enterprise characteristics and market characteristics, and uses individual microdata to investigate the comprehensive impact of various factors on the income of employees and their interaction with income.
In order to reveal this problem deeply and thoroughly, on the basis of theoretical analysis, we have adopted a variety of mathematical models and quantitative and empirical methods. In order to distinguish the different distribution mechanisms of the state economy and the non-state economy, the paper establishes a "profit sharing model" and a "labor and capital negotiation model" respectively. It reveals the process of sharing the profits of the workers, managers and the government in the state-owned monopoly enterprises. The three parties can share the profit of the enterprise according to a certain proportion. Using the latter, we can fully simulate the mutual game process between labor and capital in non-state-owned enterprises, and the game process will form a balanced wage in the market. This paper calculates the proportion of irrational factors in the income gap between monopoly industries and other industries by Quantile Regression and Blinder-Oaxaca decomposition. According to our calculation, the income gap between them is at least 55%. Finally, the paper uses the current more advanced elastic production function model and Profile semi parameter estimation. A model is set up to calculate the dividend ratio of the enterprise, and a model is used to calculate the dividends paid by some monopolies. The proportion and amount of the dividends paid by different enterprises in different profits are calculated. Through the mathematical model and the empirical analysis method, the theoretical framework of the present system is fully studied and clear. Revealing the system "mechanism" that affects the internal distribution of monopoly industries is not only intuitive but also scientific.
As a study of a "mechanism", we have noticed that the high income of the state-owned monopoly industry is not only a problem in the field of economics, but also a historical problem, but also a political problem. Therefore, the study of this problem needs to be grasped from multiple aspects and the organic aspects of the study. This article tries to make a detailed analysis and grasp of the role and specific proportion of various factors in the complex relations of diachronic and synchronic factors of various factors, in order to make accurate and practical presentation and Analysis on the development and operation mechanism of the economic phenomenon. First, this paper reviews the state-owned ridge. The historical evolution of the broken industry and the transition process of the distribution system, from the perspective of historical evolution, analyzed the relationship between state-owned monopoly and the current state economy, as well as the process of transforming the resource allocation power controlled by the original planned economy system into the process of monopoly power, and elaborated that the number of state-owned monopolies is less and less in the present. At the same time, we also discuss the inheritance of the "shared" distribution mode of the equalitarianism of the state-owned enterprises in the planned economy during the distribution system. Secondly, the political background and the political background of the income problem of the state-owned monopoly industry are discussed. Political factors, from the perspective of new political economics, re examine the background of the high income problem in the state owned monopoly industry, the current situation and the difficulty of solving it. It is realized that the monopoly enterprise group as a vested interest group depends on the "conformability" relationship with the government and the powerful political ability to obstruct the reform, which also makes the state-owned monopoly. The reform of income distribution in the broken industry is difficult to push forward. In a word, this article tries to reveal the "mechanism" in the connection point of the history and reality of the enterprise development in the state monopoly industry in the link between the political and economic interaction. The reform provides theoretical basis, especially on the practical level.
In order to solve the problem of high income in the state-owned monopoly industry, this paper puts forward the policy suggestions to improve the monopoly system of state-owned enterprises. The dividend system can reduce the large amount of retained funds within the monopoly enterprise group, and play a binding role in the blind investment and internal profit division of the monopoly enterprises. Although the state began to collect the dividend of the state-owned enterprises in 2007 But through our research, we find that the current effect is not ideal, on the one hand, the reason is that most of the dividends are returned to the enterprises through the form of financial expenditure, and the proportion of public demand and social security is very low; on the other hand, the proportion of the state to the monopoly industries of the state is low, too. It is a very important factor.
The main conclusion of this paper is: as a kind of "mechanism", the high income problem of the state-owned monopoly industry is a systematic project which is combined with many mutual factors. From the historical point of view, the state-owned monopoly enterprises born out of the state-owned enterprises "inherit" the "sharing" profit sharing model of the traditional state-owned enterprises. Under the guarantee of the profit of the monopoly, the high income of the "average level" within the monopoly industry is possible. From the form of distribution, the distribution of the state-owned monopoly industries has a stronger inclination to the insiders, because the enterprises in the state-owned monopoly industry are the economic form of the state-owned economy, and the workers are not only the owners but not the only ones. In the public ownership economy, only as the provider of labor factors participate in the production and distribution of the public ownership economy, the capital owners, the operators and the workers of the state-owned monopoly enterprises have internal consistency and non antagonism. The enterprise workers and the owners share the profits of the enterprises together and obtain some monopoly rents. From the new political economics, the new political economy is a new political economy. The reason why the reform of the income distribution reform in the state-owned monopoly industry is difficult to push forward is the result of the strong obstruction of the vested interest groups, including the few monopolized state-owned enterprises, and the monopoly enterprise group because of the "co - capacity" relationship with the government regulation of the interests of the group, and the strong economic strength and political discourse power. In the end, we point out that the perfection of the dividend system of the state-owned enterprises is an effective way to solve the high income problem of the state-owned monopoly industry at present. However, because of the many problems existing in the process of monopolization of state-owned enterprises, the results of the dividend have not come out, which is the place where the policy of the state-owned enterprise dividends need to be perfected urgently.
The framework of the paper is as follows:
The first chapter, first of all, according to the phenomenon of high income in China's state-owned monopoly industry, this paper puts forward the research proposition of this paper, and then gives a brief description of the research ideas, research methods, main contents, technical route and the main innovation points and shortcomings. At the same time, it defines the important related concepts in this paper.
The second chapter, the related theory introduction and the literature review. First, the relevant theories used in this paper are expounded, and then the research status of the field at home and abroad is described, and the important research literature is combed. At present, the systematic sorting and digging and digging of the literature in this field are still relatively short, so this chapter is based on this chapter. The orientation of the study is summed up and reviewed from two dimensions, including the summary of the status description of the state owned monopoly industry, the analysis of the causes, the suggestions for reform and so on, and the induction and summary of the use of the theoretical model and the empirical analysis method in the literature.
In the third chapter, the historical evolution and the historical evolution of the historical evolution and distribution system of the state owned and state owned monopolies are reviewed and analyzed. Through the study, we find that the problems highlighted by the state-owned monopoly industries are to a great extent the remaining forms of the traditional planned economy system in the transition period, and at the same time, in the market economy. In the process of reform, the state-owned monopoly industry has appeared new changes and showed new characteristics. Therefore, many problems existing in the state-owned monopoly industry in our country can find the root of the historical change and evolution. This paper focuses on the basic system and the law of change related to the income distribution mechanism of the state-owned monopoly industries. From the beginning of the founding of new China to the present stage, various systems that affect the income distribution mechanism of state monopoly industries have been presented and presented in different time periods.
【學位授予單位】：山東大學
【學位級別】：博士
【學位授予年份】：2013
【分類號】：F124.7

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