【摘要】：使用持續(xù)專(zhuān)利時(shí)間、持續(xù)專(zhuān)利數(shù)量、持續(xù)發(fā)明時(shí)間和持續(xù)發(fā)明數(shù)量對(duì)企業(yè)持續(xù)創(chuàng)新進(jìn)行測(cè)度,就公司規(guī)模、企業(yè)盈利能力、債權(quán)融資水平、股權(quán)結(jié)構(gòu)和高管激勵(lì)等對(duì)企業(yè)持續(xù)創(chuàng)新的影響進(jìn)行理論分析,提出相關(guān)假設(shè),并以國(guó)泰安"中國(guó)上市公司專(zhuān)利研究數(shù)據(jù)庫(kù)"1985-2015年涉及的1 921家上市公司為樣本進(jìn)行實(shí)證檢驗(yàn)。結(jié)果發(fā)現(xiàn):公司規(guī)模與企業(yè)持續(xù)創(chuàng)新正相關(guān);盈利能力和債權(quán)融資水平對(duì)企業(yè)持續(xù)創(chuàng)新的影響不顯著;股權(quán)結(jié)構(gòu)中,第一大股東持股比例與持續(xù)專(zhuān)利時(shí)間、持續(xù)發(fā)明時(shí)間負(fù)相關(guān),對(duì)持續(xù)專(zhuān)利數(shù)量和持續(xù)發(fā)明數(shù)量的影響不顯著。機(jī)構(gòu)投資者持股比例與企業(yè)持續(xù)專(zhuān)利時(shí)間正相關(guān),對(duì)其它持續(xù)創(chuàng)新變量的正向影響不顯著;在高管激勵(lì)中,以薪酬測(cè)度的高管短期激勵(lì)與企業(yè)持續(xù)創(chuàng)新正相關(guān),以持股比例測(cè)度的高管長(zhǎng)期激勵(lì)對(duì)企業(yè)持續(xù)創(chuàng)新的積極作用沒(méi)有得到完全發(fā)揮。
[Abstract]:The continuous innovation of an enterprise is measured by using the continuous patent time, the number of continuous patents, the continuous invention time and the number of continuous inventions. The influence of the size of the company, the profitability of the enterprise, the level of debt financing, the ownership structure and the executive incentive on the sustainable innovation of the enterprise is analyzed theoretically, and the relevant assumptions are put forward. A sample of 1 921 listed companies involved in Guotai'an Patent Research Database of China listed companies from 1985 to 2015 was taken as an empirical test. The results show that the size of the company is positively correlated with the continuous innovation of the enterprise, the influence of profitability and creditor's rights financing level on the sustainable innovation of the enterprise is not significant, in the ownership structure, the proportion of the largest shareholder is negatively correlated with the duration of patent and the time of continuous invention, but the influence on the number of continuous patents and the number of continuous inventions is not significant. The proportion of institutional investors' shareholding is positively correlated with the duration of corporate patents, but the positive effect on other continuous innovation variables is not significant. In executive incentive, the short-term incentive measured by compensation is positively correlated with the continuous innovation of enterprises, while the positive role of long-term incentive measured by shareholding ratio on sustainable innovation has not been brought into full play.
【作者單位】： 河南科技大學(xué)管理學(xué)院;
【基金】：國(guó)家自然科學(xué)基金項(xiàng)目(U1204704/G0202) 國(guó)家社會(huì)科學(xué)基金項(xiàng)目(16BJY070) 河南省高等學(xué)校哲學(xué)社會(huì)科學(xué)優(yōu)秀學(xué)者基金項(xiàng)目(2014-YXXZ-17)
【分類(lèi)號(hào)】：F273.1

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