【摘要】：產(chǎn)品價(jià)格直接決定企業(yè)利潤(rùn),定價(jià)決策是零售商的永恒主題。隨著科技的發(fā)展和創(chuàng)新的推動(dòng),產(chǎn)品生命周期縮短、逾期價(jià)格較低,傳統(tǒng)定價(jià)策略很難適用。隨著消費(fèi)者越來(lái)越具有理性,面對(duì)心儀的商品不會(huì)立即購(gòu)買,而是通過(guò)觀察,對(duì)零售商未來(lái)的折價(jià)策略和庫(kù)存狀況形成理性預(yù)期,追求自身消費(fèi)者剩余最大化來(lái)合理安排購(gòu)買時(shí)機(jī),這樣的消費(fèi)者稱為戰(zhàn)略消費(fèi)者。零售商忽視戰(zhàn)略消費(fèi)者的延遲購(gòu)買行為會(huì)導(dǎo)致巨大的收益損失。在細(xì)分消費(fèi)者的基礎(chǔ)上,動(dòng)態(tài)定價(jià)立足于分階段實(shí)行價(jià)格彈性滿足更多的消費(fèi)者。動(dòng)態(tài)定價(jià)對(duì)緩解戰(zhàn)略消費(fèi)者延遲購(gòu)買行為和增加零售商收益具有重要的作用。在消費(fèi)者固定需求條件下,本文考慮到消費(fèi)者在打折期存在買不到商品的風(fēng)險(xiǎn),以一種新的思路基于兩階段消費(fèi)者剩余的比較,構(gòu)建消費(fèi)者購(gòu)買決策模型。通過(guò)分析消費(fèi)者購(gòu)買轉(zhuǎn)移行為,求出兩階段購(gòu)買產(chǎn)品的消費(fèi)者數(shù)量并構(gòu)建零售商收益函數(shù),然后基于零售商追求利潤(rùn)最大化的目標(biāo)求解零售商最優(yōu)動(dòng)態(tài)定價(jià)策略和利潤(rùn)。在本文所構(gòu)建的零售商銷售單產(chǎn)品兩階段動(dòng)態(tài)定價(jià)模型基礎(chǔ)上,分析了信息透明在零售商與消費(fèi)者Stackelberg博弈中的重要性,指出差價(jià)補(bǔ)償機(jī)制能夠緩解戰(zhàn)略消費(fèi)者的影響。最后基于本文所構(gòu)建的單產(chǎn)品兩階段動(dòng)態(tài)定價(jià)模型做實(shí)例分析,通過(guò)數(shù)值模擬求解零售商最優(yōu)動(dòng)態(tài)定價(jià)策略,達(dá)到理論與應(yīng)用的結(jié)合,為零售商動(dòng)態(tài)定價(jià)決策提供一種新的思路和參考。在實(shí)例分析的基礎(chǔ)上,探討本文所構(gòu)建的兩階段動(dòng)態(tài)定價(jià)模型中參數(shù)的變化對(duì)零售商最優(yōu)產(chǎn)品定價(jià)和零售商利潤(rùn)的影響。然后基于參數(shù)影響,提出零售商動(dòng)態(tài)定價(jià)的一些建議。最后指出了本文主要研究結(jié)論和未來(lái)模型拓展的方向。
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圖片說(shuō)明：Lp與1p函數(shù)關(guān)系圖
[Abstract]:Product price directly determines the profit of the enterprise, and pricing decision is the eternal theme of retailers. With the development of science and technology and the promotion of innovation, the product life cycle is shortened and the overdue price is low, so the traditional pricing strategy is difficult to apply. As consumers become more and more rational, the desired goods will not buy immediately, but through observation, the future discount strategy and inventory situation of retailers form rational expectations, and pursue the maximization of their own consumer surplus to arrange the purchase opportunity reasonably. Such consumers are called strategic consumers. Retailers neglecting the delayed purchase behavior of strategic consumers will lead to huge revenue losses. On the basis of subdividing consumers, dynamic pricing is based on the phased implementation of price elasticity to meet more consumers. Dynamic pricing plays an important role in alleviating the delayed purchase behavior of strategic consumers and increasing the revenue of retailers. Under the condition of fixed demand of consumers, this paper takes into account the risk that consumers can not buy goods during the discount period, and constructs a consumer purchase decision model based on the comparison of two-stage consumer surplus with a new idea. By analyzing the behavior of consumer purchase and transfer, the number of consumers who buy products in two stages is obtained and the profit function of retailers is constructed, and then the optimal dynamic pricing strategy and profit of retailers are solved based on the goal of maximizing profits. On the basis of the two-stage dynamic pricing model of retailers' single-product sales, this paper analyzes the importance of information transparency in the Stackelberg game between retailers and consumers, and points out that the price difference compensation mechanism can alleviate the influence of strategic consumers. Finally, based on the single product two-stage dynamic pricing model constructed in this paper, the optimal dynamic pricing strategy of retailers is solved by numerical simulation, which achieves the combination of theory and application, and provides a new idea and reference for retailers to make dynamic pricing decisions. On the basis of example analysis, this paper discusses the influence of the parameters in the two-stage dynamic pricing model on the optimal product pricing and the profit of retailers. Then, based on the influence of parameters, some suggestions on dynamic pricing of retailers are put forward. Finally, the main research conclusions and the future model expansion direction are pointed out.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：河北大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級(jí)別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2017
【分類號(hào)】：F274

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