【摘要】：所有者與經(jīng)營(yíng)者之間的委托代理問題一直是公司治理研究的熱點(diǎn)。在經(jīng)歷了半個(gè)多世紀(jì)的發(fā)展之后,股權(quán)激勵(lì)制度在美國(guó)日益成熟,并對(duì)美國(guó)股市的繁榮產(chǎn)生了不可磨滅的影響,締造出了一個(gè)又一個(gè)股市神話。然而,被市場(chǎng)譽(yù)為"金手銬"的股權(quán)激勵(lì),卻并不總能給公司帶來高業(yè)績(jī),并且隨著轟動(dòng)全球的安然事件、代價(jià)昂貴的伊利股份高管人員股權(quán)激勵(lì)計(jì)劃以及AIG天價(jià)高管薪酬的事件曝光后,學(xué)者們逐漸意識(shí)到股權(quán)激勵(lì)制度中也存在著廣泛的非激勵(lì)性因素。研發(fā)支出作為企業(yè)的一項(xiàng)資源,能從企業(yè)的產(chǎn)出、生產(chǎn)率以及價(jià)值三個(gè)方面顯著提高企業(yè)業(yè)績(jī)。那么,我國(guó)企業(yè)目前實(shí)施的股權(quán)激勵(lì)會(huì)對(duì)企業(yè)的研發(fā)投資活動(dòng)產(chǎn)生何種影響?股權(quán)激勵(lì)中非激勵(lì)因素的廣泛存在對(duì)于企業(yè)研發(fā)活動(dòng)的開展又會(huì)產(chǎn)生哪些不利影響?為了回答上述問題,本文從我國(guó)當(dāng)前股權(quán)激勵(lì)和研發(fā)支出現(xiàn)狀出發(fā),基于委托代理理論、管理層權(quán)力理論以及人力資本理論,就股權(quán)激勵(lì)對(duì)研發(fā)支出的實(shí)質(zhì)影響進(jìn)行研究,并試圖從股權(quán)激勵(lì)動(dòng)機(jī)的視角出發(fā),進(jìn)一步探究不同動(dòng)機(jī)下股權(quán)激勵(lì)對(duì)公司研發(fā)支出的影響。本文分五個(gè)部分進(jìn)行研究。第一部分為緒論。首先對(duì)全文的研究背景和研究意義進(jìn)行了闡述,然后總結(jié)了國(guó)內(nèi)外的研究現(xiàn)狀,最后簡(jiǎn)要說明了研究思路、方法及創(chuàng)新點(diǎn)。第二部分為相關(guān)概念界定與理論基礎(chǔ)。這部分對(duì)股權(quán)激勵(lì)和研發(fā)支出等基本概念和相關(guān)基礎(chǔ)理論進(jìn)行了介紹,包括委托代理理論、管理層權(quán)力理論及人力資本理論等。第三部分為理論分析與研究假設(shè)。該部分闡述了我國(guó)上市企業(yè)股權(quán)激勵(lì)與研發(fā)支出的現(xiàn)狀,并分析了提出相關(guān)研究假設(shè)的理論依據(jù)和影響路徑。第四部分為實(shí)證研究。通過樣本數(shù)據(jù)的收集和變量指標(biāo)的選擇,實(shí)證模型的構(gòu)建,選取2006-2014年滬深證券交易所A股上市公司作為樣本,進(jìn)行描述性統(tǒng)計(jì)、相關(guān)性分析以及多元回歸分析。第五部分為研究結(jié)論與政策建議。研究結(jié)果表明:(1)股權(quán)激勵(lì)與研發(fā)支出之間呈現(xiàn)"倒U型"曲線關(guān)系。(2)相對(duì)于非激勵(lì)型股權(quán)激勵(lì),激勵(lì)型股權(quán)激勵(lì)能顯著提高研發(fā)支出水平。本文可能的創(chuàng)新點(diǎn)在于:(1)研究視角創(chuàng)新。國(guó)內(nèi)外學(xué)者關(guān)于股權(quán)激勵(lì)對(duì)研發(fā)支出的影響研究取得了一定的成果,但相關(guān)研究主要圍繞單一指標(biāo)研究或區(qū)分行業(yè)類型、產(chǎn)權(quán)性質(zhì)、股權(quán)激勵(lì)類型等加以研究,本文試圖以股權(quán)激勵(lì)動(dòng)機(jī)為視角,研究?jī)深悇?dòng)機(jī)——激勵(lì)型動(dòng)機(jī)、非激勵(lì)型動(dòng)機(jī)下股權(quán)激勵(lì)對(duì)公司研發(fā)支出的影響;(2)研究?jī)?nèi)容創(chuàng)新。本文基于委托代理理論、管理層權(quán)力理論以及人力資本理論,采用市場(chǎng)模型方法區(qū)分股權(quán)激勵(lì)動(dòng)機(jī),將公司研發(fā)支出水平與其資本市場(chǎng)表現(xiàn)有機(jī)結(jié)合,分別考察兩類激勵(lì)動(dòng)機(jī)下股權(quán)激勵(lì)對(duì)研發(fā)支出的影響,進(jìn)一步拓展股權(quán)激勵(lì)對(duì)研發(fā)支出的影響研究。
[Abstract]:The principal-agent problem between owner and operator has always been a hot topic in the research of corporate governance. After more than half a century of development, the equity incentive system has become more and more mature in the United States, and has an indelible impact on the prosperity of the American stock market, creating one stock market myth after another. However, equity incentives hailed by the market as "golden handcuffs" do not always bring high performance to the company, and with the global Enron events, After the revelations of the expensive Ely stock executive equity incentive scheme and the AIG high-cost executive compensation, scholars gradually realized that there are also a wide range of non-incentive factors in the equity incentive system. As a resource of an enterprise, R & D expenditure can significantly improve enterprise performance from three aspects: output, productivity and value. So, what is the impact of equity incentive on R & D investment activities of enterprises in China? What are the adverse effects of the widespread existence of non-incentive factors in equity incentive on the development of R & D activities of enterprises? In order to answer the above questions, based on the principal-agent theory, management power theory and human capital theory, this paper studies the real impact of equity incentive on R & D expenditure from the current situation of equity incentive and R & D expenditure in China. From the perspective of equity incentive motivation, we try to explore the influence of equity incentive on R & D expenditure of companies under different motivations. This paper is divided into five parts. The first part is the introduction. Firstly, the research background and significance of the full text are described, and then the research status at home and abroad is summarized. Finally, the research ideas, methods and innovations are briefly explained. The second part is the definition and theoretical basis of related concepts. This part introduces the basic concepts of equity incentive and R & D expenditure, including principal-agent theory, management power theory and human capital theory. The third part is theoretical analysis and research hypothesis. This part describes the current situation of equity incentive and R & D expenditure of listed enterprises in China, and analyzes the theoretical basis and influence path of relevant research hypotheses. The fourth part is an empirical study. Through the collection of sample data, the selection of variable index and the construction of empirical model, the paper selects A-share listed companies in Shanghai-Shenzhen Stock Exchange from 2006 to 2014 as samples, and carries on descriptive statistics, correlation analysis and multiple regression analysis. The fifth part is the research conclusions and policy recommendations. The results show that: (1) there is a "inverted U" curve between equity incentive and R & D expenditure; (2) compared with non-incentive equity incentive, incentive equity incentive can significantly improve R & D expenditure level. The possible innovations of this paper are as follows: (1) the innovation of research perspective. Scholars at home and abroad have made some achievements on the impact of equity incentive on R & D expenditure, but the related research focuses on the study of single index or differentiation of industry type, property right nature, equity incentive type and so on. From the perspective of equity incentive motivation, this paper attempts to study the impact of equity incentive on R & D expenditure of companies under incentive motivation and non-incentive motivation. (2) Innovation of research content. Based on the principal-agent theory, the management power theory and the human capital theory, this paper uses the market model method to distinguish the motivation of equity incentive, and combines the level of R & D expenditure of the company with its capital market performance. The effects of equity incentive on R & D expenditure under two types of incentive motivation are investigated, and the research on the impact of equity incentive on R & D expenditure is further expanded.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：安徽大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級(jí)別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2017
【分類號(hào)】：F272.92;F273.1

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