【摘要】：文章研究了易腐品二級供應鏈中的延遲支付策略問題,對于資金充足和資金受限兩種情景,分別給出了沒有延遲支付和存在延遲支付時零售商及供應商的利潤模型及最優(yōu)策略,并建立了供應商主導的Stackelberg博弈模型,設計了求解均衡解的粒子群優(yōu)化算法.最后,通過數(shù)值算例探討了延付期、批發(fā)價格及延付利息的變化對零售商和供應商利潤的影響,得到了零售商的最優(yōu)訂貨策略以及供應商的最優(yōu)延遲支付決策,對零售商是否接受延遲支付策略進行了權(quán)衡分析.結(jié)果表明,短期的延付期是可以提高零售商和供應商的利潤,但延付期的延長不一定帶來零售商利潤的提升,同樣供應商也無法從零售商手中賺取額外利息利潤,反而降低了供應商的利潤.另外,資金受限下零售商采用延付通常能夠取得更高的收益,同時供應商能夠通過提高批發(fā)價和利息獲得更大利潤.
[Abstract]:In this paper, the problem of delayed payment strategy in the secondary supply chain of perishable goods is studied. For the two scenarios of sufficient funds and limited funds, the profit model and optimal strategy of retailers and suppliers with no delay payment and with delay payment are given respectively. The vendor-led Stackelberg game model is established and the particle swarm optimization algorithm is designed to solve the equilibrium solution. Finally, through numerical examples, the effects of delay period, wholesale price and deferred interest on the profit of retailers and suppliers are discussed, and the optimal ordering strategy of retailers and the optimal delay payment decision of suppliers are obtained. A tradeoff analysis is made on whether retailers accept the delayed payment strategy. The results show that the short delay period can increase the profits of retailers and suppliers, but the extension of the delay period does not necessarily lead to the increase of retailer profits, nor can suppliers earn additional interest profits from retailers. On the contrary, it reduces the profit of suppliers. In addition, retailers with limited funds usually make higher profits by using deferred payments, while suppliers can make greater profits by raising wholesale prices and interest rates.
【作者單位】： 北京化工大學理學院;中國太平保險控股有限公司;北京工業(yè)大學經(jīng)濟管理學院北京現(xiàn)代制造業(yè)發(fā)展研究基地;
【基金】：國家自然科學基金(71571010)資助課題
【分類號】：F274

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