【摘要】：如今市場(chǎng)競(jìng)爭(zhēng)越來(lái)越激烈,成本費(fèi)用的控制對(duì)于企業(yè)的生存和發(fā)展有著至關(guān)重要的影響。傳統(tǒng)的成本費(fèi)用模型將成本分為兩個(gè)部分,即固定成本和變動(dòng)成本,其中變動(dòng)成本會(huì)隨著業(yè)務(wù)量的變化而呈正比例的變動(dòng)。然而現(xiàn)實(shí)世界中存在著費(fèi)用粘性,即業(yè)務(wù)量上升時(shí)比業(yè)務(wù)量下降時(shí)的成本費(fèi)用變動(dòng)比例更大。費(fèi)用粘性的代理問(wèn)題觀認(rèn)為,由于委托人與代理人之間存在代理問(wèn)題,管理者出于自利動(dòng)機(jī)對(duì)資源的調(diào)整會(huì)導(dǎo)致企業(yè)的成本習(xí)性偏離其最優(yōu)配置,并致使費(fèi)用粘性現(xiàn)象的產(chǎn)生。那么具體會(huì)有哪些帝國(guó)構(gòu)建行為對(duì)費(fèi)用粘性產(chǎn)生影響?同時(shí),關(guān)于財(cái)務(wù)冗余的作用,學(xué)術(shù)界也一直存在著兩種對(duì)立的觀點(diǎn),它作為一種冗余資源,又會(huì)對(duì)帝國(guó)構(gòu)建行為與費(fèi)用粘性之間的關(guān)系產(chǎn)生怎樣的影響呢?本文以公司規(guī)模增長(zhǎng)率、過(guò)度投資和并購(gòu)行為作為帝國(guó)構(gòu)建行為的代理變量,研究了帝國(guó)構(gòu)建行為與費(fèi)用粘性之間的關(guān)系。并將財(cái)務(wù)冗余分為現(xiàn)金冗余和負(fù)債冗余,從代理理論出發(fā)進(jìn)一步研究其分別對(duì)帝國(guó)構(gòu)建行為與費(fèi)用粘性之間關(guān)系產(chǎn)生的影響。研究結(jié)果發(fā)現(xiàn):(1)帝國(guó)構(gòu)建行為與費(fèi)用粘性之間呈顯著的正相關(guān)關(guān)系。從帝國(guó)構(gòu)建行為的具體表現(xiàn)來(lái)看,公司規(guī)模增長(zhǎng)率會(huì)加強(qiáng)費(fèi)用粘性程度;過(guò)度投資會(huì)加強(qiáng)費(fèi)用粘性程度;并購(gòu)行為與費(fèi)用粘性之間的正相關(guān)關(guān)系尚不明確,原因有兩個(gè),一是因?yàn)橹袊?guó)上市公司存在報(bào)表性重組現(xiàn)象,二是因?yàn)閷?shí)質(zhì)性并購(gòu)帶來(lái)的影響需要一定時(shí)間才能體現(xiàn)。(2)財(cái)務(wù)冗余較高的公司,帝國(guó)構(gòu)建行為與費(fèi)用粘性之間的關(guān)系更強(qiáng),而較低的財(cái)務(wù)冗余水平將緩解帝國(guó)構(gòu)建行為與費(fèi)用粘性之間的正相關(guān)關(guān)系。具體來(lái)說(shuō),高水平的現(xiàn)金冗余和負(fù)債冗余都將加強(qiáng)規(guī)模增長(zhǎng)和過(guò)度投資與費(fèi)用粘性之間的正相關(guān)關(guān)系;現(xiàn)金冗余和負(fù)債冗余水平較低時(shí),規(guī)模增長(zhǎng)將顯著降低費(fèi)用粘性。本文的研究結(jié)果可以幫助企業(yè)在現(xiàn)實(shí)中減少管理層的自利行為,同時(shí)為公司作出合理的財(cái)務(wù)政策提供一定的借鑒。
[Abstract]:Nowadays, the market competition is more and more intense, the cost control has the vital influence to the enterprise survival and development. The traditional cost model divides the cost into two parts, that is, fixed cost and variable cost, in which the variable cost changes in proportion with the change of business volume. However, in the real world, there is a stickiness of cost, that is, when the volume of business increases, the proportion of cost and cost changes is larger than when the volume of business decreases. In the view of agency problem of cost stickiness, because of the agency problem between principal and agent, the adjustment of resources by managers out of self-interest motive will lead to the deviation of enterprise's cost habit from its optimal allocation, and cause the phenomenon of cost stickiness to come into being. So what kind of empire building behavior will have an impact on cost stickiness? At the same time, on the role of financial redundancy, there have been two opposing views in academia. As a redundant resource, how will it affect the relationship between the behavior of empire building and the cost stickiness? In this paper, the relationship between the behavior of empire building and the stickiness of cost is studied by taking the growth rate of firm size, overinvestment and merger and acquisition as proxy variables of the behavior of empire building. The financial redundancy is divided into cash redundancy and liability redundancy, and the influence of financial redundancy on the relationship between the behavior of empire building and the stickiness of expenses is further studied from the perspective of agency theory. The results show that: (1) there is a significant positive correlation between Empire Building behavior and cost stickiness. From the specific performance of empire building behavior, the growth rate of company size will strengthen the degree of fee stickiness; excessive investment will strengthen the degree of cost viscosity; the positive correlation between merger and acquisition behavior and fee viscosity is not clear, for two reasons. One is that there is a phenomenon of report reorganization in listed companies in China, the other is that the impact of substantial mergers and acquisitions takes some time to reflect. (2) for companies with high financial redundancy, the relationship between the behavior of empire building and the stickiness of expenses is stronger. A lower level of financial redundancy will ease the positive correlation between empire building behavior and cost stickiness. Specifically, the high level of cash redundancy and debt redundancy will strengthen the positive correlation between scale growth and overinvestment and cost stickiness, while when the level of cash redundancy and debt redundancy is low, the scale increase will significantly reduce the cost stickiness. The research results of this paper can help enterprises to reduce the self-interest behavior of management in reality, and provide some reference for the company to make reasonable financial policy.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：南京大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級(jí)別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2017
【分類號(hào)】：F275
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本文編號(hào)：2258219