本文選題：真實盈余管理 + 雙重股權(quán)結(jié)構(gòu)　； 參考：《西南交通大學》2017年碩士論文

【摘要】：我國資本市場還尚未允許的雙重股權(quán)結(jié)構(gòu),早在二十世紀二十年代的美國就受到了一定的歡迎,現(xiàn)在雙重股權(quán)結(jié)構(gòu)在世界各地資本市場的認可度也在不斷增加。隨著百度、京東等從事互聯(lián)網(wǎng)業(yè)務的知名公司被國內(nèi)法律制度制約,紛紛以雙重股權(quán)結(jié)構(gòu)的身份去美國上市,也隨著Facebook、Google等國外互聯(lián)網(wǎng)知名公司不謀而合地選擇雙重股權(quán)結(jié)構(gòu),雙重股權(quán)結(jié)構(gòu)這種制度和實踐,開始進入公眾的視野并且逐漸受到我國學術界的關注。雙重股權(quán)結(jié)構(gòu)的出現(xiàn)、興起和發(fā)展,在各界對其褒貶不一的評價下,也經(jīng)歷了一個較為波折的過程。所以這一種股權(quán)結(jié)構(gòu)有其優(yōu)勢,也有其弊端。其優(yōu)勢在于經(jīng)營者在進入資本市場募集資金的同時,不會被稀釋對公司的控制權(quán),并能夠保護企業(yè)免遭控制權(quán)收購,使得管理者可以對公司實行長期戰(zhàn)略。其弊端則為管理團隊可能會在已降低的并購壓力情形下和失效的董事會監(jiān)督下,侵害公眾投資者的利益并且濫用控制權(quán)謀取私利。此類現(xiàn)象的發(fā)生可能會使擁有控制權(quán)的股東與其他股東之間出現(xiàn)不良的代理問題,則也會伴隨盈余管理現(xiàn)象的發(fā)生。本文正是從目前國內(nèi)學術界還未曾有學者研究的雙重股權(quán)結(jié)構(gòu)與真實盈余管理的關系入手,對雙重股權(quán)結(jié)構(gòu)的相關概念以及真實盈余管理的相關理論進行闡述,并且以2012-2015年,我國數(shù)個成功在國外以雙重股權(quán)結(jié)構(gòu)上市的公司的財務數(shù)據(jù)為樣本,運用定量分析和定性分析相結(jié)合的方法進行了理論分析和實證檢驗,將選擇雙重股權(quán)結(jié)構(gòu)公司的投票權(quán)和現(xiàn)金流權(quán)分離的現(xiàn)象與其發(fā)生真實盈余管理行為的影響進行研究,在與采用同股同權(quán)的公司進行對比后,得出了如下結(jié)論:第一,與同股同權(quán)結(jié)構(gòu)的公司相比,采用雙重股權(quán)結(jié)構(gòu)的上市公司,越高的管理層投票權(quán)比例,使得真實盈余管理程度上升,二者為正比例關系。第二,雙重股權(quán)結(jié)構(gòu)的上市公司的管理層的現(xiàn)金流權(quán)比例越高,真實盈余管理程度越微弱。第三,雙重股權(quán)結(jié)構(gòu)的上市公司的管理層投票權(quán)比例和現(xiàn)金流權(quán)比例的背離程度越大,真實盈余管理程度越強烈。綜上來看,本文研究表明了選擇雙重股權(quán)結(jié)構(gòu)的上市公司,真實盈余管理行為的發(fā)生較為顯著。
[Abstract]:China's capital market has not yet allowed the dual equity structure, as early as the 1920s, the United States has been welcomed, and now the recognition of dual equity structure in the world capital markets is also increasing. As well-known companies such as Baidu, JingDong and others engaged in Internet business have been restricted by domestic legal systems, they have been listed in the United States as a dual equity structure, and with Facebook, JingDong and other well-known foreign Internet companies opting for a dual equity structure, The system and practice of dual ownership structure, which began to enter the public vision and gradually attracted the attention of the academic circles of our country. The emergence, rise and development of dual ownership structure have also experienced a more twists and turns process. So this kind of ownership structure has its advantage, also has its malpractice. Its advantage lies in the fact that the managers can not dilute the control right of the company while they enter the capital market to raise funds, and can protect the enterprises from the acquisition of the control rights, so that the managers can carry out the long-term strategy to the company. The drawback is that the management team may infringe on the interests of public investors and abuse control for private gain under reduced M & A pressure and under the supervision of the ineffective board of directors. The occurrence of this kind of phenomenon may lead to the bad agency problem between the shareholders who have the control right and other shareholders, and it will also accompany the earnings management phenomenon. This paper begins with the relationship between dual equity structure and real earnings management, which has not been studied by scholars in China at present, expounds the related concepts of dual ownership structure and the relevant theories of real earnings management, and takes 2012-2015 as an example to analyze the relationship between dual ownership structure and real earnings management. In this paper, the financial data of several companies listed in foreign countries with dual equity structure are used as samples, and the theoretical analysis and empirical test are carried out by combining quantitative analysis with qualitative analysis. This paper studies the phenomenon of separation of voting rights and cash flow rights of companies with dual ownership structure and the impact of real earnings management on them. After comparing with the companies adopting the same share and same rights, the following conclusions are drawn: first, Compared with the companies with the same shares and the same rights, the higher the voting ratio of the management, the higher the voting ratio of the listed companies with dual equity structure, which leads to the rise of the real earnings management degree, and the two are in direct proportion. Second, the higher the cash flow right ratio of the listed companies with dual equity structure, the weaker the real earnings management. Third, the greater the deviation between the voting rights of management and the proportion of cash flow rights, the stronger the real earnings management degree of dual equity structure listed companies. In summary, the research shows that the real earnings management behavior of the listed companies with dual equity structure is significant.
【學位授予單位】：西南交通大學
【學位級別】：碩士
【學位授予年份】：2017
【分類號】：F275;F49

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本文編號：2098484