本文選題：制造商預(yù)售 + 按訂單裝配�。� 參考：《預(yù)測》2017年02期

【摘要】：針對由多個零部件供應(yīng)商、單個制造商和一個零售商所組成的按訂單裝配式供應(yīng)鏈,本文在零部件供應(yīng)不確定的環(huán)境中,分析了在分散決策和集中決策下制造商和零售商各自的訂單決策及期望利潤,在此基礎(chǔ)上提出了制造商在線預(yù)售策略,并比較分析預(yù)售對供應(yīng)鏈各級成員決策的影響。通過建立預(yù)售模型及證明推導(dǎo),研究結(jié)果表明:如果無法從其他競爭對手吸引更多的消費(fèi)者,制造商在線預(yù)售會損害零售商的利益;而且預(yù)售策略并不總是優(yōu)于集中決策。零售商對預(yù)售的反應(yīng)策略是反直覺的:預(yù)售量越小,零售商越有漲價的動機(jī);預(yù)售量越大,零售商反而需要通過折扣來最大化期望利潤。
[Abstract]:For an order-based assembly supply chain composed of multiple component suppliers, single manufacturers and a retailer, this paper presents an environment in which the supply of components is uncertain. The order decision and expected profit of manufacturer and retailer under decentralized and centralized decision are analyzed. On this basis, the online presale strategy of manufacturer is put forward, and the influence of presale on the decision of members of supply chain is compared. By establishing the pre-sale model and proving the derivation, the research results show that if the manufacturer can not attract more consumers from other competitors, the manufacturer's online pre-sale will harm the retailer's interests, and the pre-sale strategy is not always superior to the centralized decision. The reaction strategy of retailers to presale is counter-intuitive: the smaller the presale volume, the more incentive retailers have to increase the price; the larger the presale amount, the more retailers need to maximize the expected profit by discount.
【作者單位】： 中南財經(jīng)政法大學(xué)信息與安全工程學(xué)院;華中科技大學(xué)管理學(xué)院;貴州財經(jīng)大學(xué)工商學(xué)院;
【基金】：國家自然科學(xué)基金資助項(xiàng)目(71401180)
【分類號】：F274

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