發(fā)布時間：2018-06-15 08:22

  本文選題：研發(fā)投資 + 高管年薪�。� 參考：《鄭州航空工業(yè)管理學(xué)院》2017年碩士論文

【摘要】：在知識經(jīng)濟(jì)時代的今天,創(chuàng)新是企業(yè)在激烈的市場競爭中立足的重要保障,研發(fā)投資是創(chuàng)新的核心環(huán)節(jié)。近年來,我國研發(fā)投資強(qiáng)度不斷增強(qiáng),但是與發(fā)達(dá)國家相比還相差甚遠(yuǎn),這一現(xiàn)象已成為制約我國經(jīng)濟(jì)“創(chuàng)新驅(qū)動”戰(zhàn)略轉(zhuǎn)型和提升國家綜合實力的重要因素之一。如何破解公司研發(fā)投資不足難題,學(xué)術(shù)界主要從財稅優(yōu)惠和高管薪酬兩方面展開了研究。目前關(guān)于財稅優(yōu)惠和高管薪酬對研發(fā)投資的影響研究主要集中在單要素研究層面,缺乏系統(tǒng)的、深層次的分析。由于影響公司研發(fā)投資問題是一個復(fù)雜的系統(tǒng)問題,而非單要素的簡單加和,基于此,本文將高管薪酬、財稅優(yōu)惠與研發(fā)投資納入同一分析框架,從系統(tǒng)層面運(yùn)用系統(tǒng)論的協(xié)同效應(yīng)深入探討高管薪酬和財稅優(yōu)惠對公司研發(fā)投資的協(xié)同效應(yīng),不僅進(jìn)一步擴(kuò)大了研究范圍,而且為提升公司研發(fā)投資提供了新的視角。為檢驗高管薪酬和財稅優(yōu)惠對公司研發(fā)投資的協(xié)同效應(yīng),采用規(guī)范研究法和實證研究法,選取2010—2015年滬深A(yù)股上市公司為研究樣本進(jìn)行實證檢驗。研究發(fā)現(xiàn):第一,總體上,高管年薪顯著促進(jìn)公司研發(fā)投資,持股比例與研發(fā)投資呈顯著的倒U型關(guān)系;高管股權(quán)激勵對提升研發(fā)投資的激勵效果比年薪更好;對于國有企業(yè),高管年薪和持股比例均能夠顯著促進(jìn)研發(fā)投資;對于民營企業(yè),高管年薪不能有效提升研發(fā)投資,持股比例只有在0~36.44%范圍內(nèi)時顯著促進(jìn)研發(fā)投資。第二,政府補(bǔ)貼和優(yōu)惠稅率均能夠顯著提升不同所有權(quán)性質(zhì)企業(yè)研發(fā)投資,但優(yōu)惠稅率的激勵效果更好。第三,政府補(bǔ)貼與優(yōu)惠稅率的交互項、高管年薪與政府補(bǔ)貼和優(yōu)惠稅率的交互項對不同所有權(quán)性質(zhì)企業(yè)研發(fā)投資均具有顯著的協(xié)同效應(yīng),高管持股比例只有在0~36.44%范圍內(nèi)時與高管年薪、政府補(bǔ)貼和優(yōu)惠稅率的交互項對不同所有權(quán)性質(zhì)企業(yè)研發(fā)投資具有顯著的協(xié)同效應(yīng)。針對研究結(jié)論,本文從企業(yè)和政府兩個層面提出對策建議。企業(yè)層面,合理設(shè)計高管薪酬結(jié)構(gòu),以股權(quán)激勵為主導(dǎo)方向。政府層面,政府補(bǔ)貼與稅收優(yōu)惠相結(jié)合,以稅收優(yōu)惠為主導(dǎo)方向;調(diào)整政府補(bǔ)貼在不同所有權(quán)性質(zhì)企業(yè)間的比重。
[Abstract]:In the era of knowledge economy, innovation is the important guarantee for enterprises to stand in the fierce market competition. Research and development investment is the core of innovation. In recent years, the intensity of R & D investment in China has been increasing, but it is far from the developed countries. This phenomenon has become a strategic transformation of "innovation driven" in China's economy. One of the important factors to promote the comprehensive strength of the country. How to solve the problem of the lack of R & D investment in the company, the academic circle mainly studies the two aspects of the financial and tax incentives and executive compensation. At present, the research on the impact of financial and tax incentives and executive compensation on R & D investment is mainly focused on the single factor research level, which lacks systematic and deep analysis. Because the problem of R & D investment is a complex system problem, rather than the simple addition of single factor, based on this, this paper puts the executive compensation, financial and tax incentives and R & D investment into the same analysis framework, and uses systematic synergy effect to explore the synergy effect of executive compensation and tax incentives on R & D investment. It not only further expands the scope of research, but also provides a new perspective for the promotion of R & D investment in the company. In order to test the synergy effect of executive compensation and financial and tax incentives on R & D investment, it adopts the normative research method and empirical research method, and selects the Shanghai and Shenzhen A shares listed companies for the empirical test from 2010 to 2015. First, on the whole, the annual salary of senior executives significantly promotes the company's R & D investment, the proportion of shareholding and R & D investment has a significant inverted U relationship, and the incentive effect of executive equity incentive is better than the annual salary for the promotion of R & D investment; for the state-owned enterprises, the annual salary and the share ratio of senior executives can significantly promote R & D investment; for private enterprises, the senior executives are not paid a salary. It can promote R & D investment effectively. The proportion of shareholding can only promote R & D investment significantly only in the range of 0~36.44%. Second, government subsidies and preferential tax rates can significantly improve the R & D investment of different ownership enterprises, but the incentive effect of preferential tax rate is better. Third, the interaction of government subsidy and preferential tax rate, senior executive salary and government subsidy The interaction between the preferential tax rate and the preferential tax rate has significant synergy effect on the R & D investment of different ownership enterprises. The proportion of the executive stock is only within the range of 0~36.44% and the annual salary of the executive. The interaction of government subsidy and preferential tax rate has significant synergistic effect on the enterprise R & D investment with different ownership properties. From the two levels of the enterprise and the government, the paper puts forward the countermeasures and suggestions. The enterprise level, the rational design of executive compensation structure, with equity incentive as the leading direction. The government level, the government subsidies and tax incentives combined, tax preference as the dominant direction, adjustment of the proportion of government subsidies in different ownership of enterprises.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：鄭州航空工業(yè)管理學(xué)院
【學(xué)位級別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2017
【分類號】：F272.92;F275;F832.51

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