信息不對稱、信號質(zhì)量與股權眾籌融資績效
發(fā)布時間:2018-05-30 02:37
本文選題:股權眾籌 + 信號理論; 參考:《財貿(mào)經(jīng)濟》2017年05期
【摘要】:由于互聯(lián)網(wǎng)的虛擬性,股權眾籌中信息不對稱問題更甚于傳統(tǒng)融資市場,這極大地阻礙了股權眾籌行業(yè)的健康發(fā)展。本文從股權眾籌的信息不對稱角度出發(fā),以信號理論為基礎,利用京東東家私募股權融資平臺上83個融資成功的創(chuàng)投板項目對股權眾籌項目質(zhì)量的信號進行研究,并深入到信號質(zhì)量層面探究信號的作用機制。研究結果表明:項目描述、人力資本、起投金額、社交互動是項目質(zhì)量的正向信號而不確定性是反向信號,領投人的投資不是項目質(zhì)量的有效信號;項目不確定性負向調(diào)節(jié)了質(zhì)量信號對融資績效的作用。根據(jù)不確定性的高低,本文區(qū)分了項目描述和人力資本代理變量的"真?zhèn)?:當項目的不確定性高時,項目簡介的文本長度和是否有視頻是"真信號",項目團隊成員數(shù)目是"偽信號";而當項目不確定性低時,項目簡介的文本長度和是否有視頻是"偽信號",項目團隊成員數(shù)目是"真信號"。本文結果為項目發(fā)起方提升融資績效以及股權眾籌平臺優(yōu)化機制設計提供了應用參考。
[Abstract]:Because of the fictitious nature of the Internet, the information asymmetry in crowdfunding is more serious than that in the traditional financing market, which greatly hinders the healthy development of the stock raising industry. Based on the signal theory and the information asymmetry of crowdfunding, this paper makes use of 83 successful venture board projects on the private equity financing platform of JingDong owners to study the signal of the quality of the stock crowdfunding projects. And further into the level of signal quality to explore the mechanism of signal action. The results show that: project description, human capital, investment amount, social interaction are positive signals of project quality, uncertainty is the reverse signal, and the investment of lead investors is not the effective signal of project quality; Project uncertainty negatively regulates the effect of quality signals on financing performance. According to the uncertainty, this paper distinguishes the "true or false" between the project description and the human capital agent variable: when the uncertainty of the project is high, The text length of the project profile and whether there is a video is a "true signal", and the number of project team members is a "false signal"; and when the project uncertainty is low, The text length of the project profile and whether there is a video is a false signal, and the number of project team members is a true signal. The results of this paper provide an application reference for the project sponsors to improve their financing performance and the optimization mechanism design of equity crowdfunding platform.
【作者單位】: 武漢大學經(jīng)濟與管理學院金融系;武漢大學經(jīng)濟與管理學院;
【基金】:國家自然科學基金重大研究計劃重點支持項目“基于知識關聯(lián)的金融大數(shù)據(jù)價值分析、發(fā)現(xiàn)及協(xié)同創(chuàng)造機制”(91646206);國家自然科學基金重點項目“基于互聯(lián)網(wǎng)金融模式的結構性理財產(chǎn)品風險度量及應用研究”(71631005)的資助
【分類號】:F830.42;F832.51
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本文編號:1953553
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