本文選題：云服務(wù)提供商 + 道德風(fēng)險(xiǎn)�。� 參考：《系統(tǒng)管理學(xué)報(bào)》2017年05期

【摘要】：客戶企業(yè)實(shí)施云外包時(shí),面臨著服務(wù)質(zhì)量信息不對稱所帶來的風(fēng)險(xiǎn)。針對在"一對多"的云外包服務(wù)模式下,因云服務(wù)提供商(CSP)服務(wù)質(zhì)量不可觀測所引發(fā)的共同代理問題,以客戶企業(yè)期望收入最大化為目標(biāo),分別在客戶企業(yè)合作及不合作情況下,設(shè)計(jì)外包合同以激勵(lì)CSP付出最優(yōu)的服務(wù)質(zhì)量水平,并對兩種情況下的合同激勵(lì)效果進(jìn)行比較分析。研究表明:當(dāng)客戶企業(yè)之間合作時(shí),收益共享系數(shù)由服務(wù)質(zhì)量對產(chǎn)出的影響系數(shù)、風(fēng)險(xiǎn)規(guī)避度、產(chǎn)出方差和成本效率參數(shù)所決定;當(dāng)不合作時(shí),具有先動(dòng)優(yōu)勢的客戶企業(yè)不會(huì)向CSP支付固定服務(wù)報(bào)酬;客戶企業(yè)之間合作時(shí)的合同激勵(lì)效果要優(yōu)于不合作時(shí)的激勵(lì)效果。
[Abstract]:When customer enterprise implements cloud outsourcing, it faces the risk of asymmetric service quality information. Under the "one to many" cloud outsourcing service mode, the common agent problem caused by the unobservable service quality of the cloud service provider (CSP) is aimed at the maximization of the customer's expected income. Under the circumstances, the design outsourcing contract is designed to encourage the CSP to pay the best quality of service and to compare the effect of the contract incentive under the two circumstances. When the company does not cooperate, the customer enterprises with predominant advantage will not pay the fixed service payment to the CSP, and the incentive effect of the contract between the customers' enterprises is better than the incentive effect when they do not cooperate.
【作者單位】： 重慶工商大學(xué)商務(wù)策劃學(xué)院;電子科技大學(xué)經(jīng)濟(jì)管理學(xué)院;重慶大學(xué)經(jīng)濟(jì)與工商管理學(xué)院;西南政法大學(xué)經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)院;
【基金】：國家自然科學(xué)基金資助項(xiàng)目(71272086) 國家社會(huì)科學(xué)基金重大項(xiàng)目(15ZDB169) 重慶市教委科學(xué)技術(shù)研究項(xiàng)目(KJ1705126);重慶市教委人文社科項(xiàng)目(17SKG075)
【分類號(hào)】：F274
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本文編號(hào)：1938649