本文選題：供應(yīng)鏈 + 延長(zhǎng)擔(dān)保　； 參考：《中國(guó)科學(xué)技術(shù)大學(xué)》2017年碩士論文

【摘要】：近年來(lái),延長(zhǎng)擔(dān)保在電腦、汽車、家用電器等耐用產(chǎn)品行業(yè)中非常流行。以往這類行業(yè)的一個(gè)重要特征就是制造商在整個(gè)供應(yīng)鏈中處于領(lǐng)導(dǎo)者的角色。面對(duì)日益激烈的市場(chǎng)競(jìng)爭(zhēng)以及瞬息萬(wàn)變的經(jīng)濟(jì)地位,供應(yīng)鏈中的零售商正在不斷增強(qiáng)自身的實(shí)力,有時(shí)候甚至可以支配整個(gè)供應(yīng)鏈的運(yùn)作方向�；谀壳笆袌�(chǎng)上的零售現(xiàn)狀并針對(duì)以往學(xué)者們的研究不足,本文進(jìn)行了零售商為領(lǐng)導(dǎo)者和制造商為領(lǐng)導(dǎo)者的延長(zhǎng)擔(dān)保供應(yīng)商模型對(duì)比分析。本文主要研究延長(zhǎng)擔(dān)保供應(yīng)鏈中制造商和零售商的博弈地位對(duì)產(chǎn)品政策和延長(zhǎng)擔(dān)保政策的影響,我們假設(shè)這個(gè)延長(zhǎng)擔(dān)保供應(yīng)鏈中只有一個(gè)制造商和一個(gè)零售商,并用斯坦科爾伯格博弈理論來(lái)描述制造商和零售商之間的博弈。這篇文章同時(shí)研究了制造商為領(lǐng)導(dǎo)者和零售商為領(lǐng)導(dǎo)者的情況,并且將產(chǎn)品的質(zhì)量作為決策變量,對(duì)比分析了兩種延長(zhǎng)擔(dān)保提供者模型:零售商或制造商提供延長(zhǎng)擔(dān)保。研究表明,不管是制造商還是零售商為領(lǐng)導(dǎo)者,產(chǎn)品的最優(yōu)質(zhì)量在制造商提供延長(zhǎng)擔(dān)保模型中低于零售商提供延長(zhǎng)擔(dān)保模型,且零售商提供延長(zhǎng)擔(dān)保時(shí),產(chǎn)品及延長(zhǎng)擔(dān)保銷量最大。制造商提供延長(zhǎng)擔(dān)保時(shí),零售商作為領(lǐng)導(dǎo)者時(shí)產(chǎn)品的質(zhì)量低于制造商作為領(lǐng)導(dǎo)者時(shí)產(chǎn)品的質(zhì)量。零售商提供延長(zhǎng)擔(dān)保時(shí)產(chǎn)品質(zhì)量最高,制造商提供延長(zhǎng)擔(dān)保且其處于弱勢(shì)地位時(shí)產(chǎn)品質(zhì)量最差。延長(zhǎng)擔(dān)保提供者相同時(shí),制造商作為領(lǐng)導(dǎo)者,產(chǎn)品及延長(zhǎng)擔(dān)保銷量最大。對(duì)各方而言,提供延長(zhǎng)擔(dān)保時(shí)比不提供時(shí)利潤(rùn)要大,提供延長(zhǎng)擔(dān)保是最優(yōu)決策,且處于領(lǐng)導(dǎo)地位時(shí)的優(yōu)勢(shì)更大。
[Abstract]:In recent years, extended warranty in computers, cars, household appliances and other durable products industry is very popular. An important feature of such industries in the past was the leading role of manufacturers in the entire supply chain. Facing the increasingly fierce market competition and the rapidly changing economic status, the retailers in the supply chain are increasing their own strength, and sometimes they can even control the operation direction of the whole supply chain. Based on the current retail situation in the market and the lack of previous scholars, this paper makes a comparative analysis of extended guarantee supplier models with retailers as leaders and manufacturers as leaders. This paper mainly studies the influence of the game position of manufacturer and retailer on product policy and extended guarantee policy in the extended guarantee supply chain. We assume that there is only one manufacturer and one retailer in the extended guarantee supply chain. The game between manufacturer and retailer is described by Steinkelberg game theory. This paper studies the situation of manufacturer as leader and retailer as leader, and takes product quality as decision variable, and compares two extended guarantee provider models: retailer or manufacturer provides extended guarantee. The research shows that, whether the manufacturer or the retailer is the leader, the optimal quality of the product is lower in the extended warranty model than in the extended guarantee model provided by the manufacturer, and when the retailer provides the extended guarantee model, Sales of products and extended warranty are the largest. When the manufacturer provides extended warranty, the quality of the retailer as leader is lower than that of the manufacturer as leader. The product quality is the highest when the retailer provides the extension guarantee, and the product quality is the worst when the manufacturer provides the extension guarantee and is in the weak position. When the extension guarantee provider is the same, the manufacturer as the leader, the product and extension guarantee sales are the largest. For the parties, the profit is greater when extending the guarantee than when the guarantee is not provided, and it is the best decision to provide the extended guarantee, and the advantage is greater when it is in the leading position.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：中國(guó)科學(xué)技術(shù)大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級(jí)別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2017
【分類號(hào)】：F274

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