本文選題：單邊非完全信息 + 信號博弈　； 參考：《西安建筑科技大學》2017年碩士論文

【摘要】：近年來,使用博弈論研究供應鏈的方法已經(jīng)引起了學術(shù)界的高度關(guān)注,并被廣泛應用。傳統(tǒng)研究供應鏈的方法主要有三種。第一,控制理論。它用差分方程為供應鏈建模,用積分變換來研究其特性。優(yōu)點是可以動態(tài)的分析供應鏈,缺點是要求供應鏈系統(tǒng)是線性的。而實際情況下的供應鏈都不能滿足這個條件,大大限制了其使用范圍;第二,仿真方法。它是針對供應鏈系統(tǒng)建立模型;第三,運籌學方法。它主要適用于非線性的供應鏈系統(tǒng),但是這種方法不能嚴格動態(tài)的分析供應鏈。以往對于供應鏈的研究僅僅集中在系統(tǒng)具體的節(jié)點企業(yè)上,對于整條鏈作為整體研究其協(xié)調(diào)問題少之又少,即使有也只是局限于單邊非完全信息的情形下。缺乏對供應鏈系統(tǒng)節(jié)點企業(yè)同時擁有私人信息情形的進一步研究,尤其是用供應鏈契約協(xié)調(diào)系統(tǒng)內(nèi)的各節(jié)點企業(yè)。在生產(chǎn)成本與市場需求的變化下,擁有產(chǎn)品生產(chǎn)成本私人信息的供應商與擁有真實市場需求信息的銷售商二者的利潤是一種你增我減的情形。銷售獎懲契約具有平衡供應商和銷售商信息優(yōu)勢的靈活性。第一,研究在單邊非完全信息情形下,從供應商發(fā)送信號方式的角度解決供應商的選擇問題。設(shè)計了不同類型的供應商發(fā)送信號成本不同的博弈模型,通過數(shù)學方法得到唯一的精煉貝葉斯均衡解。得到結(jié)論只有不同類型供應商信號發(fā)送成本不同時,生產(chǎn)商可通過接收信號甄別供應商。解決了在單邊非完全信息情形下供應商的選擇博弈問題。第二,研究擁有產(chǎn)品生產(chǎn)成本私人信息的供應商與擁有市場真實需求信息的銷售商構(gòu)成的二級供應鏈在此種雙邊非完全信息情形下,制定供應鏈契約的問題。本文引入了沒有個人利潤的利他委托人作為系統(tǒng)的委托人,以供應鏈作為協(xié)調(diào)主體,建立了供應商與銷售商構(gòu)成的二級供應鏈在此雙邊非完全信息情形下的博弈模型。首先將完全信息情形下的最優(yōu)訂購量與雙邊非完全信息情形下的最優(yōu)訂購量進行對比,研究發(fā)現(xiàn)供應鏈的利潤發(fā)生了扭曲,得到了該二級供應鏈在此種雙邊非完全信息情形下很難達到協(xié)調(diào)。其次得到了系統(tǒng)中節(jié)點企業(yè)的轉(zhuǎn)移支付。最后,研究了固定價格契約問題,求解出銷售獎懲契約的具體參數(shù)形式。本論文對于供應鏈系統(tǒng)內(nèi)具體節(jié)點的研究以及制定其他類型供應鏈系統(tǒng)契約提供了理論基礎(chǔ)與實踐方法。
[Abstract]:In recent years, the method of using game theory to study supply chain has attracted much attention and been widely used. There are three methods of traditional research on supply chain. First, the theory of control. The difference equation is used to model the supply chain and the integral transformation is used to study its characteristics. The advantage is that the supply chain can be dynamically analyzed, but the disadvantage is that the supply chain system is required to be linear. In fact, the supply chain can not meet this condition, which greatly limits the scope of its use. Second, the simulation method. It is to build a model for the supply chain system; third, the operational research method. It is mainly suitable for nonlinear supply chain system, but this method can not be used to analyze supply chain strictly and dynamically. In the past, the research of supply chain is only focused on the specific node enterprises of the system, and the coordination problem of the whole chain as a whole is very few, even if there is only limited to the case of unilateral incomplete information. There is a lack of further research on the situation that the node enterprises in the supply chain system have private information at the same time, especially the node enterprises in the supply chain contract coordination system. Under the change of production cost and market demand, the profit of supplier with private information of production cost and seller with real market demand information is a case of increasing or decreasing. Sales rewards and penalties contracts have the flexibility to balance the information advantages of suppliers and vendors. Firstly, in the case of unilateral incomplete information, the problem of supplier selection is solved from the point of view of the way the supplier sends signals. A game model with different cost of sending signals from different suppliers is designed and the unique refined Bayesian equilibrium solution is obtained by mathematical method. It is concluded that only different types of suppliers have different signaling costs and manufacturers can identify suppliers by receiving signals. The problem of supplier selection game in the case of unilateral incomplete information is solved. Secondly, this paper studies the problem of making supply chain contract in the case of bilateral incomplete information between suppliers with private information of product production cost and vendors with real market demand information. In this paper, we introduce altruistic clients with no personal profit as the trustor of the system, take the supply chain as the coordinating agent, and set up the game model of the two-level supply chain composed of the supplier and the seller under the condition of the bilateral incomplete information. Firstly, the optimal order quantity in the case of complete information is compared with that in the case of bilateral incomplete information, and it is found that the profit of the supply chain is distorted. The two-level supply chain is difficult to coordinate under the condition of bilateral incomplete information. Secondly, the transfer payment of node enterprises in the system is obtained. Finally, the fixed price contract problem is studied, and the specific parameter form of the sales reward and punishment contract is solved. This paper provides the theoretical basis and practical method for the research of the specific nodes in the supply chain system and the formulation of other types of supply chain system contracts.
【學位授予單位】：西安建筑科技大學
【學位級別】：碩士
【學位授予年份】：2017
【分類號】：F274

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本文編號：1873111