本文選題：十八大 + 反腐敗��； 參考：《金融研究》2016年08期

【摘要】：盡管精確地評(píng)估反腐敗對經(jīng)濟(jì)的影響具有重要學(xué)術(shù)意義與政策價(jià)值,但囿于數(shù)據(jù)以及計(jì)量識(shí)別策略,當(dāng)前研究還存在諸多爭議和不足。本文利用一個(gè)中國的準(zhǔn)自然實(shí)驗(yàn)作為外生沖擊,來識(shí)別反腐敗與微觀企業(yè)行為之間的因果關(guān)系。具體而言,我們利用倍差法(DID)考察十八大前后中國上市公司的公司治理、高管激勵(lì)與股東價(jià)值是否發(fā)生了變化,研究發(fā)現(xiàn):(1)十八大之后,高腐敗地區(qū)上市公司的現(xiàn)金持有的市場價(jià)值明顯增加,同時(shí)此類上市公司的高管薪酬業(yè)績敏感性也顯著提高。(2)在會(huì)計(jì)質(zhì)量方面,高腐敗地區(qū)上市公司在十八大后財(cái)務(wù)報(bào)表質(zhì)量明顯提升,同時(shí)盈余管理的情況顯著減少。此外,我們還發(fā)現(xiàn),高腐敗地區(qū)上市公司在十八大后會(huì)計(jì)質(zhì)量的改善主要集中于非國有企業(yè),高管薪酬業(yè)績敏感性的提升則主要集中于國有企業(yè)。本文研究豐富了反腐敗研究文獻(xiàn),為我國進(jìn)一步深化改革實(shí)踐提供了政策參考,即反腐敗有助于改善公司治理,強(qiáng)化高管激勵(lì)機(jī)制和提高會(huì)計(jì)質(zhì)量,從而最終增進(jìn)股東價(jià)值。
[Abstract]:Although it is of great academic significance and policy value to accurately assess the impact of anti-corruption on the economy, due to the data and metrological identification strategies, there are still many controversies and deficiencies in the current research. In this paper, a quasi-natural experiment in China is used as an exogenous shock to identify the causal relationship between anti-corruption and microenterprise behavior. In particular, we use the double dip method to investigate the corporate governance of listed companies in China before and after the 18th National Congress, and whether the value of executive incentives and shareholders has changed. The study found that after the 18th National Congress, The market value of cash holdings of listed companies in high corruption areas increased significantly, and the sensitivity of executive compensation performance of such listed companies also increased significantly. The quality of financial statements and earnings management of listed companies in high corruption areas improved significantly after the 18th CPC National Congress. In addition, we also find that the improvement of accounting quality of listed companies in high corruption areas after the 18th CPC National Congress is mainly focused on non-state-owned enterprises, while the sensitivity of executive compensation performance is mainly concentrated in state-owned enterprises. This study enriches the research literature on anti-corruption and provides a policy reference for further deepening the reform practice in our country, that is, anti-corruption helps to improve corporate governance, strengthen the incentive mechanism of senior executives and improve the quality of accounting, thus ultimately enhancing the value of shareholders.
【作者單位】： 對外經(jīng)濟(jì)貿(mào)易大學(xué);中南財(cái)經(jīng)政法大學(xué);
【分類號(hào)】：D262.6;F271
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本文編號(hào)：1842406