本文選題：供應(yīng)中斷 + 雙源采購��； 參考：《煙臺大學(xué)》2017年碩士論文

【摘要】：經(jīng)濟(jì)全球化的發(fā)展使得市場競爭環(huán)境日益復(fù)雜,供應(yīng)鏈中的不確定因素越來越多,各種突發(fā)事件頻發(fā),加劇了供應(yīng)中斷的風(fēng)險(xiǎn);加之供應(yīng)鏈各成員之間私人信息不共享,導(dǎo)致市場失靈,供應(yīng)鏈運(yùn)作低效。市場各種弊端的訴求使得緩解中斷風(fēng)險(xiǎn)、信息共享迫在眉睫。本文對上述出現(xiàn)的供應(yīng)鏈問題分兩部分加以論述,首先采用雙源采購策略來緩解供應(yīng)中斷風(fēng)險(xiǎn),假定供應(yīng)可靠性信息已知,研究由一個(gè)制造商和兩個(gè)供應(yīng)商構(gòu)成的兩級供應(yīng)鏈契約設(shè)計(jì),考慮部分中斷和完全中斷兩種類型的供應(yīng)商,將部分中斷供應(yīng)商作為主供應(yīng)商,完全中斷供應(yīng)商作為次供應(yīng)商,建立雙源采購的供應(yīng)鏈契約設(shè)計(jì)模型,運(yùn)用逆序解法,得到供應(yīng)商的最優(yōu)生產(chǎn)規(guī)模和制造商的最優(yōu)契約設(shè)計(jì),并分析當(dāng)供應(yīng)商面臨雙源采購時(shí)的簽約決策及訂貨策略。然后考慮信息不對稱問題,假定市場中存在高可靠性和低可靠性兩種類型的供應(yīng)商,且供應(yīng)商可靠性為其私人信息,市場需求服從隨機(jī)分布。制造商提供一組契約包括四個(gè)決策變量:固定支付、變動支付、訂貨量和懲罰成本,供應(yīng)商根據(jù)契約內(nèi)容決定自己的最優(yōu)生產(chǎn)規(guī)模。然后建立動態(tài)規(guī)劃模型,運(yùn)用顯示原理,研究在信息對稱和不對稱兩種情況下制造商的契約設(shè)計(jì)和供應(yīng)商的生產(chǎn)決策,最后分析供應(yīng)商可靠性的信息價(jià)值。研究結(jié)果表明:供應(yīng)商最優(yōu)生產(chǎn)規(guī)模與產(chǎn)品的單位生產(chǎn)成本呈負(fù)相關(guān),與單位變動支付和單位懲罰成本呈正相關(guān);制造商的訂貨量與供應(yīng)商的可靠性呈正相關(guān);供應(yīng)商的懲罰成本與自身可靠性呈負(fù)相關(guān)。不論信息是否共享,制造商對高可靠性供應(yīng)商的訂貨量都大于對低可靠性供應(yīng)商的訂貨量,且信息價(jià)值隨著兩種供應(yīng)商的可靠性水平之差的增大而增大,隨著高可靠性供應(yīng)商在市場中所占比例的增大而增大,隨著低可靠性供應(yīng)商在市場中所占比例的增大而減小。
[Abstract]:With the development of economic globalization, the market competition environment is becoming more and more complex, the uncertain factors in supply chain are more and more, and various kinds of unexpected events frequently occur, which aggravate the risk of supply interruption; in addition, private information is not shared among members of supply chain. Lead to market failure, supply chain operation is inefficient. All kinds of malpractices in the market make it urgent to reduce the risk of interruption and share information. In this paper, the supply chain problems mentioned above are discussed in two parts. Firstly, dual-source purchasing strategy is used to mitigate the supply interruption risk, assuming that the supply reliability information is known. This paper studies the design of a two-level supply chain contract consisting of one manufacturer and two suppliers, considering two types of suppliers: partial interruption and complete interruption. The partial interrupt supplier is regarded as the main supplier and the complete interrupt supplier as the secondary supplier. The supply chain contract design model of dual-source purchasing is established. The optimal production scale of supplier and the optimal contract design of manufacturer are obtained by using reverse order method. The contract decision and ordering strategy are analyzed when the supplier is faced with dual-source purchase. Then considering the problem of information asymmetry, it is assumed that there are two types of suppliers in the market with high reliability and low reliability, and the supplier reliability is its private information, and the market demand is randomly distributed. The manufacturer provides a set of contracts with four decision variables: fixed payment, variable payment, order quantity and penalty cost, and suppliers determine their optimal production scale according to the content of the contract. Then the dynamic programming model is established and the information value of supplier reliability is analyzed by using the display principle to study the contract design of the manufacturer and the production decision of the supplier under the condition of information symmetry and asymmetry. The results show that the optimal production scale of the supplier is negatively correlated with the unit production cost of the product, positively correlated with the unit variable payment and unit penalty cost, and the order quantity of the manufacturer is positively correlated with the reliability of the supplier. The penalty cost of suppliers is negatively correlated with their own reliability. Regardless of whether the information is shared or not, the manufacturer's order volume for high reliability suppliers is greater than for low reliability suppliers, and the value of information increases with the increase of the difference between the two suppliers' reliability levels. With the increase of the proportion of high reliability suppliers in the market, the proportion of low reliability suppliers in the market increases and decreases.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：煙臺大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2017
【分類號】：F274

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