發(fā)布時(shí)間：2018-04-11 14:53

  本文選題：零杠桿政策 + 銀行債權(quán)人缺失　； 參考：《財(cái)貿(mào)研究》2016年02期

【摘要】：以中國(guó)滬深股市2007—2013年上市公司為樣本,從銀行債權(quán)人缺失的視角實(shí)證檢驗(yàn)零杠桿政策對(duì)股東與管理層間代理沖突的影響。結(jié)果表明:由于銀行債權(quán)人的缺失,零杠桿公司中因股東與管理層間的代理沖突所產(chǎn)生的代理成本顯著高于杠桿公司;零杠桿政策的持續(xù)時(shí)間越長(zhǎng),由股東與管理層間的代理沖突所產(chǎn)生的代理成本就越大;此外,公司采用零杠桿"進(jìn)入"決策時(shí),零杠桿"進(jìn)入"決策當(dāng)年的代理成本顯著高于"進(jìn)入"決策前一年度的代理成本。
[Abstract]:Based on the sample of listed companies in China's Shanghai and Shenzhen stock markets from 2007 to 2013, this paper empirically examines the impact of zero-leverage policy on the agency conflict between shareholders and management from the perspective of bank creditor deficiency.The results show that the agency cost caused by the conflict between shareholders and management in the zero-leverage company is significantly higher than that in the leveraged company due to the lack of bank creditors, and the longer the zero-leverage policy lasts,The greater the agency costs arising from agency conflicts between shareholders and management; in addition, when companies use zero leverage to "enter" decisions,The agency cost in the year of zero leverage entry decision is significantly higher than that in the year prior to entry decision.
【作者單位】： 西安交通大學(xué)管理學(xué)院;上海對(duì)外經(jīng)貿(mào)大學(xué)會(huì)計(jì)學(xué)院;
【基金】：教育部人文社會(huì)科學(xué)研究西部和邊疆地區(qū)青年基金項(xiàng)目“重要性判斷、公司治理與財(cái)務(wù)重述信息披露”(14XJC790001)
【分類號(hào)】：F275
，

本文編號(hào)：1736457