本文選題：政治關(guān)聯(lián) + 過度投資水平　； 參考：《西北大學(xué)》2017年碩士論文

【摘要】：在轉(zhuǎn)型經(jīng)濟(jì)的制度背景下,政治關(guān)聯(lián)作為非制度因素的一種補(bǔ)充機(jī)制,是影響企業(yè)過度投資的重要因素。在我國,政府對(duì)社會(huì)稀缺資源的干預(yù)能力很強(qiáng),顯著影響企業(yè)經(jīng)營活動(dòng)。與國有企業(yè)不同,民營企業(yè)的發(fā)展受眾多因素限制,迫切需要與政府保持密切聯(lián)系以改善外部資源環(huán)境。本文選取2013-2015年滬、深A(yù)股的民營上市公司為初始樣本,從政治關(guān)聯(lián)存在性、政治關(guān)聯(lián)程度及強(qiáng)度和政治關(guān)聯(lián)類型三個(gè)層次構(gòu)建政治關(guān)聯(lián)體系,分析我國民營上市公司政治關(guān)聯(lián)與過度投資之間的相關(guān)性,得到以下結(jié)論:(1)政治關(guān)聯(lián)的確會(huì)引發(fā)我國民營企業(yè)過度投資,促使其過度投資水平更高;(2)進(jìn)一步地,政治關(guān)聯(lián)程度顯著促進(jìn)民營企業(yè)過度投資問題更加嚴(yán)重,民營企業(yè)過度投資水平會(huì)隨著政治關(guān)聯(lián)程度的提高而上升;(3)政治關(guān)聯(lián)強(qiáng)度并不會(huì)加重民營企業(yè)過度投資,二者呈不顯著的正相關(guān)關(guān)系,即民營企業(yè)過度投資水平不會(huì)隨著政治關(guān)聯(lián)強(qiáng)度的增強(qiáng)而升高;(4)對(duì)政治關(guān)聯(lián)類型作進(jìn)一步區(qū)分后的結(jié)果表明,獨(dú)立董事型政治關(guān)聯(lián)并沒有發(fā)揮治理效應(yīng),反而促進(jìn)民營企業(yè)過度投資,但這種效果并不顯著。即獨(dú)立董事型政治關(guān)聯(lián)并不會(huì)抑制民營企業(yè)過度投資;(5)其他高管型政治關(guān)聯(lián)會(huì)加重民營企業(yè)過度投資,二者呈現(xiàn)顯著的正相關(guān)關(guān)系。即民營企業(yè)過度投資問題會(huì)隨著其他高管政治關(guān)聯(lián)的建立而更加嚴(yán)重。
[Abstract]:Under the institutional background of the transition economy, political association, as a supplementary mechanism of non-institutional factors, is an important factor affecting the overinvestment of enterprises.In China, the government's ability to intervene in social scarce resources is very strong, significantly affecting business activities.Different from the state-owned enterprises, the development of private enterprises is restricted by many factors, so it is urgent to maintain close contact with the government to improve the external resource environment.This paper selects the private listed companies of Shanghai and Shenzhen A shares from 2013-2015 as the initial sample to construct the political association system from three levels: the existence of political association, the degree and intensity of political association and the type of political association.By analyzing the correlation between political association and overinvestment of private listed companies in China, the following conclusions are drawn: 1) political association will indeed lead to excessive investment of private enterprises in China, and promote the level of over-investment in private enterprises to a higher level.The degree of political connection significantly promotes the problem of excessive investment of private enterprises, and the level of excessive investment of private enterprises will rise with the increase of the degree of political connection) the intensity of political connection will not aggravate the excessive investment of private enterprises.There is no significant positive correlation between the two, that is, the level of excessive investment in private enterprises will not increase with the increase of the intensity of political association.The political relation of independent director does not exert the governance effect, on the contrary, it promotes the private enterprise to invest excessively, but this kind of effect is not remarkable.That is, independent director-type political association does not restrain private enterprise overinvestment. Other top-level political association will aggravate private enterprise overinvestment, and there is a significant positive correlation between them.That is, the problem of excessive investment in private enterprises will become more serious with the establishment of political connections among other senior executives.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：西北大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級(jí)別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2017
【分類號(hào)】：F276.5;D0;F275

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本文編號(hào)：1734066