本文選題：股權(quán)激勵 + 制度環(huán)境��； 參考：《金融經(jīng)濟學(xué)研究》2017年04期

【摘要】：以2006~2015年推出股權(quán)激勵方案的上市公司為考察對象,采用OLS回歸的方法實證檢驗了股權(quán)激勵對企業(yè)資本投資效率的影響,并深入分析了股權(quán)激勵、制度環(huán)境與企業(yè)資本投資效率間的關(guān)系。研究發(fā)現(xiàn),股權(quán)激勵有效地抑制了企業(yè)投資過度和緩解投資不足,改善了企業(yè)資本投資效率;與限制性股票激勵相比,股票期權(quán)激勵對企業(yè)資本投資效率的作用更明顯;股權(quán)激勵強度與企業(yè)資本投資效率存在U型關(guān)系,股權(quán)激勵強度抑制企業(yè)投資過度行為作用更為明顯;股權(quán)激勵能改善國有企業(yè)資本投資效率,股權(quán)激勵強度能有效抑制非國有企業(yè)投資過度行為。因此,在具體股權(quán)激勵實施中,要根據(jù)實際情況選擇股權(quán)激勵方式和確定最優(yōu)激勵水平。
[Abstract]:Taking the listed companies that launched the equity incentive scheme from 2006 to 2015 as the object of investigation, this paper empirically tests the influence of equity incentive on the efficiency of capital investment by using OLS regression method, and analyzes the equity incentive in depth.The relationship between institutional environment and capital investment efficiency.It is found that the equity incentive can effectively restrain the excessive investment and alleviate the insufficient investment, and improve the efficiency of the enterprise capital investment, compared with the restrictive stock incentive, the stock option incentive has a more obvious effect on the efficiency of the enterprise capital investment.There is a U-type relationship between the intensity of equity incentive and the efficiency of capital investment, and the effect of intensity of equity incentive on the excessive behavior of enterprise investment is more obvious, and equity incentive can improve the efficiency of capital investment of state-owned enterprises.The intensity of equity incentive can effectively restrain the excessive investment behavior of non-state-owned enterprises.Therefore, in the implementation of specific equity incentive, we should choose the equity incentive mode and determine the optimal incentive level according to the actual situation.
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本文編號：1732335