本文選題：瀘州老窖　切入點(diǎn)：股權(quán)激勵(lì)　出處：《黑龍江八一農(nóng)墾大學(xué)》2017年碩士論文

【摘要】：在現(xiàn)代企業(yè)制度中,委托代理制度的存在使得企業(yè)所有權(quán)和經(jīng)營(yíng)權(quán)相分離,造成所有者和經(jīng)營(yíng)者利益不一致,股權(quán)激勵(lì)制度是解決公司制中“委托—代理”問(wèn)題的最好工具。股權(quán)激勵(lì)作為公司采用的一種長(zhǎng)期激勵(lì)工具,能解決所有者和經(jīng)營(yíng)者利益不一致的問(wèn)題,實(shí)現(xiàn)兩者利益的最大化。股權(quán)激勵(lì)作為一種長(zhǎng)期且行之有效的激勵(lì)手段,近幾年來(lái)在我國(guó)的上市公司中非常受歡迎。目前國(guó)有企業(yè)正處于改革階段,其中最具有代表性的國(guó)有控股白酒行業(yè)的改革備受矚目,國(guó)有企業(yè)在改革期間實(shí)施股權(quán)激勵(lì)來(lái)保證企業(yè)的長(zhǎng)遠(yuǎn)發(fā)展,但同時(shí)也存在眾多的問(wèn)題,比如資本市場(chǎng)不成熟、缺少有效業(yè)績(jī)考核機(jī)制等。所以,在此背景下研究股權(quán)激勵(lì)的作用、效果、缺點(diǎn)并改進(jìn),也為之后企業(yè)實(shí)施股權(quán)激勵(lì)提供了理論基礎(chǔ)。本文在委托代理理論、人力資本理論和激勵(lì)理論的基礎(chǔ)上,進(jìn)行個(gè)例研究,以典型的國(guó)有控股白酒企業(yè)瀘州老窖為研究對(duì)象,研究其股權(quán)激勵(lì)的方案和實(shí)施的效果,并對(duì)股權(quán)激勵(lì)方案進(jìn)行改進(jìn)優(yōu)化操作。主要研究?jī)?nèi)容是在股權(quán)激勵(lì)理論的基礎(chǔ)上介紹并分析了瀘州老窖實(shí)施的股權(quán)激勵(lì)方案,接著利用定性和定量的研究方法分析了股權(quán)激勵(lì)的實(shí)施效果并深入探討了股權(quán)激勵(lì)方案在實(shí)施過(guò)程中暴露出的問(wèn)題,最后在分析了股權(quán)激勵(lì)的實(shí)施對(duì)企業(yè)的影響后,對(duì)股權(quán)激勵(lì)方案進(jìn)行優(yōu)化設(shè)計(jì),得出相關(guān)結(jié)論。
[Abstract]:In the modern enterprise system, the existence of the principal-agent system separates the ownership and the management right of the enterprise, which causes the interests of the owner and the manager to be inconsistent. The equity incentive system is the best tool to solve the problem of "principal-agent" in the corporate system.As a long-term incentive tool, equity incentive can solve the problem of inconsistent interests between owners and managers, and realize the maximization of the interests of both.As a long-term and effective incentive, equity incentive is very popular in listed companies in China in recent years.At present, the state-owned enterprises are in the reform stage, the most representative of which is the reform of the state-controlled liquor industry. During the reform period, the state-owned enterprises implement equity incentives to ensure the long-term development of the enterprises, but there are also many problems at the same time.For example, capital market is immature, lack effective achievement appraisal mechanism and so on.Therefore, in this context, the study of the role, effect, shortcomings and improvement of equity incentive also provides a theoretical basis for the implementation of equity incentive.On the basis of principal-agent theory, human capital theory and incentive theory, this paper makes a case study, taking Luzhou Laojiao, a typical state-controlled liquor enterprise, as the research object, and studies the scheme and effect of its equity incentive.And carry on the improvement optimization operation to the stock right incentive plan.The main research content is to introduce and analyze the equity incentive scheme of Luzhou Laojiao on the basis of equity incentive theory.Then using qualitative and quantitative research methods to analyze the implementation effect of equity incentive and deeply discuss the problems exposed in the implementation of equity incentive scheme. Finally, after analyzing the impact of the implementation of equity incentive on enterprises.The optimization design of equity incentive scheme is carried out, and the relevant conclusions are drawn.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：黑龍江八一農(nóng)墾大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級(jí)別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2017
【分類號(hào)】：F426.82;F272.92

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