本文選題：企業(yè)縱向邊界　切入點：企業(yè)治理　出處：《湖南大學》2016年碩士論文

【摘要】：關于企業(yè)縱向邊界如何確定,學術界有新古典經(jīng)濟理論、交易成本理論、企業(yè)能力理論等進行過相關研究。這些理論雖然能夠在一定程度上解釋企業(yè)縱向邊界的確定,但更適用于所有權(quán)與控制權(quán)合一的古典企業(yè)中。由于現(xiàn)代企業(yè)的所有權(quán)與控制權(quán)分離,因此企業(yè)縱向邊界的確定會受到代理人主觀偏好的影響。因為企業(yè)通過縱向一體化戰(zhàn)略,擴大縱向邊界后,代理人面臨的市場競爭壓力減小,代理人與所有者的信息不對稱會進一步加劇,同時代理人也擁有更大的控制權(quán)。既然企業(yè)縱向邊界的擴大會帶來以上三方面的變化,那么在縱向邊界大的企業(yè)中,代理問題是否更加突出?企業(yè)實施縱向一體化戰(zhàn)略后隨之而來的代理問題,能否通過內(nèi)部治理機制進行緩解?本文以企業(yè)縱向邊界擴大所帶來的影響為切入點,通過理論分析、數(shù)學模型推導以及實證檢驗,結(jié)果表明：企業(yè)縱向邊界越大,代理問題越嚴重,企業(yè)的代理成本也越大。當將樣本按照代理人是否持股分為兩組,進一步研究發(fā)現(xiàn)在代理人持股的公司中,出現(xiàn)了相反的結(jié)論。由于代理人持有股份而與企業(yè)利益更加協(xié)調(diào)一致,所以縱向邊界的擴張反而可以帶來代理成本的相對節(jié)約。不同的企業(yè)治理要素在緩解代理問題上所起的作用差異較大,部分企業(yè)治理要素能夠降低代理成本,而其他治理要素則不能。本文還將單個企業(yè)治理要素進行主成分分析后得到一個綜合指標來衡量企業(yè)的治理水平。將該綜合指標納入回歸模型進行分析后,發(fā)現(xiàn)在綜合治理水平高的企業(yè)中,縱向邊界對代理成本的影響會受到削弱。根據(jù)研究結(jié)論,本文提出了謹慎實施縱向一體化戰(zhàn)略、建設職業(yè)經(jīng)理人市場、加強企業(yè)制度建設等建議,為緩解代理問題、降低代理成本提供參考。
[Abstract]:As to how to determine the vertical boundary of the enterprise, the academic circle has carried on the related research such as the neoclassical economic theory, the transaction cost theory, the enterprise ability theory and so on. These theories can explain the determination of the vertical boundary of the enterprise to a certain extent. However, it is more suitable for classical enterprises where ownership and control are United. Because of the separation of ownership and control in modern enterprises, the determination of vertical boundaries will be influenced by the subjective preference of agents. After enlarging the vertical boundary, the market competition pressure of the agent is reduced, and the information asymmetry between the agent and the owner will be further aggravated. At the same time, agents also have greater control. Since the expansion of vertical boundaries of enterprises will bring about the changes of the above three aspects, is the agency problem more prominent in enterprises with large vertical boundaries? After the implementation of vertical integration strategy, can the agency problem be alleviated through the internal governance mechanism? This paper takes the influence of the expansion of the vertical boundary of the enterprise as the starting point, through theoretical analysis, mathematical model derivation and empirical test, the results show that the bigger the vertical boundary, the more serious the agency problem is. When the sample is divided into two groups according to whether the agent holds shares, further study shows that in the company that the agent holds the shares, A contrary conclusion emerged. Because the agent held shares, the interests of the enterprise were more aligned, Therefore, the expansion of vertical boundary can bring about relative savings of agency cost. Different factors of corporate governance play a different role in alleviating agency problems, and some elements of corporate governance can reduce agency costs. However, the other governance elements can not. This paper also gets a comprehensive index to measure the governance level of the enterprise after the single corporate governance element is analyzed by principal component analysis, and the comprehensive index is incorporated into the regression model to analyze the governance level of the enterprise. It is found that the influence of vertical boundary on agency cost will be weakened in the enterprises with high level of comprehensive management. According to the conclusion of the research, this paper puts forward the strategy of implementing the vertical integration carefully and constructing the professional manager market. Strengthen the construction of enterprise system and provide reference for alleviating agency problem and reducing agency cost.
【學位授予單位】：湖南大學
【學位級別】：碩士
【學位授予年份】：2016
【分類號】：F271;F275

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