本文選題：股權(quán)激勵(lì)　切入點(diǎn)：股份支付　出處：《蘭州理工大學(xué)》2016年碩士論文

【摘要】：隨著市場(chǎng)經(jīng)濟(jì)的快速發(fā)展,企業(yè)經(jīng)營(yíng)者在兼顧自身利益的同時(shí)往往背離股東利益,這使得企業(yè)經(jīng)營(yíng)權(quán)與所有權(quán)難以平衡,而股權(quán)激勵(lì)作為一種長(zhǎng)期激勵(lì)與約束的制度便應(yīng)運(yùn)而生,這不僅可以減少兩權(quán)分離所產(chǎn)生的委托代理成本,同時(shí)也能有效地提高企業(yè)經(jīng)營(yíng)業(yè)績(jī)。在國(guó)外發(fā)達(dá)國(guó)家,股權(quán)激勵(lì)經(jīng)過(guò)較長(zhǎng)時(shí)間的實(shí)踐,被越來(lái)越多的上市公司所采用。而在我國(guó),股權(quán)激勵(lì)起步較晚,對(duì)于股權(quán)激勵(lì)的相關(guān)研究與制度不盡完善,導(dǎo)致股權(quán)激勵(lì)在我國(guó)的發(fā)展較為滯后。2007年1月1日正式實(shí)施的《企業(yè)會(huì)計(jì)準(zhǔn)則第11號(hào)——股份支付》準(zhǔn)則使我國(guó)股權(quán)激勵(lì)制度邁向了一個(gè)新的高度,其對(duì)激勵(lì)模式應(yīng)用下的會(huì)計(jì)處理作出界定。但是,上市公司在享有股權(quán)激勵(lì)所帶來(lái)正向效應(yīng)的同時(shí),其不同模式在其實(shí)務(wù)處理過(guò)程中的風(fēng)險(xiǎn)也不斷凸顯,引發(fā)了會(huì)計(jì)界對(duì)其越來(lái)越多的關(guān)注和討論。本文從股份支付會(huì)計(jì)準(zhǔn)則的角度出發(fā),結(jié)合相關(guān)理論基礎(chǔ)與股權(quán)激勵(lì)模式概述,從股權(quán)激勵(lì)制度背景的視角對(duì)上市公司股權(quán)激勵(lì)實(shí)施現(xiàn)狀進(jìn)行分析。然后,以WK公司兩輪股權(quán)激勵(lì)方案為例,通過(guò)其實(shí)施背景、模式選擇、方案內(nèi)容、會(huì)計(jì)處理及經(jīng)濟(jì)后果的深入研究,并對(duì)兩輪激勵(lì)方案進(jìn)行對(duì)比與評(píng)價(jià)。最后,本文結(jié)合研究結(jié)論為我國(guó)現(xiàn)行股份支付準(zhǔn)則的單一化和模糊化短板提出合理化建議,以完善股權(quán)激勵(lì)相關(guān)會(huì)計(jì)制度,同時(shí),通過(guò)對(duì)WK公司兩輪激勵(lì)方案的對(duì)比分析為其他上市公司實(shí)施股權(quán)激勵(lì)提供參考性建議。
[Abstract]:With the rapid development of market economy, business operators often deviate from the interests of shareholders while taking into account their own interests, which makes it difficult to balance the right of operation and ownership of enterprises. As a long-term incentive and constraint system, equity incentive can not only reduce the principal-agent cost caused by the separation of two rights, but also effectively improve the performance of enterprises in developed countries. After a long time of practice, equity incentive has been adopted by more and more listed companies. As a result, the development of equity incentive is lagging behind in our country. The Standard of Enterprise Accounting Standard No. 11-share payment, which was formally implemented on January 1, 2007, has made the stock incentive system of our country move to a new height. It defines the accounting treatment under the application of incentive mode. However, while the listed companies enjoy the positive effect of equity incentive, the risks of different modes in the process of practical treatment are also highlighted. It has aroused more and more attention and discussion in the accounting field. This paper, from the perspective of accounting standards for share payment, combines the relevant theoretical basis and the summary of equity incentive model. From the perspective of equity incentive system background, this paper analyzes the status quo of equity incentive implementation of listed companies. Then, taking two rounds of equity incentive scheme of WK Company as an example, through its implementation background, mode selection, program content, The accounting treatment and economic consequences of the in-depth study, and the comparison and evaluation of the two rounds of incentive schemes. Finally, combined with the conclusions of the study, this paper puts forward some reasonable suggestions for the simplification and fuzziness of the current stock payment standards in China. In order to improve the accounting system of equity incentive, and through the comparative analysis of two incentive schemes of WK company, the paper provides reference suggestions for other listed companies to implement equity incentive.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：蘭州理工大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級(jí)別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2016
【分類號(hào)】：F272.92

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