本文選題：股權(quán)激勵　切入點：股份支付　出處：《蘭州理工大學(xué)》2016年碩士論文

【摘要】：隨著市場經(jīng)濟的快速發(fā)展,企業(yè)經(jīng)營者在兼顧自身利益的同時往往背離股東利益,這使得企業(yè)經(jīng)營權(quán)與所有權(quán)難以平衡,而股權(quán)激勵作為一種長期激勵與約束的制度便應(yīng)運而生,這不僅可以減少兩權(quán)分離所產(chǎn)生的委托代理成本,同時也能有效地提高企業(yè)經(jīng)營業(yè)績。在國外發(fā)達國家,股權(quán)激勵經(jīng)過較長時間的實踐,被越來越多的上市公司所采用。而在我國,股權(quán)激勵起步較晚,對于股權(quán)激勵的相關(guān)研究與制度不盡完善,導(dǎo)致股權(quán)激勵在我國的發(fā)展較為滯后。2007年1月1日正式實施的《企業(yè)會計準(zhǔn)則第11號——股份支付》準(zhǔn)則使我國股權(quán)激勵制度邁向了一個新的高度,其對激勵模式應(yīng)用下的會計處理作出界定。但是,上市公司在享有股權(quán)激勵所帶來正向效應(yīng)的同時,其不同模式在其實務(wù)處理過程中的風(fēng)險也不斷凸顯,引發(fā)了會計界對其越來越多的關(guān)注和討論。本文從股份支付會計準(zhǔn)則的角度出發(fā),結(jié)合相關(guān)理論基礎(chǔ)與股權(quán)激勵模式概述,從股權(quán)激勵制度背景的視角對上市公司股權(quán)激勵實施現(xiàn)狀進行分析。然后,以WK公司兩輪股權(quán)激勵方案為例,通過其實施背景、模式選擇、方案內(nèi)容、會計處理及經(jīng)濟后果的深入研究,并對兩輪激勵方案進行對比與評價。最后,本文結(jié)合研究結(jié)論為我國現(xiàn)行股份支付準(zhǔn)則的單一化和模糊化短板提出合理化建議,以完善股權(quán)激勵相關(guān)會計制度,同時,通過對WK公司兩輪激勵方案的對比分析為其他上市公司實施股權(quán)激勵提供參考性建議。
[Abstract]:With the rapid development of market economy, business operators often deviate from the interests of shareholders while taking into account their own interests, which makes it difficult to balance the right of operation and ownership of enterprises. As a long-term incentive and constraint system, equity incentive can not only reduce the principal-agent cost caused by the separation of two rights, but also effectively improve the performance of enterprises in developed countries. After a long time of practice, equity incentive has been adopted by more and more listed companies. As a result, the development of equity incentive is lagging behind in our country. The Standard of Enterprise Accounting Standard No. 11-share payment, which was formally implemented on January 1, 2007, has made the stock incentive system of our country move to a new height. It defines the accounting treatment under the application of incentive mode. However, while the listed companies enjoy the positive effect of equity incentive, the risks of different modes in the process of practical treatment are also highlighted. It has aroused more and more attention and discussion in the accounting field. This paper, from the perspective of accounting standards for share payment, combines the relevant theoretical basis and the summary of equity incentive model. From the perspective of equity incentive system background, this paper analyzes the status quo of equity incentive implementation of listed companies. Then, taking two rounds of equity incentive scheme of WK Company as an example, through its implementation background, mode selection, program content, The accounting treatment and economic consequences of the in-depth study, and the comparison and evaluation of the two rounds of incentive schemes. Finally, combined with the conclusions of the study, this paper puts forward some reasonable suggestions for the simplification and fuzziness of the current stock payment standards in China. In order to improve the accounting system of equity incentive, and through the comparative analysis of two incentive schemes of WK company, the paper provides reference suggestions for other listed companies to implement equity incentive.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：蘭州理工大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2016
【分類號】：F272.92

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