本文選題：浙大網(wǎng)新　切入點(diǎn)：效果　出處：《蘭州財(cái)經(jīng)大學(xué)》2017年碩士論文

【摘要】：股權(quán)激勵(lì)制度在西方國(guó)家已經(jīng)發(fā)展、實(shí)踐幾十年之久。在眾多激勵(lì)理論與制度中,股權(quán)激勵(lì)已經(jīng)成為操作性較強(qiáng),成效較為顯著的激勵(lì)制度之一。股權(quán)激勵(lì)制度能夠長(zhǎng)期有效地推動(dòng)企業(yè)的發(fā)展,促進(jìn)國(guó)民經(jīng)濟(jì)的增長(zhǎng)。2005年股權(quán)分置改革,標(biāo)志著我國(guó)股權(quán)激勵(lì)制度開(kāi)始實(shí)施。之后,國(guó)家相繼出臺(tái)了一系列規(guī)范股權(quán)激勵(lì)制度的法律、法規(guī)�，F(xiàn)如今,越來(lái)越多的企業(yè)選擇股權(quán)激勵(lì),尤其是在2010年之后,建立股權(quán)激勵(lì)制度的上市公司數(shù)量迅速增長(zhǎng)。但是,在實(shí)施股權(quán)激勵(lì)的上市公司中,并非所有公司的業(yè)績(jī)都獲得提升。許多企業(yè)在實(shí)施股權(quán)激勵(lì)時(shí)都存在不同程度的問(wèn)題。有的是因?yàn)槿狈?duì)自身內(nèi)外部因素的了解、調(diào)研,所制定的股權(quán)激勵(lì)計(jì)劃與企業(yè)自身情況、發(fā)展需求不適應(yīng);還有的是因?yàn)樵诠蓹?quán)激勵(lì)計(jì)劃設(shè)計(jì)上就存在缺陷,導(dǎo)致股權(quán)激勵(lì)難以順利實(shí)施。本文基于契約不完備理論、剩余索取權(quán)理論、委托代理理論,梳理了相關(guān)文獻(xiàn)資料,運(yùn)用案例分析法,對(duì)浙江省一家高新技術(shù)企業(yè)——浙大網(wǎng)新科技股份有限公司實(shí)施的股權(quán)激勵(lì)效果進(jìn)行研究。首先,通過(guò)實(shí)施股權(quán)激勵(lì)后公司財(cái)務(wù)業(yè)績(jī)、管理者行為、公司股價(jià)的變化來(lái)分析其效果。其次,從正、反兩方面對(duì)股權(quán)激勵(lì)的效果進(jìn)行評(píng)價(jià)。最后,針對(duì)存在的問(wèn)題從制度設(shè)計(jì)和公司治理兩個(gè)方面提出改進(jìn)建議。研究發(fā)現(xiàn),浙大網(wǎng)新股權(quán)激勵(lì)效果并不理想,最后以失敗告終。這讓我們?cè)僖淮握J(rèn)識(shí)到股權(quán)激勵(lì)制度所具有的雙面性。有效的資本市場(chǎng)、健全的法律制度、合理設(shè)計(jì)的股權(quán)激勵(lì)計(jì)劃、完善的公司治理結(jié)構(gòu)才能保障企業(yè)股權(quán)激勵(lì)順利實(shí)施。通過(guò)本文的研究,希望能夠給實(shí)施股權(quán)激勵(lì)的上市公司提供些許建議,使他們?cè)趯?shí)行股權(quán)激勵(lì)時(shí)能夠盡量規(guī)避股權(quán)激勵(lì)的負(fù)面效應(yīng),使其正面效應(yīng)得到充分有效的發(fā)揮。
[Abstract]:The equity incentive system has developed in western countries and has been practiced for decades. Among the many incentive theories and systems, the equity incentive system has become more operational. Equity incentive system can effectively promote the development of enterprises and promote the growth of national economy for a long time. The reform of split share structure in 2005 marks the implementation of equity incentive system in China. The country has issued a series of laws and regulations to regulate the equity incentive system one after another. Nowadays, more and more enterprises choose equity incentive, especially after 2010, the number of listed companies establishing equity incentive system has increased rapidly. However, In the listed companies that implement equity incentive, not all companies' performance has been improved. Many enterprises have different degree of problems in implementing equity incentive. Some of them are lack of understanding of their own internal and external factors. The stock right incentive plan is not suitable to the enterprise's own situation, and the development demand is not suitable. What's more, there are some defects in the design of the equity incentive plan, which leads to the difficulty of carrying out the equity incentive plan smoothly. This paper is based on the theory of incomplete contract. The theory of residual claim, principal-agent theory, combing the relevant literature, using case analysis, to study the effect of equity incentive implemented by Zhejiang New Technology Co., Ltd., a high-tech enterprise in Zhejiang Province. The effect of equity incentive is analyzed through the changes of financial performance, manager's behavior and stock price. Secondly, the effect of equity incentive is evaluated from positive and negative aspects. Finally, In view of the existing problems, this paper puts forward some suggestions for improvement from two aspects of system design and corporate governance. The research finds that the new equity incentive effect of Zhejiang University is not ideal. Finally, it ended in failure. This makes us realize once again the dual nature of the equity incentive system. An effective capital market, a sound legal system, and a reasonably designed equity incentive plan. Only a perfect corporate governance structure can guarantee the smooth implementation of corporate equity incentive. Through the research of this paper, we hope to provide some suggestions to the listed companies that implement the equity incentive. So that they can avoid the negative effect of equity incentive and give full play to its positive effect.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：蘭州財(cái)經(jīng)大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級(jí)別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2017
【分類號(hào)】：F272.92;F49

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