本文選題：競(jìng)爭(zhēng)戰(zhàn)略　切入點(diǎn)：低成本戰(zhàn)略　出處：《湖南大學(xué)》2016年碩士論文　論文類(lèi)型：學(xué)位論文

【摘要】：根據(jù)最優(yōu)契約理論與激勵(lì)理論,高管薪酬應(yīng)當(dāng)與公司業(yè)績(jī)緊密相聯(lián)。理論界對(duì)高管薪酬業(yè)績(jī)敏感性的變化特征與成因,展開(kāi)了深入、廣泛的研究,取得了頗豐的研究成果,然而從經(jīng)營(yíng)戰(zhàn)略角度對(duì)高管薪酬業(yè)績(jī)敏感性的研究卻較匱乏。隨著市場(chǎng)化競(jìng)爭(zhēng)的加劇,競(jìng)爭(zhēng)戰(zhàn)略對(duì)一個(gè)企業(yè)的生存與發(fā)展至關(guān)重要,高管在戰(zhàn)略的制定與實(shí)施中舉足輕重,如何引導(dǎo)高管的行為,薪酬是關(guān)鍵因素之一。高管薪酬應(yīng)當(dāng)與競(jìng)爭(zhēng)戰(zhàn)略相匹配,促使高管為競(jìng)爭(zhēng)戰(zhàn)略目標(biāo)的實(shí)現(xiàn)而努力奮斗。我國(guó)的國(guó)有企業(yè)和民營(yíng)企業(yè)有著產(chǎn)權(quán)屬性的根本不同,區(qū)分不同產(chǎn)權(quán)性質(zhì),研究競(jìng)爭(zhēng)戰(zhàn)略對(duì)高管薪酬業(yè)績(jī)敏感性的影響,能夠得到更科學(xué)、合理的結(jié)論。因此,本文以2009至2014年滬深A(yù)股制造業(yè)上市公司的數(shù)據(jù)為樣本,區(qū)分民營(yíng)與國(guó)有兩種不同的產(chǎn)權(quán)性質(zhì),研究公司競(jìng)爭(zhēng)戰(zhàn)略對(duì)高管薪酬業(yè)績(jī)敏感性的影響。結(jié)果發(fā)現(xiàn),對(duì)國(guó)企而言,差異化戰(zhàn)略相比于成本領(lǐng)先戰(zhàn)略,顯著降低了高管薪酬會(huì)計(jì)業(yè)績(jī)敏感性和高管薪酬市場(chǎng)業(yè)績(jī)敏感性。而對(duì)民企而言,差異化競(jìng)爭(zhēng)相比于成本領(lǐng)先戰(zhàn)略,顯著提高了高管薪酬市場(chǎng)業(yè)績(jī)敏感性,而對(duì)高管薪酬會(huì)計(jì)業(yè)績(jī)敏感性沒(méi)有顯著影響。實(shí)證結(jié)果證實(shí)了競(jìng)爭(zhēng)戰(zhàn)略是影響高管薪酬業(yè)績(jī)敏感性的一個(gè)重要因素,從激勵(lì)角度來(lái)看,民營(yíng)企業(yè)實(shí)現(xiàn)了高管薪酬政策與競(jìng)爭(zhēng)戰(zhàn)略的有效匹配,而國(guó)有企業(yè)則由于復(fù)雜的原因未能實(shí)現(xiàn)二者的有效匹配,為此,提出國(guó)企高管薪酬績(jī)效評(píng)價(jià)綜合化、國(guó)企高管選拔機(jī)制市場(chǎng)化、國(guó)有企業(yè)治理結(jié)構(gòu)有效化的改進(jìn)建議。
[Abstract]:According to the optimal contract theory and incentive theory, executive compensation should be closely related to corporate performance. However, the research on the sensitivity of executive compensation performance from the perspective of management strategy is relatively scarce. With the intensification of market-oriented competition, competitive strategy is very important to the survival and development of an enterprise, and the senior executive plays an important role in the formulation and implementation of the strategy. Compensation is one of the key factors in how to guide executive behavior. Executive pay should match competitive strategies. The state-owned enterprise and the private enterprise have the fundamental difference of the property right attribute, distinguish the different property right nature, study the influence of the competitive strategy to the executive salary performance sensitivity. Therefore, taking the data of Shanghai and Shenzhen A-share manufacturing listed companies from 2009 to 2014 as a sample, we can distinguish between private enterprises and countries with two different properties of property rights. This paper studies the effect of competitive strategy on executive compensation performance sensitivity. The results show that, for state-owned enterprises, differentiation strategy is more important than cost leading strategy. It significantly reduces the sensitivity of executive compensation accounting performance and executive compensation market performance. For private enterprises, compared with the cost leading strategy, differentiated competition significantly improves the performance sensitivity of executive compensation market. The empirical results confirm that competitive strategy is an important factor affecting executive compensation performance sensitivity. Private enterprises have realized the effective matching between executive compensation policy and competitive strategy, while state-owned enterprises have failed to achieve the effective matching for complicated reasons. Therefore, the paper puts forward the integration of executive compensation performance evaluation of state-owned enterprises. The state-owned enterprise executive selection mechanism marketization, the state-owned enterprise governance structure effective improvement suggestion.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：湖南大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級(jí)別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2016
【分類(lèi)號(hào)】：F271;F272.92

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