本文選題：動(dòng)態(tài)錦標(biāo)賽　切入點(diǎn)：傾斜政策　出處：《重慶大學(xué)》2016年碩士論文　論文類型：學(xué)位論文

【摘要】：錦標(biāo)賽作為一種相對(duì)績(jī)效評(píng)估的激勵(lì)機(jī)制,因其具有減少監(jiān)督成本、排除外部干擾、減少主觀評(píng)價(jià)的道德風(fēng)險(xiǎn)等優(yōu)點(diǎn),在薪酬管理、促銷管理、專利開發(fā)競(jìng)爭(zhēng)、地方政府間的競(jìng)爭(zhēng)等諸多領(lǐng)域都有廣泛的研究和應(yīng)用。但在以往的研究中,對(duì)該機(jī)制的研究更側(cè)重于對(duì)靜態(tài)環(huán)境的分析,即在預(yù)先制定了規(guī)則,代理人具有確定的水平,固定的努力程度。在現(xiàn)實(shí)中,由于信息泄露、階段性總結(jié)等因素會(huì)導(dǎo)致代理人根據(jù)競(jìng)爭(zhēng)的情況調(diào)整自己的行為。由于其多階段的動(dòng)態(tài)特性和信息共享,動(dòng)態(tài)的比賽可以更深入地表征現(xiàn)實(shí)生活,并得到研究者更多的關(guān)注。正是由于動(dòng)態(tài)錦標(biāo)賽多階段特征更貼近現(xiàn)實(shí)生活,引發(fā)了我們對(duì)于如下問題的研究興趣:第一,現(xiàn)實(shí)生活中,如何針對(duì)競(jìng)爭(zhēng)者在不同階段相對(duì)不同的努力水平實(shí)施對(duì)應(yīng)的策略?第二,現(xiàn)實(shí)競(jìng)爭(zhēng)環(huán)境中存在的不公平現(xiàn)象會(huì)對(duì)競(jìng)爭(zhēng)者的行為產(chǎn)生怎樣的影響?傾斜政策,是給落后對(duì)象予額外的輸出補(bǔ)償,也就是說,向落后對(duì)象予以額外的“偏見”或“照顧”。傾斜政策的實(shí)施無疑給予了落后者一個(gè)有利的競(jìng)爭(zhēng)環(huán)境,那么采取這一措施是否真的會(huì)對(duì)他們起到幫助效用?傾斜政策的實(shí)施,對(duì)領(lǐng)先者而言則產(chǎn)生了一定的競(jìng)爭(zhēng)壓力,對(duì)落后者而言卻相當(dāng)于多了一層"保護(hù)傘”,這是否會(huì)對(duì)他們的努力水平和拆臺(tái)水平產(chǎn)生影響?競(jìng)爭(zhēng)者以及組織者的收益將存在怎樣的波動(dòng)情況?為了研究上述問題,本文設(shè)計(jì)了五個(gè)努力實(shí)驗(yàn)進(jìn)行了實(shí)驗(yàn)研究,重點(diǎn)在動(dòng)態(tài)的比賽機(jī)制中探究?jī)A斜策略和不公平環(huán)境中的代理人努力水平,拆臺(tái)情況。通過對(duì)134名被試的實(shí)驗(yàn)數(shù)據(jù)進(jìn)行分析,本文得出以下研究結(jié)論第一,不公平將會(huì)導(dǎo)致代理人總體努力水平減少;第二,極端不公平將會(huì)導(dǎo)致一部分代理人努力水平的提升;第三,傾斜政策只會(huì)激發(fā)一部分代理人的努力水平;第四,在添加傾斜策略實(shí)驗(yàn)中,實(shí)施傾斜策略并未增加員工的總產(chǎn)出,即未提高組織收益。最后,從組織整體角度而言,實(shí)施傾斜政策,并不會(huì)帶來額外收益,但此舉可以調(diào)節(jié)組織內(nèi)部氛圍�？傊�,對(duì)于企業(yè)而言,應(yīng)該限制政策傾斜的實(shí)施。因?yàn)?即使對(duì)落后員工實(shí)施特殊的"照顧”,并不能提高其收益。相反,實(shí)施傾斜政策可能增加企業(yè)的交易成本。本文的研究結(jié)論對(duì)政府實(shí)施的宏觀政策也具有一定借鑒作用。例如,對(duì)高收入群體征收個(gè)人所得高額累進(jìn)稅,會(huì)減少其勞動(dòng)積極性,同時(shí)助長(zhǎng)低收入群體的惰性,從而導(dǎo)致國(guó)家的總稅收降低。從這個(gè)角度看,優(yōu)惠政策的實(shí)施不利于提高員工的努力水平,不利于提高國(guó)家的整體福利水平,甚至政府也會(huì)加大對(duì)這些政策的實(shí)施和管理成本。因此,政府應(yīng)重新評(píng)估實(shí)施傾斜政策對(duì)社會(huì)福利的總體影響。故,不公平因素和傾斜策略對(duì)代理人的行為影響也為組織管理者決策提供了理論參考。
[Abstract]:As an incentive mechanism for relative performance evaluation, tournaments have the advantages of reducing supervision cost, eliminating external interference, reducing moral hazard of subjective evaluation, and so on, in salary management, promotion management, patent development competition, etc. Competition among local governments has been widely studied and applied in many fields, but in previous studies, the study of this mechanism has focused more on the analysis of the static environment, that is, when the rules are made in advance, the agent has a certain level. In reality, due to information leakage, periodic summary and other factors, agents will adjust their behavior according to the competitive situation. Because of its multi-stage dynamic characteristics and information sharing, Dynamic competition can more deeply represent real life, and get more attention from researchers. It is precisely because the multi-stage characteristics of dynamic championships are closer to real life that we are interested in the following questions: first, In real life, how to implement the corresponding strategies for competitors at different stages of relatively different levels of effort? Second, how does the unfair phenomenon in the real competitive environment affect the behavior of the competitors? The tilting policy is to compensate the backward object with extra output, that is, to give the backward object an extra "prejudice" or "care". The implementation of the tilting policy undoubtedly gives the laggard a favorable competitive environment. So will this measure really help them? The implementation of the tilt policy has produced certain competitive pressure for the leaders, but for the laggards, it is equivalent to an extra "umbrella". Will this have an impact on their level of effort and the level of dismantling?. What are the fluctuations in the earnings of competitors and organizers? In order to study the above problems, this paper designs five experiments to carry out experimental research, focusing on the dynamic competition mechanism to explore the tilting strategy and the level of agent effort in unfair environment. By analyzing the experimental data of 134 subjects, this paper draws the following conclusions: firstly, unfairness will lead to the reduction of agent's overall effort level; second, The extreme unfairness will lead to the improvement of some agents' effort level; third, the tilting policy will only stimulate some agents' effort level; 4th, in the experiment of adding tilting strategy, the implementation of tilting strategy does not increase the total output of employees. That is, no increase in organizational income. Finally, from the overall perspective of the organization, the implementation of a preferential policy will not bring additional benefits, but this can regulate the internal atmosphere of the organization. In a word, for enterprises, The implementation of the policy bias should be limited. Because even if special "care" is given to backward employees, it will not increase their returns. On the contrary, The conclusion of this paper can also be used for reference to the macro policies implemented by the government. For example, levying a high progressive tax on the individual income of the high-income group will reduce their labor enthusiasm. At the same time, it encourages the inertia of the low-income groups, thus leading to a decrease in the country's total tax revenue. From this point of view, the implementation of preferential policies is not conducive to raising the level of efforts of employees and to raising the overall welfare level of the country. Even the government will increase the cost of implementing and managing these policies. Therefore, the government should reassess the overall impact of the implementation of preferential policies on social welfare. The influence of unfair factors and tilting strategies on the behavior of agents also provides a theoretical reference for organizational managers to make decisions.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：重慶大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級(jí)別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2016
【分類號(hào)】：F272.92

【相似文獻(xiàn)】

相關(guān)期刊論文 前10條

1 胡進(jìn)祥;試論產(chǎn)業(yè)傾斜政策的理論依據(jù)前提條件和行為準(zhǔn)則[J];貴州社會(huì)科學(xué);1990年07期

2 胡進(jìn)祥;產(chǎn)業(yè)傾斜政策理論分析[J];經(jīng)濟(jì)問題;1990年05期

3 胡進(jìn)祥;產(chǎn)業(yè)傾斜政策理論分析[J];山東社會(huì)科學(xué);1990年03期

4 宿基國(guó);對(duì)實(shí)施傾斜政策的憂慮與建議[J];經(jīng)營(yíng)與管理;1990年05期

5 李建紅;實(shí)施傾斜政策六忌[J];經(jīng)營(yíng)與管理;1990年11期

6 魯秉群;李盛福;;農(nóng)業(yè)傾斜政策管見[J];經(jīng)濟(jì)問題探索;1990年06期

7 胡進(jìn)祥;;產(chǎn)業(yè)傾斜政策理論分析[J];經(jīng)濟(jì)問題探索;1990年06期

8 何通威;;產(chǎn)業(yè)傾斜政策的實(shí)現(xiàn)途徑[J];科學(xué)·經(jīng)濟(jì)·社會(huì);1990年05期

9 郭錦權(quán);;信貸傾斜政策的負(fù)效應(yīng)[J];江蘇農(nóng)村金融;1990年12期

10 張龍年;;對(duì)“傾斜政策”一詞的商榷[J];秘書之友;1990年07期

相關(guān)重要報(bào)紙文章 前10條

1 記者　 林智嵐 實(shí)習(xí)生 黃詩(shī)勤;倉(cāng)山實(shí)施公共財(cái)政傾斜政策[N];福建日?qǐng)?bào);2007年

2 本報(bào)記者 蔣興華;涉農(nóng)專業(yè)學(xué)生培養(yǎng)和安置應(yīng)有傾斜政策[N];貴州政協(xié)報(bào);2014年

3 蘇州市第四中學(xué)教師 張志峰;如何落實(shí)向一線教師的傾斜政策[N];中國(guó)教育報(bào);2013年

4 李斌;取消對(duì)企業(yè)的一切財(cái)政傾斜政策[N];證券時(shí)報(bào);2012年

5 順定強(qiáng);六項(xiàng)傾斜政策確保實(shí)現(xiàn)“普九”[N];阿壩日?qǐng)?bào);2007年

6 肖峰;質(zhì)疑傾斜政策[N];中國(guó)企業(yè)報(bào);2000年

7 東早;上海擬對(duì)“失獨(dú)老人”養(yǎng)老出臺(tái)傾斜政策[N];中國(guó)老年報(bào);2013年

8 本報(bào)記者 楊靖;工資傾斜政策 能否留住鄉(xiāng)村教師[N];科技日?qǐng)?bào);2014年

9 記者 姚興奇;采取傾斜政策 支持西藏發(fā)展[N];中國(guó)城鄉(xiāng)金融報(bào);2002年

10 記者 彭建基 實(shí)習(xí)生 鄧靜;堅(jiān)定不移打好治污攻堅(jiān)戰(zhàn)[N];西江日?qǐng)?bào);2014年

相關(guān)碩士學(xué)位論文 前2條

1 鄭潤(rùn)東;動(dòng)態(tài)錦標(biāo)賽中不公平與傾斜政策對(duì)代理人行為影響的實(shí)驗(yàn)研究[D];重慶大學(xué);2016年

2 趙亞玲;高考錄取少數(shù)民族考生傾斜政策與邊疆民族地區(qū)社會(huì)穩(wěn)定研究[D];云南師范大學(xué);2008年

，

本文編號(hào)：1556495