本文關鍵詞： 風險承擔 董事會規(guī)模 產權性質 市場化進程　出處：《云南財經大學學報》2016年02期 　論文類型：期刊論文

【摘要】：以中國滬、深兩市1999~2012年上市公司為研究對象,研究了董事會規(guī)模如何影響企業(yè)風險承擔以及產權性質和市場化進程對上述關系的調節(jié)作用。研究表明:規(guī)模較大的董事會對極端決策更難達成一致,傾向于選擇風險相對較小的項目,董事會規(guī)模與企業(yè)風險承擔顯著負相關。與非國有控股公司相比,國有控股公司董事會的決策權力有限,其董事會規(guī)模對企業(yè)風險承擔的負向影響也相對較小。市場化進程的改善能夠增強董事會成員對企業(yè)風險承擔價值的認識,降低群體決策的溝通與協調成本,便于董事會成員對企業(yè)風險承擔決策達成一致,進而減弱董事會規(guī)模對企業(yè)風險承擔的負向影響。
[Abstract]:Taking the listed companies of Shanghai and Shenzhen stock markets in China from 1999 to 2012 as the research objects, This paper studies how the size of the board of directors affects the risk-taking of enterprises and the moderating effect of the nature of property rights and the process of marketization on the above relations. The research shows that it is more difficult for the larger board of directors to reach agreement on extreme decisions. The size of the board of directors is negatively correlated with the risk bearing of the enterprise. Compared with the non-state-owned holding company, the decision-making power of the board of directors of the state-owned holding company is limited. The improvement of the marketization process can enhance the members of the board of directors to understand the value of corporate risk-taking, and reduce the communication and coordination costs of group decision-making. It is convenient for the board members to reach an agreement on the enterprise risk bearing decision, and then to reduce the negative influence of the board size on the enterprise risk undertaking.
【作者單位】： 西北工業(yè)大學管理學院;
【基金】：國家自然科學基金項目“股權激勵、管理層權利與公司風險擔當”(71402141) 教育部人文社會科學研究青年基金項目“管理層股權激勵、風險承擔與資本配置效率”(14YJC790103) 中國博士后科學基金“我國公司風險承擔動因與影響效應研究”(2015M582705) 陜西省社會科學基金“促進陜西省企業(yè)風險承擔的治理機制研究”(13D211)
【分類號】：F271;F275

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