本文關鍵詞： 財政透明度 土地資源獲取 產能過剩　出處：《財經研究》2017年05期 　論文類型：期刊論文

【摘要】：文章把地方政府的財政透明度納入企業(yè)微觀行為的分析體系,根據(jù)《2012年中國市級政府財政透明度研究報告》和《2012年世界銀行中國企業(yè)調查數(shù)據(jù)》等統(tǒng)計資料,實證檢驗了財政透明度對企業(yè)產能過剩的兩種影響機制——企業(yè)"主觀"投資偏誤形成機理和"被動"投資偏誤形成機理。研究發(fā)現(xiàn):(1)財政透明度的提高會增加企業(yè)對政府行為的理性預期,減少其對外部經營環(huán)境的不確定性判斷,抑制了企業(yè)由于"主觀"投資偏誤而導致的產能利用率低下、產能過剩現(xiàn)象;(2)財政透明度的提高增加了政府干預土地要素市場的成本,繼而減少了企業(yè)因政府干預土地要素市場而產生的"被動"投資偏誤,產能利用率提高。
[Abstract]:In this paper, the financial transparency of local governments is incorporated into the microcosmic behavior analysis system of enterprises. According to the statistical data such as the 2012 Research report on the Fiscal Transparency of Chinese Municipal governments and the 2012 World Bank Survey data on Chinese Enterprises, etc. This paper empirically tests two kinds of influence mechanisms of fiscal transparency on overcapacity of enterprises, that is, the formation mechanism of "subjective" investment bias and "passive" investment bias of enterprises. It is found that the improvement of fiscal transparency will increase enterprises. Industry's rational expectation of government behavior, Reducing the uncertainty judgment of external operating environment, restraining the low utilization rate of production capacity caused by "subjective" investment bias, and increasing the fiscal transparency of excess capacity increase the cost of government intervention in the land factor market. Then it reduces the "passive" investment bias caused by government intervention in the land factor market, and improves the utilization rate of production capacity.
【作者單位】： 上海財經大學公共經濟與管理學院;
【基金】：國家社會科學基金項目(11BZZ061) 上海財經大學研究生創(chuàng)新基金項目(CXJJ-2016-39)
【分類號】：F279.2;F812.2
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本文編號：1511657