本文關(guān)鍵詞： 規(guī)制 試用期 匹配 最低工資 委托代理　出處：《天津大學(xué)》2016年博士論文　論文類型：學(xué)位論文

【摘要】：薪酬問題是現(xiàn)代企業(yè)人力資源管理的核心問題,關(guān)系到企業(yè)自身的生產(chǎn)效率及其在市場(chǎng)上的競(jìng)爭(zhēng)優(yōu)勢(shì).薪酬問題也是社會(huì)問題,關(guān)系到一個(gè)國(guó)家或地區(qū)生產(chǎn)消費(fèi)的均衡、關(guān)系到社會(huì)公平甚至社會(huì)穩(wěn)定.政府會(huì)在薪酬制定方面對(duì)企業(yè)加以規(guī)制.研究政府規(guī)制下薪酬制定問題對(duì)現(xiàn)代社會(huì)來說有著非常重要的意義.基于搜尋匹配理論和委托代理理論,本文研究了在政府規(guī)制下,試用期工資和最低工資對(duì)薪酬的影響問題.本文的主要內(nèi)容如下:研究試用期工資對(duì)失業(yè)和議價(jià)工資的影響.建立了帶有試用期的搜尋匹配模型.在試用期階段企業(yè)按照政府規(guī)定的試用期標(biāo)準(zhǔn)支付給員工工資.在正式錄用階段,員工的工資由企業(yè)和員工通過議價(jià)形成.得到了混合均衡和分離均衡兩類穩(wěn)態(tài)均衡.通過與沒有試用期的匹配模型比較,發(fā)現(xiàn)試用期的引入在降低失業(yè)率的同時(shí)也降低了員工的議價(jià)工資.對(duì)試用期工資的比較靜態(tài)分析表明隨著試用期工資的增加失業(yè)率會(huì)上升,員工的議價(jià)工資也會(huì)增加.研究非對(duì)稱信息下具有最低工資標(biāo)準(zhǔn)的企業(yè)薪酬合同設(shè)計(jì)問題.分別建立了完全信息、努力不可觀測(cè)和非對(duì)稱能力信息情形下帶有最低工資約束的工資激勵(lì)機(jī)制模型.利用委托代理理論,得到了三種情形下最優(yōu)的薪酬合同.分析了最低工資對(duì)最優(yōu)合同的影響.探討了最低工資的引入對(duì)企業(yè)利潤(rùn)和社會(huì)福利的影響.結(jié)論表明最低工資標(biāo)準(zhǔn)比較高時(shí),最低工資的引入降低了企業(yè)利潤(rùn)和社會(huì)福利.研究雙重非對(duì)稱信息下具有最低工資標(biāo)準(zhǔn)的企業(yè)薪酬合同設(shè)計(jì)問題.建立了雙重非對(duì)稱信息下帶有最低工資約束的薪酬激勵(lì)模型.基于委托代理理論得到了最優(yōu)的薪酬合同.分析了最低工資的引入對(duì)最優(yōu)合同、企業(yè)利潤(rùn)、員工效用和社會(huì)福利的影響.結(jié)論表明最低工資標(biāo)準(zhǔn)比較高時(shí),最低工資的引入降低了企業(yè)利潤(rùn),對(duì)企業(yè)是不利的;最低工資的引入既增加了高類型員工的效用也增加了其工資;只能增加低類型員工的工資而不能增加其效用,這對(duì)員工有利.但在某些情況下最低工資的引入能增加社會(huì)福利.
[Abstract]:Compensation is the core of modern enterprise human resource management, which is related to the production efficiency of the enterprise and its competitive advantage in the market. The compensation problem is also a social problem. It is related to the balance of production and consumption in a country or region. The government will regulate the enterprise in the aspect of salary making. It is very important for modern society to study the problem of salary establishment under government regulation. Based on search and match theory, it is very important to study the problem of salary establishment in modern society. And principal-agent theory. This article has studied under the government regulation. The effect of probationary period wage and minimum wage on salary. The main contents of this paper are as follows:. This paper studies the effect of probation wage on unemployment and bargaining wage. A search matching model with probationary period is established. During the probation period, the enterprise pays the employee wages according to the standard of probation period set by the government. . Employees' wages are formed by bargaining between enterprises and employees. Two kinds of steady-state equilibrium, mixed equilibrium and separated equilibrium, are obtained and compared with the matching model without probationary period. It is found that the introduction of probationary period not only reduces the unemployment rate but also reduces the bargaining wage of employees. The comparative static analysis of probationary wage shows that the unemployment rate will rise with the increase of probation wage. The bargaining wage of employees will also increase. This paper studies the design of the minimum wage contract with minimum wage standard under asymmetric information and establishes the complete information respectively. In the case of unobservable and asymmetric ability information, the model of wage incentive mechanism with minimum wage constraint is established. The principal-agent theory is used. The influence of minimum wage on the optimal contract is analyzed. The influence of the introduction of minimum wage on enterprise profit and social welfare is discussed. The conclusion is drawn that the minimum wage is higher when the minimum wage is higher. . The introduction of minimum wage reduces the profit and social welfare of the enterprise. This paper studies the design of the minimum wage contract with minimum wage under the double asymmetric information. The minimum wage constraint under the double asymmetric information is established. Based on the principal-agent theory, the optimal salary contract is obtained, and the introduction of minimum wage to the optimal contract is analyzed. The conclusion shows that when the minimum wage is relatively high, the introduction of the minimum wage reduces the profit of the enterprise, which is disadvantageous to the enterprise; The introduction of minimum wage not only increases the utility of high type of employees, but also increases their wages; It is good for the employee to increase the wage of the low type of employee, but in some cases the introduction of the minimum wage can increase the social welfare.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：天津大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級(jí)別】：博士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2016
【分類號(hào)】：F272.92

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