本文關(guān)鍵詞：中國(guó)家族上市企業(yè)控制權(quán)與現(xiàn)金流權(quán)分離對(duì)非效率投資行為的影響　出處：《南京大學(xué)》2016年碩士論文　論文類型：學(xué)位論文

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【摘要】：隨著我國(guó)市場(chǎng)經(jīng)濟(jì)改革的不斷深化,中國(guó)家族企業(yè)發(fā)展極為迅速,逐漸成長(zhǎng)為國(guó)民經(jīng)濟(jì)中不可或缺的重要組成部分。得益于中國(guó)資本市場(chǎng)的的不斷壯大,越來越多的中國(guó)家族企業(yè)選擇登陸中國(guó)滬深A(yù)股市場(chǎng),包括了中小板與創(chuàng)業(yè)板,資本市場(chǎng)出現(xiàn)了越來越多優(yōu)秀的家族企業(yè)。學(xué)術(shù)界針對(duì)家族企業(yè)也進(jìn)行了越來越多的研究。家族企業(yè)的一個(gè)主要特征是控制權(quán)與現(xiàn)金流權(quán)的分離,這是學(xué)者們關(guān)注的重點(diǎn)所在,因此學(xué)術(shù)界對(duì)家族企業(yè)的研究也主要集中在公司股權(quán)結(jié)構(gòu)與公司治理問題上,如：控制權(quán)與現(xiàn)金流權(quán)分離對(duì)公司價(jià)值的影響,控制權(quán)與現(xiàn)金流權(quán)分離對(duì)公司績(jī)效的影響。投資行為作為企業(yè)發(fā)展的原動(dòng)力,會(huì)對(duì)公司融資政策、分配政策產(chǎn)生重大影響,繼而影響到公司未來業(yè)績(jī)和發(fā)展前景。但是學(xué)者們對(duì)控制權(quán)與現(xiàn)金流權(quán)分離對(duì)投資效率的影響關(guān)系卻鮮少探討,因此,我們研究控制權(quán)與現(xiàn)金流權(quán)分離對(duì)企業(yè)投資效率的影響是非常必要且有意義的。本文以公司終極控制人為家族或個(gè)人作為界定家族上市公司的標(biāo)準(zhǔn),從滬深A(yù)股中篩選出471家符合要求的中國(guó)家族上市企業(yè)。選取2012-2013兩年的數(shù)據(jù),研究控制權(quán)與現(xiàn)金流權(quán)分離對(duì)非效率投資行為的影響。文章首先闡述了家族企業(yè)的定義和本文的兩個(gè)理論基礎(chǔ)——委托代理理論和控制權(quán)理論,分析了控制權(quán)與現(xiàn)金流權(quán)分離的實(shí)現(xiàn)方式和測(cè)量方法,以及控制權(quán)與現(xiàn)金流權(quán)分離對(duì)投資行為會(huì)產(chǎn)生何種影響。其次,基于2012-2013年中國(guó)471家家族上市企業(yè)已披露的年報(bào)中股權(quán)與控制關(guān)系確認(rèn)上市公司終極控制股東,計(jì)算終極控制股東的控制權(quán)與現(xiàn)金流權(quán)以及控制權(quán)與現(xiàn)金流權(quán)的分離度。再次,采用Richardson模型,對(duì)樣本企業(yè)進(jìn)行多元回歸分析,以回歸方程的殘差項(xiàng)代表非效率投資的類型及程度。最后以控制權(quán)與現(xiàn)金流權(quán)的分離度作為解釋變量,非效率投資作為被解釋變量,進(jìn)行多元回歸分析,探討兩者的影響關(guān)系。在此基礎(chǔ)上,以471家樣本企業(yè)終極控制人的現(xiàn)金流權(quán)中位數(shù)為界,分為高現(xiàn)金流權(quán)組和低現(xiàn)金流組,分別進(jìn)行多元線性回歸分析。并且探討現(xiàn)金持有水平是否會(huì)對(duì)控制權(quán)與現(xiàn)金流權(quán)分離對(duì)投資效率的影響產(chǎn)生調(diào)節(jié)作用。實(shí)證結(jié)果表明,第一,中國(guó)家族上市企業(yè)普遍存在非效率投資行為,投資不足的樣本數(shù)多于投資過度的樣本數(shù)。第二,控制權(quán)與現(xiàn)金流權(quán)的分離度越大,投資不足越嚴(yán)重,但控制權(quán)與現(xiàn)金流權(quán)的分離對(duì)投資過度則沒有顯著影響。第三,基于利益協(xié)同效應(yīng),高現(xiàn)金流權(quán)組中,控制權(quán)與現(xiàn)金流權(quán)的分離對(duì)非效率投資行為沒有顯著影響,但在低現(xiàn)金流權(quán)組,控制權(quán)與現(xiàn)金流權(quán)的分離與投資不足顯著正相關(guān)。第四,現(xiàn)金持有水平的調(diào)節(jié)效應(yīng)不顯著。為了防范由于家族企業(yè)終極控制人追逐私利掏空上市公司帶來的對(duì)中小股東利益侵害的風(fēng)險(xiǎn),本文提出三點(diǎn)建議。其一,完善股權(quán)結(jié)構(gòu)和監(jiān)督機(jī)制；其二,減少控制鏈層級(jí),降低控制權(quán)與現(xiàn)金流權(quán)的分離程度；其三,引入職業(yè)經(jīng)理人制度,提高家族控股股東的持股比例。
[Abstract]:With the deepening of the reform of the market economy in China, the development of family enterprises in China is very rapid and has gradually grown into an indispensable part of the national economy. Thanks to the continuous growth of China's capital market, more and more Chinese family businesses choose to go to China's Shanghai and Shenzhen A share market, including small and medium-sized board and gem, and there are more and more excellent family businesses in capital market. More and more studies have been carried out on family businesses in the academic world. One of the main characteristics of family enterprises is the separation of control right and cash flow right, this is the focus of scholars, so the family business academic research also focused on the ownership structure and corporate governance company, such as: control rights and cash flow rights separation effect on the value of the company, control rights and cash flow rights separation effect on corporate performance. As the driving force of the development of enterprises, investment behavior will have a significant impact on the company's financing policy and distribution policy, and then affect the company's future performance and development prospects. But scholars have seldom discussed the relationship between control right and cash flow right separation to investment efficiency. Therefore, it is very necessary and meaningful for us to study the influence of separation of control rights and cash flow rights on the investment efficiency of enterprises. In this paper, we take the ultimate control family or family as the standard to define family listed companies. We select 471 eligible Chinese family listed companies from Shanghai and Shenzhen A shares. The data of 2012-2013 years are selected to study the influence of the separation of control and cash flow on the inefficiency investment behavior. This article firstly expounds the definition of family business and the two theoretical basis of principal-agent theory and control theory, analyzes the way and method to realize the control rights and cash flow rights separation, and the separation of control rights and cash flow rights will affect investment behavior. Secondly, based on the relationship between ownership and control in the annual reports published by 471 Chinese Family Listed Companies in the past 2012-2013 years, we confirm the ultimate controlling shareholders of listed companies, and calculate the separation of control and cash flow rights of the ultimate controlling shareholders and the separation of control rights and cash flow rights. Thirdly, the Richardson model is used to analyze the sample enterprise by multiple regression analysis, and the residual term of the regression equation represents the type and degree of the inefficiency investment. Finally, taking the separation degree of control rights and cash flow rights as explanatory variables, inefficient investment is used as explanatory variable, and multiple regression analysis is conducted to explore the relationship between them. On this basis, the median of the cash flow rights of the ultimate controller of 471 sample enterprises is bounded, and they are divided into high cash flow group and low cash flow group, and multiple linear regression analysis is conducted respectively. It also discusses whether the level of cash holding will regulate the impact of the separation of control and cash flow on the efficiency of investment. The empirical results show that, first, the non efficient investment behavior is common in Chinese listed companies, and the number of underinvested samples is more than the number of overinvestment samples. Second, the greater the separation of the right of control and cash flow, the more serious the investment is, but the separation of the right of control and cash flow has no significant influence on the overinvestment. Third, based on the synergistic effect of interest, the separation of control rights and cash flow rights has no significant impact on inefficient investment behavior in high cash flow group, but in the low cash flow group, the separation of control rights and cash flow rights is significantly positively related to underinvestment. Fourth, the adjustment effect of cash holding level is not significant. In order to prevent the risk that the ultimate controller of the family enterprise is pursuing private profits to empty the listed companies, this paper puts forward three suggestions. First, improve the ownership structure and supervision mechanism; secondly, reduce the control chain level, reduce the separation of control rights and cash flow rights; thirdly, introduce the professional manager system to improve the shareholding ratio of family controlled shareholders.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：南京大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級(jí)別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2016
【分類號(hào)】：F275;F276.5

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