本文關鍵詞：中國家族上市企業(yè)控制權與現(xiàn)金流權分離對非效率投資行為的影響　出處：《南京大學》2016年碩士論文　論文類型：學位論文

  更多相關文章： 家族上市企業(yè) 控制權與現(xiàn)金流權的分離 投資效率 現(xiàn)金持有

【摘要】：隨著我國市場經濟改革的不斷深化,中國家族企業(yè)發(fā)展極為迅速,逐漸成長為國民經濟中不可或缺的重要組成部分。得益于中國資本市場的的不斷壯大,越來越多的中國家族企業(yè)選擇登陸中國滬深A股市場,包括了中小板與創(chuàng)業(yè)板,資本市場出現(xiàn)了越來越多優(yōu)秀的家族企業(yè)。學術界針對家族企業(yè)也進行了越來越多的研究。家族企業(yè)的一個主要特征是控制權與現(xiàn)金流權的分離,這是學者們關注的重點所在,因此學術界對家族企業(yè)的研究也主要集中在公司股權結構與公司治理問題上,如：控制權與現(xiàn)金流權分離對公司價值的影響,控制權與現(xiàn)金流權分離對公司績效的影響。投資行為作為企業(yè)發(fā)展的原動力,會對公司融資政策、分配政策產生重大影響,繼而影響到公司未來業(yè)績和發(fā)展前景。但是學者們對控制權與現(xiàn)金流權分離對投資效率的影響關系卻鮮少探討,因此,我們研究控制權與現(xiàn)金流權分離對企業(yè)投資效率的影響是非常必要且有意義的。本文以公司終極控制人為家族或個人作為界定家族上市公司的標準,從滬深A股中篩選出471家符合要求的中國家族上市企業(yè)。選取2012-2013兩年的數(shù)據(jù),研究控制權與現(xiàn)金流權分離對非效率投資行為的影響。文章首先闡述了家族企業(yè)的定義和本文的兩個理論基礎——委托代理理論和控制權理論,分析了控制權與現(xiàn)金流權分離的實現(xiàn)方式和測量方法,以及控制權與現(xiàn)金流權分離對投資行為會產生何種影響。其次,基于2012-2013年中國471家家族上市企業(yè)已披露的年報中股權與控制關系確認上市公司終極控制股東,計算終極控制股東的控制權與現(xiàn)金流權以及控制權與現(xiàn)金流權的分離度。再次,采用Richardson模型,對樣本企業(yè)進行多元回歸分析,以回歸方程的殘差項代表非效率投資的類型及程度。最后以控制權與現(xiàn)金流權的分離度作為解釋變量,非效率投資作為被解釋變量,進行多元回歸分析,探討兩者的影響關系。在此基礎上,以471家樣本企業(yè)終極控制人的現(xiàn)金流權中位數(shù)為界,分為高現(xiàn)金流權組和低現(xiàn)金流組,分別進行多元線性回歸分析。并且探討現(xiàn)金持有水平是否會對控制權與現(xiàn)金流權分離對投資效率的影響產生調節(jié)作用。實證結果表明,第一,中國家族上市企業(yè)普遍存在非效率投資行為,投資不足的樣本數(shù)多于投資過度的樣本數(shù)。第二,控制權與現(xiàn)金流權的分離度越大,投資不足越嚴重,但控制權與現(xiàn)金流權的分離對投資過度則沒有顯著影響。第三,基于利益協(xié)同效應,高現(xiàn)金流權組中,控制權與現(xiàn)金流權的分離對非效率投資行為沒有顯著影響,但在低現(xiàn)金流權組,控制權與現(xiàn)金流權的分離與投資不足顯著正相關。第四,現(xiàn)金持有水平的調節(jié)效應不顯著。為了防范由于家族企業(yè)終極控制人追逐私利掏空上市公司帶來的對中小股東利益侵害的風險,本文提出三點建議。其一,完善股權結構和監(jiān)督機制；其二,減少控制鏈層級,降低控制權與現(xiàn)金流權的分離程度；其三,引入職業(yè)經理人制度,提高家族控股股東的持股比例。
[Abstract]:With the deepening of the reform of the market economy in China, the development of family enterprises in China is very rapid and has gradually grown into an indispensable part of the national economy. Thanks to the continuous growth of China's capital market, more and more Chinese family businesses choose to go to China's Shanghai and Shenzhen A share market, including small and medium-sized board and gem, and there are more and more excellent family businesses in capital market. More and more studies have been carried out on family businesses in the academic world. One of the main characteristics of family enterprises is the separation of control right and cash flow right, this is the focus of scholars, so the family business academic research also focused on the ownership structure and corporate governance company, such as: control rights and cash flow rights separation effect on the value of the company, control rights and cash flow rights separation effect on corporate performance. As the driving force of the development of enterprises, investment behavior will have a significant impact on the company's financing policy and distribution policy, and then affect the company's future performance and development prospects. But scholars have seldom discussed the relationship between control right and cash flow right separation to investment efficiency. Therefore, it is very necessary and meaningful for us to study the influence of separation of control rights and cash flow rights on the investment efficiency of enterprises. In this paper, we take the ultimate control family or family as the standard to define family listed companies. We select 471 eligible Chinese family listed companies from Shanghai and Shenzhen A shares. The data of 2012-2013 years are selected to study the influence of the separation of control and cash flow on the inefficiency investment behavior. This article firstly expounds the definition of family business and the two theoretical basis of principal-agent theory and control theory, analyzes the way and method to realize the control rights and cash flow rights separation, and the separation of control rights and cash flow rights will affect investment behavior. Secondly, based on the relationship between ownership and control in the annual reports published by 471 Chinese Family Listed Companies in the past 2012-2013 years, we confirm the ultimate controlling shareholders of listed companies, and calculate the separation of control and cash flow rights of the ultimate controlling shareholders and the separation of control rights and cash flow rights. Thirdly, the Richardson model is used to analyze the sample enterprise by multiple regression analysis, and the residual term of the regression equation represents the type and degree of the inefficiency investment. Finally, taking the separation degree of control rights and cash flow rights as explanatory variables, inefficient investment is used as explanatory variable, and multiple regression analysis is conducted to explore the relationship between them. On this basis, the median of the cash flow rights of the ultimate controller of 471 sample enterprises is bounded, and they are divided into high cash flow group and low cash flow group, and multiple linear regression analysis is conducted respectively. It also discusses whether the level of cash holding will regulate the impact of the separation of control and cash flow on the efficiency of investment. The empirical results show that, first, the non efficient investment behavior is common in Chinese listed companies, and the number of underinvested samples is more than the number of overinvestment samples. Second, the greater the separation of the right of control and cash flow, the more serious the investment is, but the separation of the right of control and cash flow has no significant influence on the overinvestment. Third, based on the synergistic effect of interest, the separation of control rights and cash flow rights has no significant impact on inefficient investment behavior in high cash flow group, but in the low cash flow group, the separation of control rights and cash flow rights is significantly positively related to underinvestment. Fourth, the adjustment effect of cash holding level is not significant. In order to prevent the risk that the ultimate controller of the family enterprise is pursuing private profits to empty the listed companies, this paper puts forward three suggestions. First, improve the ownership structure and supervision mechanism; secondly, reduce the control chain level, reduce the separation of control rights and cash flow rights; thirdly, introduce the professional manager system to improve the shareholding ratio of family controlled shareholders.
【學位授予單位】：南京大學
【學位級別】：碩士
【學位授予年份】：2016
【分類號】：F275;F276.5

【參考文獻】

相關期刊論文 前10條

1 冉茂盛;彭文偉;黃凌云;;現(xiàn)金流權與控制權分離下的企業(yè)R&D投資[J];科學學與科學技術管理;2010年01期

2 楊淑娥;蘇坤;;終極控制、自由現(xiàn)金流約束與公司績效——基于我國民營上市公司的經驗證據(jù)[J];會計研究;2009年04期

3 程仲鳴;夏新平;余明桂;;政府干預、金字塔結構與地方國有上市公司投資[J];管理世界;2008年09期

4 沈藝峰;況學文;聶亞娟;;終極控股股東超額控制與現(xiàn)金持有量價值的實證研究[J];南開管理評論;2008年01期

5 辛清泉;林斌;王彥超;;政府控制、經理薪酬與資本投資[J];經濟研究;2007年08期

6 許永斌;彭白穎;;控制權、現(xiàn)金流權與公司業(yè)績——來自中國民營上市公司的經驗研究[J];商業(yè)經濟與管理;2007年04期

7 葉勇;劉波;黃雷;;終極控制權、現(xiàn)金流量權與企業(yè)價值——基于隱性終極控制論的中國上市公司治理實證研究[J];管理科學學報;2007年02期

8 何源;白瑩;文翹翹;;負債融資、大股東控制與企業(yè)過度投資行為[J];系統(tǒng)工程;2007年03期

9 劉少波;;控制權收益悖論與超控制權收益——對大股東侵害小股東利益的一個新的理論解釋[J];經濟研究;2007年02期

10 彭白穎;;最終控制股東控制權與現(xiàn)金流權偏離的實現(xiàn)機制[J];工業(yè)技術經濟;2006年10期

相關博士學位論文 前1條

1 蘇啟林;上市公司家族控制與公司治理：基于契約理論的研究[D];暨南大學;2004年

相關碩士學位論文 前1條

1 梁光紅;家族上市公司控制權與現(xiàn)金流權分離對投資行為的影響[D];暨南大學;2011年

，

本文編號：1343260