【摘要】：中國封建王朝包容性制度雖然對全社會有益,但對統(tǒng)治者的政權(quán)穩(wěn)定弊多利少,它可能降低統(tǒng)治者相對于潛在競爭者或利益集團對全社會經(jīng)濟剩余的實際占有率。只有當統(tǒng)治者認為潛在競爭者或利益集團的威脅較小時,不壓制王朝制度包容性的成長才是統(tǒng)治者較理性的選擇。若潛在競爭者或利益集團看起來受益于包容性的經(jīng)濟增長過程而變得強大,統(tǒng)治者的核心激勵則是強化向下攫取或管制以釜底抽薪式地降低他們不臣或蠹蝕的隱患。而統(tǒng)治者過分壓制利益集團反而刺激了利益集團分利性的增長,二者遂陷入競相向下攫取的惡性競爭,使全社會制度攫取性螺旋式上升,王朝便亡于這種惡性循環(huán)。
[Abstract]:Although the inclusive system of Chinese feudal dynasty is beneficial to the whole society, it does more harm than good to the regime stability of the rulers, and it may reduce the actual share of the rulers relative to the potential competitors or interest groups to the whole social economic surplus. It is only when rulers consider that the threats of potential competitors or interest groups are relatively small, and not suppressing the inclusive growth of dynastic systems is a more rational choice for rulers. If potential competitors or interest groups appear to benefit from an inclusive economic growth process, the central incentive for rulers is to strengthen downward grabbing or regulation to reduce their vulnerability to corruption. On the contrary, the ruler suppressed the interest group too much and stimulated the interest group to increase, so they fell into the vicious competition, which led to the rise of the whole social system grab spiral, and the dynasty died in this kind of vicious circle.
【作者單位】： 南京大學(xué)商學(xué)院;
【基金】：國家社科基金項目“基于新制度經(jīng)濟學(xué)視角的中國封建王朝興衰周期律研究”(項目號:15BJL063)的階段性成果
【分類號】：F129
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本文編號：2300643