地方政府行為影響產(chǎn)業(yè)集聚的理論和實(shí)證分析
[Abstract]:The purpose of this paper is to study the influence of local government behavior on industrial agglomeration. In theory, the behavior of local government is divided into four aspects: supply of local public goods, maintenance of market effectiveness, promotion and protection of knowledge spillover, and local protectionism. And the related theories in these four fields are described in detail, and the mechanism of government action on industrial agglomeration in these four aspects is discussed in detail. We believe that the expenditure of local public goods is helpful to the improvement of local industrial convergence, and the maintenance of local market effectiveness can improve the efficiency of industrial agglomeration market. The promotion and protection of knowledge spillover can greatly accelerate the formation and development of industrial agglomeration, while the impact of local protectionism on local industrial agglomeration is uncertain. Empirically, this paper elects five variables to represent the industrial agglomeration index, such as local GDP specific coefficient, local financial expenditure proportion, market allocation resource proportion, market segmentation index, scientific research personnel proportion index of labor force, and so on. Local public goods, local protectionism, effectiveness maintenance, knowledge spillover are five factors, and regional population proportion, provincial trade volume ratio index represents population and foreign trade as limiting variables, A general econometric model is constructed for empirical analysis. In order to study the effect of each explanatory variable on the explained variable dynamically and clearly, we used the data of 31 provinces from 2000 to 2009, established the panel data model, and analyzed it scientifically and reasonably. Finally, the conclusion of variable intercept fixed effect model is selected as the final empirical result from several model conclusions. Results support our theoretical analysis results, the conclusion shows: local public goods expenditure, market effectiveness variable coefficient, scientific research personnel specific gravity coefficient is positive, public goods expenditure in several factors the effect is the most obvious. The variables representing local protectionism are not significant enough, indicating the diversity of their effects.
【學(xué)位授予單位】:湖南師范大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級(jí)別】:碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】:2014
【分類號(hào)】:D630;F127;F279.2
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