本文選題：雙重政策保護 + 產能過剩�。� 參考：《財經研究》2017年11期

【摘要】：是不是只要政府予以企業(yè)保護就一定會導致產能過剩?針對此問題文章建立了一個簡明的理論模型,并運用固定效應模型、傾向得分匹配法以及事件沖擊DID方法進行了實證檢驗,探究了地方政府在"官員晉升錦標賽"體制下運用財政補貼,與中央政府的產業(yè)鼓勵政策一起給企業(yè)提供雙重政策保護,從而導致產能過剩的整個機制。結論表明:(1)單一的政策保護并不會引發(fā)嚴重的產能過剩,中央政府的產業(yè)鼓勵政策和地方政府的財政補貼政策的雙重疊加才是導致產能過剩的真正原因;(2)當中央政府明確經濟增長任務后,那些所在地政府迅速推出地方版財政刺激計劃的企業(yè)更容易發(fā)生產能過剩;(3)相比較而言,雙重保護的效果在國有企業(yè)中更為明顯。
[Abstract]:Does it mean that as long as the government protects enterprises, it will lead to overcapacity? In this paper, a concise theoretical model is established, and the fixed effect model, the tendency score matching method and the event shock Did method are used to carry out an empirical test. This paper probes into the whole mechanism of local governments applying financial subsidies under the system of "official promotion championship", together with the industrial encouragement policy of the central government, to provide the enterprises with dual policy protection, thus leading to the whole mechanism of overcapacity. The conclusions are as follows: (1) single policy protection does not lead to serious overcapacity. The superposition of the central government's industrial encouragement policy and the local government's fiscal subsidy policy is the real cause of overcapacity. (2) when the central government defines the task of economic growth, Companies whose local governments quickly rolled out local fiscal stimulus packages are more likely to experience overcapacity; (3) the effect of dual protection is more pronounced in state-owned enterprises than in state-owned enterprises.
【作者單位】： 上海商學院商務經濟學院;上海大學經濟學院;
【基金】：國家自然科學基金面上項目(71573171) 上海市哲學社會科學青年項目(2016EJB001)
【分類號】：F120

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