本文選題：中國式分權(quán)　切入點：自利性投資偏好　出處：《經(jīng)濟研究》2017年06期

【摘要】：本文基于政府官員"經(jīng)濟政治人"假設(shè),論證了中國式分權(quán)下市場參與者的投資行為邏輯,為中國粗放式經(jīng)濟增長提供了一種解釋。在垂直集中的官員治理模式下,中央政府因信息所限,難以有效約束地方官員"重生產(chǎn),輕創(chuàng)新"的自利性投資偏好。在經(jīng)濟分權(quán)體制下,地方政府及其官員掌控著可觀的經(jīng)濟資源,形成政府主導(dǎo)型經(jīng)濟。結(jié)果是,地方官員的自利性投資偏好能夠借助政府"有形之手",作用于各類市場參與者的投資行為,從而整個社會投資呈現(xiàn)"重生產(chǎn),輕創(chuàng)新"的偏向。本文運用省級面板數(shù)據(jù)檢驗了理論假說,結(jié)果表明,在中國式分權(quán)下,地方財政分權(quán)度越高,地方政府、企業(yè)和社會的創(chuàng)新性支出占生產(chǎn)性支出的比重越低。
[Abstract]:Based on the assumption of "economic and political person" of government officials, this paper demonstrates the logic of investment behavior of Chinese market participants under decentralization, which provides an explanation for China's extensive economic growth. The central government, limited by information, is unable to effectively constrain the self-interest investment preferences of local officials, which "emphasize production rather than innovation". Under a decentralized economic system, local governments and their officials control considerable economic resources. The result is that local officials' self-interest investment preferences can benefit from the "tangible hand" of the government and act on the investment behavior of all kinds of market participants, so that the whole social investment presents a "heavy production". This paper uses provincial panel data to test the theoretical hypothesis. The results show that the higher the degree of local fiscal decentralization is, the lower the proportion of innovative expenditure of local government, enterprise and society in productive expenditure is.
【作者單位】： 中國社會科學(xué)院經(jīng)濟研究所;
【基金】：國家社會科學(xué)基金項目(14BJY019) 人力資源和社會保障部留學(xué)人員科技活動擇優(yōu)資助項目的資助
【分類號】：F124
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本文編號：1670325