【摘要】：隨著經(jīng)濟全球化的迅速發(fā)展，產(chǎn)業(yè)集群在區(qū)域經(jīng)濟中扮演著越來越重要的角色。它將相同或相似產(chǎn)業(yè)的企業(yè)聚集起來，產(chǎn)生巨大的規(guī)模經(jīng)濟效應(yīng)與范圍經(jīng)濟效應(yīng)。產(chǎn)業(yè)集群中企業(yè)間合作創(chuàng)新所產(chǎn)生的知識溢出效應(yīng)以及企業(yè)聚集所產(chǎn)生的區(qū)域品牌效應(yīng)為產(chǎn)業(yè)集群內(nèi)企業(yè)帶來了眾多優(yōu)勢，為提升區(qū)域核心競爭力做出了巨大的貢獻。因此，，無論是發(fā)達國家還是發(fā)展中國家對產(chǎn)業(yè)集群的發(fā)展都給予了高度的重視。 技術(shù)創(chuàng)新是產(chǎn)業(yè)集群發(fā)展的不竭動力。因此，如何提高技術(shù)創(chuàng)新能力便成為如何加快產(chǎn)業(yè)集群發(fā)展的關(guān)鍵。隨著產(chǎn)業(yè)全球化布局的深入、社會分工的細化，技術(shù)創(chuàng)新的形式也發(fā)生了改變。企業(yè)出于控制研發(fā)風(fēng)險、縮短研發(fā)周期的目的，逐漸將研發(fā)方式從組織內(nèi)部獨立研發(fā)轉(zhuǎn)向組織內(nèi)外部協(xié)同研發(fā)。企業(yè)間合作創(chuàng)新逐漸成為技術(shù)創(chuàng)新的主要方式。因此，探尋企業(yè)間合作創(chuàng)新行為的內(nèi)在規(guī)律，避免合作中機會主義行為成為研發(fā)合作的成功與否的關(guān)鍵。 文章通過對以往學(xué)者的集群理論和合作創(chuàng)新理論研究成果進行回顧，為集群中企業(yè)間合作創(chuàng)新行為的研究提供理論基礎(chǔ)；建立基于根植性以及互惠性假設(shè)的產(chǎn)業(yè)集群中企業(yè)間合作創(chuàng)新行為機制，探索根植性在企業(yè)間合作創(chuàng)新行為機制中發(fā)揮的作用；運用演化博弈方法對集群中企業(yè)間合作創(chuàng)新行為進行研究分析，探索知識溢出效應(yīng)、根植性以及知識產(chǎn)權(quán)保護力度對均衡策略的影響；并運用Mat lab對不同條件下的博弈模型進行了數(shù)值模擬。 演化博弈分析的結(jié)果表明：知識溢出效應(yīng)、知識保護力度以及集群根植性對集群演化方向產(chǎn)生重要的影響。①當(dāng)集群根植性、知識溢出效應(yīng)、知識產(chǎn)權(quán)保護力度產(chǎn)生的正面收益低于機會主義行為產(chǎn)生的額外收益時，集群內(nèi)的成員會避免合作研發(fā)轉(zhuǎn)而獨立研發(fā)或者停止研發(fā)，集群內(nèi)合作創(chuàng)新將會進入“囚徒困境”模式；②當(dāng)集群根植性、知識溢出效應(yīng)、知識產(chǎn)權(quán)保護力度產(chǎn)生的正面收益高于機會主義行為產(chǎn)生的額外收益時，集群內(nèi)的成員會積極參與到合作研發(fā)中，集群內(nèi)合作創(chuàng)新會走出“囚徒困境”、實現(xiàn)共贏；③當(dāng)知識效應(yīng)、知識產(chǎn)權(quán)保護力度以及集群根植性介于上述兩者之間時，集群演化的方向取決于博弈雙方的初始策略分布。最后，文章從政府層面、產(chǎn)業(yè)集群層面以及企業(yè)層面為如何促進產(chǎn)業(yè)集群內(nèi)企業(yè)間技術(shù)創(chuàng)新合作提出了政策建議。
[Abstract]:With the rapid development of economic globalization, industrial clusters play a more and more important role in regional economy. It gathers enterprises of the same or similar industries to produce huge economies of scale and economies of scope. The knowledge spillover effect caused by inter-firm cooperative innovation and the regional brand effect caused by enterprise agglomeration have brought many advantages to the enterprises in the industrial cluster and have made great contributions to the promotion of regional core competitiveness. Therefore, both developed and developing countries attach great importance to the development of industrial clusters. Technological innovation is the inexhaustible power of industrial cluster development. Therefore, how to improve the ability of technological innovation has become the key to accelerate the development of industrial clusters. With the deepening of industrial globalization and the refinement of social division of labor, the form of technological innovation has also changed. For the purpose of controlling R & D risk and shortening R D cycle, enterprises gradually change their R & D mode from internal and external R & D to internal and external collaborative R & D. Cooperative innovation between enterprises has gradually become the main way of technological innovation. Therefore, it is the key to the success of R & D cooperation to explore the inherent law of cooperative innovation behavior and avoid opportunism in cooperation. This paper reviews the previous researches on cluster theory and cooperative innovation theory in order to provide a theoretical basis for the research of cooperative innovation behavior among enterprises in clusters. To establish the cooperative innovation behavior mechanism among enterprises in industrial clusters based on the assumption of grounding and reciprocity, and to explore the role of grounding in the cooperative innovation behavior mechanism among enterprises; By using the evolutionary game method, this paper studies and analyzes the cooperative innovation behavior among enterprises in clusters, and explores the effects of knowledge spillover effect, grounding and intellectual property protection on the equilibrium strategy. Mat lab is used to simulate the game model under different conditions. The results of evolutionary game analysis show that: knowledge spillover effect, knowledge protection and cluster root have important influence on the evolution direction of cluster. 1 when the cluster is rooted, knowledge spillover effect, knowledge spillover effect. When the positive benefits of IPR protection are lower than the additional benefits from opportunistic behavior, the members of the cluster will avoid cooperating R & D to develop independently or stop R & D. Intra-cluster cooperative innovation will enter the "prisoner's dilemma" mode; (2) when the positive benefits of cluster root, knowledge spillover and intellectual property protection are higher than those of opportunistic behavior, the members of the cluster will actively participate in cooperative R & D. The cooperative innovation in the cluster will go out of the "prisoner's dilemma" and realize the win-win situation; 3When the knowledge effect, intellectual property protection and cluster root are between them, the direction of cluster evolution depends on the initial strategy distribution of game players. Finally, the paper puts forward some policy suggestions on how to promote technological innovation cooperation among enterprises in industrial clusters from the government level, industrial cluster level and enterprise level.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：重慶大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2014
【分類號】：F273.1

【參考文獻】

相關(guān)期刊論文 前10條

1 皮星;;基于補缺聯(lián)盟的生物制藥企業(yè)技術(shù)合作創(chuàng)新模式[J];重慶工學(xué)院學(xué)報(社會科學(xué)版);2009年05期

2 葉華光;;橫向產(chǎn)業(yè)集群形成的動力機制研究[J];科技和產(chǎn)業(yè);2009年08期

3 金碚;工業(yè)經(jīng)濟學(xué)新體系研究[J];中國工業(yè)經(jīng)濟;2005年01期

4 胡宇辰,羅賢棟;企業(yè)集群的競爭力分析[J];管理科學(xué)文摘;2003年06期

5 朱小斌;林慶;;中小企業(yè)集群競爭優(yōu)勢來源的演化差異——基于浙江紹興紡織業(yè)集群的案例研究[J];管理世界;2008年10期

6 曹寶明;王曉清;;區(qū)位選擇視角下產(chǎn)業(yè)集群形成的微觀機制分析[J];江蘇社會科學(xué);2008年06期

7 吳曉波,耿帥;區(qū)域集群自稔性風(fēng)險成因分析[J];經(jīng)濟地理;2003年06期

8 李君華,彭玉蘭;基于全球供應(yīng)鏈的產(chǎn)業(yè)集群競爭優(yōu)勢[J];經(jīng)濟理論與經(jīng)濟管理;2004年01期

9 吳宣恭;企業(yè)集群的優(yōu)勢及形成機理[J];經(jīng)濟縱橫;2002年11期

10 李京文;任伶;;通過合作創(chuàng)新提升企業(yè)核心能力的模式研究[J];經(jīng)濟縱橫;2009年04期

本文編號：2300492