【摘要】：京津冀協(xié)同發(fā)展已經(jīng)上升為重大國家戰(zhàn)略,但區(qū)域利益的不協(xié)調(diào)導(dǎo)致京津冀協(xié)同發(fā)展困難重重。京津冀經(jīng)濟(jì)持續(xù)快速發(fā)展,但與長三角相比,總體競爭力明顯較弱;在各個(gè)地方政府追求行政區(qū)劃利益的動(dòng)機(jī)下,北京專注于自身發(fā)展,忽視對津冀的經(jīng)濟(jì)輻射作用;天津依靠自身強(qiáng)大的工業(yè)實(shí)力和沿海港口,打造“北方經(jīng)濟(jì)中心”,對京津冀協(xié)同發(fā)展熱情不高;河北的經(jīng)濟(jì)發(fā)展水平與京津地區(qū)形成強(qiáng)烈反差,“環(huán)京津貧困帶”現(xiàn)象依然嚴(yán)重。這些問題追根溯源是區(qū)域利益協(xié)調(diào)機(jī)制尚未健全的體制機(jī)制掣肘。本文將區(qū)域經(jīng)濟(jì)運(yùn)行的內(nèi)在聯(lián)系與宏觀經(jīng)濟(jì)協(xié)調(diào)發(fā)展目標(biāo)作為研究的基本出發(fā)點(diǎn),以京津冀協(xié)同發(fā)展為軸線,以區(qū)域利益相對獨(dú)立性作為邏輯起點(diǎn),研究京津冀區(qū)域利益沖突的外在表現(xiàn)和內(nèi)在動(dòng)因。本文先對區(qū)域利益的內(nèi)涵做出科學(xué)界定,并將區(qū)域利益的構(gòu)成分解為個(gè)人利益、企業(yè)利益、地方政府利益和中央政府利益。其次,分別從政府謀利行為、居民謀利行為、企業(yè)謀利行為對京津冀區(qū)域謀利行為進(jìn)行全面闡述。再次,為探究區(qū)域利益主體的謀利行為的深層次原因,運(yùn)用討價(jià)還價(jià)博弈模型、聲譽(yù)模型分別對中央政府與地方政府的利益博弈、地方政府之間的利益博弈進(jìn)行分析;并基于大量統(tǒng)計(jì)數(shù)據(jù)對居民與政府、企業(yè)與政府的利益博弈進(jìn)行了深入探究,提了出區(qū)域利益視角下的京津冀協(xié)同發(fā)展的機(jī)制與路徑,以改善北京市當(dāng)前的“大城市病”問題和京津惡性競爭、河北全面落后的局面,最終實(shí)現(xiàn)京津冀抱團(tuán)發(fā)展,構(gòu)建京津冀協(xié)同發(fā)展首善之區(qū)�；谏鲜龇治�,本文提出了京津冀區(qū)域利益協(xié)調(diào)的機(jī)制與實(shí)現(xiàn)路徑。京津冀區(qū)域利益的協(xié)調(diào)機(jī)制包括創(chuàng)新利益共贏機(jī)制、搭建資源共享機(jī)制、完善利益補(bǔ)償機(jī)制、構(gòu)建新型政績考核機(jī)制四類。其中,創(chuàng)新利益共贏機(jī)制包括建立利益訴求表達(dá)機(jī)制和利益分配機(jī)制;搭建資源共享機(jī)制包括產(chǎn)業(yè)共享、基礎(chǔ)設(shè)施共享和科技資源共享機(jī)制;利益補(bǔ)償機(jī)制包括產(chǎn)業(yè)轉(zhuǎn)移補(bǔ)償和生態(tài)補(bǔ)償機(jī)制。新型政績考核機(jī)制是指包含環(huán)境改善、民生改善和區(qū)域一體化指標(biāo)在內(nèi)的政績考核機(jī)制。京津冀區(qū)域利益的實(shí)現(xiàn)途徑包括明確區(qū)域整體利益、樹立協(xié)同發(fā)展觀念、建立區(qū)域治理體系三大方面。其中區(qū)域治理體系又包括區(qū)域治理法律體系、區(qū)域治理政策體系、多元主體治理框架體系等。
[Abstract]:The coordinated development of Beijing, Tianjin and Hebei has become an important national strategy, but the incoordination of regional interests makes it difficult for Beijing, Tianjin and Hebei to coordinate development. The economy of Beijing-Tianjin-Hebei has been developing rapidly, but compared with the Yangtze River Delta, the overall competitiveness is obviously weak, under the motive of the local governments pursuing the interests of administrative divisions, Beijing focuses on its own development and neglects the economic radiation effect on Tianjin-Hebei. Relying on its own strong industrial strength and coastal ports, Tianjin is a "northern economic center", and is not enthusiastic about the coordinated development of Beijing-Tianjin-Hebei; the level of economic development in Hebei is in sharp contrast to that in the Beijing-Tianjin region. The phenomenon of "poverty zone around Beijing and Tianjin" is still serious. These problems can be traced back to the unsound institutional mechanism of regional interest coordination mechanism. This paper takes the internal relation of regional economic operation and the goal of coordinated development of macro-economy as the basic starting point, taking the coordinated development of Beijing-Tianjin-Hebei as the axis and the relative independence of regional interests as the logical starting point. This paper studies the external manifestation and internal motivation of the conflict of interest in Beijing, Tianjin and Hebei regions. In this paper, the connotation of regional interest is defined scientifically, and the constitution of regional interest is divided into personal interest, enterprise interest, local government interest and central government interest. Secondly, from the government profit behavior, residents profit behavior, enterprise profit behavior to Beijing, Tianjin and Hebei region profit behavior. Thirdly, in order to explore the deep-seated reasons of the regional interest subject's profit-seeking behavior, the paper analyzes the benefit game between the central government and the local government by using the bargaining game model and the reputation model. And based on a large number of statistical data, this paper makes a deep study on the benefit game between residents and government, enterprises and government, and puts forward the mechanism and path of Beijing-Tianjin-Hebei coordinated development from the perspective of regional interests. In order to improve the current problem of "big city disease" in Beijing and the vicious competition between Beijing and Tianjin, Hebei is backward in an all-round way, so as to realize the development of Beijing, Tianjin and Hebei groups, and to construct the first and best area for the coordinated development of Beijing, Tianjin and Hebei. Based on the above analysis, this paper puts forward the mechanism and realization path of Beijing, Tianjin and Hebei regional interest coordination. The coordination mechanism of regional interests of Beijing-Tianjin-Hebei region includes four types: innovating the mechanism of win-win benefit, setting up the mechanism of sharing resources, perfecting the mechanism of compensation of interests, and constructing the new mechanism of assessing political achievements. Among them, the innovation benefit win-win mechanism includes the establishment of interest appeal expression mechanism and benefit distribution mechanism, the establishment of resource sharing mechanism, including industrial sharing, infrastructure sharing and science and technology resources sharing mechanism. Benefit compensation mechanism includes industry transfer compensation and ecological compensation mechanism. The new performance assessment mechanism includes environmental improvement, livelihood improvement and regional integration index. The ways to realize the regional interests of Beijing, Tianjin and Hebei include defining the whole interests of the region, setting up the concept of coordinated development and establishing the system of regional governance. The regional governance system includes the regional governance legal system, the regional governance policy system, the multi-subject governance framework system and so on.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：首都經(jīng)濟(jì)貿(mào)易大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2017
【分類號】：F127

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