本文選題：城市群內(nèi)部 + 競(jìng)合行為��； 參考：《西南財(cái)經(jīng)大學(xué)》2014年博士論文

【摘要】：城市群區(qū)域的全面、協(xié)調(diào)、可持續(xù)發(fā)展對(duì)優(yōu)化國(guó)土空間開(kāi)發(fā)結(jié)構(gòu)、完善城鎮(zhèn)體系建設(shè)、促進(jìn)區(qū)域經(jīng)濟(jì)協(xié)調(diào)發(fā)展乃至全面推進(jìn)中國(guó)新型城鎮(zhèn)化戰(zhàn)略進(jìn)程具有重大的戰(zhàn)略意義�！秶�(guó)民經(jīng)濟(jì)和社會(huì)發(fā)展第十二個(gè)五年規(guī)劃綱要》明確指出,未來(lái)我國(guó)城鎮(zhèn)建設(shè)必須遵循城市發(fā)展客觀規(guī)律,以大城市為依托,以中、小城市為重點(diǎn),逐步形成福射帶動(dòng)作用大的城市群,促進(jìn)大、中、小城市和小城鎮(zhèn)協(xié)調(diào)發(fā)展。依托主體功能區(qū)規(guī)劃完善城市布局、促進(jìn)城市群發(fā)展、加強(qiáng)城鎮(zhèn)化科學(xué)管理,已成為有效推進(jìn)中國(guó)城鎮(zhèn)化進(jìn)程的重大戰(zhàn)略選擇。數(shù)據(jù)表明,城市群在國(guó)民經(jīng)濟(jì)和社會(huì)發(fā)展中的關(guān)鍵作用日益突出,已成為我國(guó)區(qū)域經(jīng)濟(jì)發(fā)展的基本承載平臺(tái)和主體空間格局,隨著大量的經(jīng)濟(jì)資源逐步聚集到城市群區(qū)域,其內(nèi)部各地區(qū)如何有效配置資源、化解經(jīng)濟(jì)沖突、實(shí)現(xiàn)協(xié)調(diào)發(fā)展顯得尤為重要。我國(guó)現(xiàn)行的管理體制機(jī)制,如官員績(jī)效考核以及財(cái)政分權(quán)等,在促進(jìn)地區(qū)經(jīng)濟(jì)增長(zhǎng)的同時(shí),也加劇了地區(qū)間競(jìng)爭(zhēng),特別是一定空間范圍內(nèi)存在多個(gè)城市的城市群區(qū)域,競(jìng)爭(zhēng)更加激烈,產(chǎn)業(yè)結(jié)構(gòu)趨同、惡性競(jìng)爭(zhēng)加劇、區(qū)域合作減少、資源配置效率降低的發(fā)展態(tài)勢(shì)已成為城市群發(fā)展理論研究面臨的嚴(yán)峻挑戰(zhàn),城市群內(nèi)部次區(qū)域間競(jìng)合無(wú)序問(wèn)題及如何進(jìn)行有效的機(jī)制設(shè)計(jì)已成為城市群發(fā)展實(shí)踐中的重大課題。 論文從梳理世界五大城市群發(fā)展歷程入手,分析了世界主要城市群的發(fā)展特點(diǎn),著重探討了不同發(fā)達(dá)國(guó)家的城市群治理模式,歸納出對(duì)我國(guó)城市群治理具有一定指導(dǎo)意義的經(jīng)驗(yàn)做法。在本文提到的五大城市群中,作者同樣發(fā)現(xiàn)地區(qū)間存在著大量鄰近區(qū)域間競(jìng)合問(wèn)題,比如美國(guó)各城市間的稅率策略互動(dòng)問(wèn)題、歐洲城市間競(jìng)爭(zhēng)不平衡問(wèn)題、英國(guó)倫敦自治市惡性競(jìng)爭(zhēng)問(wèn)題、日本國(guó)土空間開(kāi)發(fā)問(wèn)題等等。通過(guò)深入研究這些城市群發(fā)展與治理模式,發(fā)現(xiàn)這些城市群在處理城市間競(jìng)合問(wèn)題時(shí),采取的一些措施和方法對(duì)我國(guó)具有一定的借鑒和啟示意義：一是充分發(fā)揮市場(chǎng)的作用,讓市場(chǎng)成為資源配置的主導(dǎo)力量；二是加強(qiáng)區(qū)域發(fā)展規(guī)劃；三是強(qiáng)調(diào)區(qū)域錯(cuò)位發(fā)展；四是設(shè)立特殊機(jī)構(gòu),協(xié)調(diào)區(qū)域利益；五是適度調(diào)整行政區(qū)劃等。 本文同樣對(duì)我國(guó)幾個(gè)主要城市群的發(fā)展歷程與競(jìng)合行為現(xiàn)狀進(jìn)行了梳理�？傮w來(lái)看,我國(guó)地區(qū)間競(jìng)爭(zhēng)可劃分為四個(gè)階段：改革開(kāi)放前的“兄弟競(jìng)爭(zhēng)”、80年代的“地方保護(hù)主義”、90年代后期的“政策競(jìng)爭(zhēng)”以及現(xiàn)階段的“全方位、多層次”競(jìng)爭(zhēng)。文章還歸納總結(jié)了現(xiàn)階段一些較為常見(jiàn)的城市群內(nèi)部競(jìng)爭(zhēng)行為,包括外商投資競(jìng)爭(zhēng)、勞動(dòng)力資源競(jìng)爭(zhēng)、發(fā)展定位競(jìng)爭(zhēng)、稅收競(jìng)爭(zhēng)、地方保護(hù)主義等。在城市群區(qū)域內(nèi)合作方面,改革開(kāi)放后,我國(guó)原有的經(jīng)濟(jì)體制被打破,區(qū)域合作機(jī)制需要重新確立。開(kāi)始于80年代的“區(qū)域經(jīng)濟(jì)技術(shù)合作組織”對(duì)促進(jìn)地區(qū)間橫向經(jīng)濟(jì)聯(lián)合起到了重要作用。經(jīng)過(guò)多年發(fā)展,我國(guó)區(qū)域間合作水平也在不斷提高。本文也對(duì)目前我國(guó)城市群內(nèi)部地區(qū)間的典型合作行為進(jìn)行了歸納總結(jié),其主要表現(xiàn)形式有：區(qū)域間基礎(chǔ)設(shè)施建設(shè)、區(qū)域產(chǎn)業(yè)分工協(xié)作、經(jīng)濟(jì)合作區(qū)建設(shè)等�？傮w看,我國(guó)城市群內(nèi)部地區(qū)間既存在大量的競(jìng)爭(zhēng)行為,也存在一些合作,但由于我國(guó)存在的,諸如官員考核選拔、財(cái)政分權(quán)等體制機(jī)制,使得城市群內(nèi)部次區(qū)域間的惡性競(jìng)爭(zhēng)數(shù)不勝數(shù),合作卻少之又少。為此,我國(guó)部分城市群相繼建立了區(qū)域協(xié)調(diào)組織,對(duì)地區(qū)間競(jìng)合行為加以協(xié)調(diào),如“環(huán)渤海區(qū)域合作市長(zhǎng)聯(lián)席會(huì)”、“長(zhǎng)三角城市經(jīng)濟(jì)協(xié)調(diào)會(huì)”、“泛珠三角9+2”區(qū)域合作組織等。但不容樂(lè)觀的是,現(xiàn)階段城市群內(nèi)部鄰近地區(qū)“以鄰為壑”、市場(chǎng)分割、地方保護(hù)主義等問(wèn)題仍然嚴(yán)重,這些區(qū)域協(xié)調(diào)組織并未實(shí)現(xiàn)其成立初衷。 為研究我國(guó)城市群內(nèi)部次區(qū)域間的競(jìng)合無(wú)序問(wèn)題,本文構(gòu)建了城市群內(nèi)部?jī)芍行臅x升博弈模型,通過(guò)求解對(duì)稱性納什均衡,并進(jìn)行比較靜態(tài)分析,提出了城市群內(nèi)部次區(qū)域間的“積極競(jìng)爭(zhēng),消極合作”行為推論,即：隨著地區(qū)間競(jìng)爭(zhēng)行為對(duì)本城市經(jīng)濟(jì)增長(zhǎng)影響程度的提高,政府競(jìng)爭(zhēng)趨于激烈；而隨著地區(qū)間合作行為對(duì)其他城市經(jīng)濟(jì)增長(zhǎng)影響程度的提高,政府合作更趨消極。為驗(yàn)證該推論,本文使用2000--2011年北京等10個(gè)城市的面板數(shù)據(jù),并選取區(qū)域?qū)I(yè)化水平、城市間交通便捷程度等變量代表合作行為；選取區(qū)域勞動(dòng)力增長(zhǎng)、外商直接投資等變量代表競(jìng)爭(zhēng)行為,驗(yàn)證這4個(gè)變量對(duì)本城市經(jīng)濟(jì)增長(zhǎng)的促進(jìn)作用是否顯著,同時(shí),還選取這4個(gè)變量的空間滯后項(xiàng)進(jìn)入模型,檢驗(yàn)這些變量對(duì)城市群其他城市經(jīng)濟(jì)增長(zhǎng)的作用,并用以匹配政府行為表現(xiàn),以此來(lái)驗(yàn)證本文提出的推論。結(jié)果顯示,政府在資本競(jìng)爭(zhēng)、勞動(dòng)力競(jìng)爭(zhēng)以及城市間交通設(shè)施建設(shè)等方面的行為能夠與本文三種不同設(shè)定的模型估計(jì)結(jié)果進(jìn)行很好地匹配,而政府在區(qū)域分工方面的行為也能夠與時(shí)點(diǎn)固定效應(yīng)模型實(shí)證結(jié)果相匹配�？傮w而言,實(shí)證結(jié)果和現(xiàn)有的數(shù)據(jù)分析能夠較好的支撐本文提出的“積極競(jìng)爭(zhēng),消極合作”的行為推論。 我國(guó)城市群內(nèi)部次區(qū)域間普遍存在的“積極競(jìng)爭(zhēng),消極合作”行為會(huì)產(chǎn)生何種后果呢?本文在第六章以城市群內(nèi)部?jī)沙鞘袪?zhēng)奪外商投資為案例基礎(chǔ),對(duì)“積極競(jìng)爭(zhēng),消極合作”行為所產(chǎn)生的后果,進(jìn)行了福利經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)分析。通過(guò)構(gòu)建由兩個(gè)地方政府和一個(gè)外商投資企業(yè)參與的多階段動(dòng)態(tài)博弈模型,發(fā)現(xiàn)在產(chǎn)業(yè)轉(zhuǎn)移過(guò)程中,地方政府的這種“積極競(jìng)爭(zhēng),消極合作”的行為產(chǎn)生了“租金耗散”的后果。本文認(rèn)為,產(chǎn)生“租金耗散”后果的直接原因在于,城市群內(nèi)各地方政府并沒(méi)有從區(qū)域分工和比較優(yōu)勢(shì)角度進(jìn)行產(chǎn)業(yè)承接,而是從自身利益最大化出發(fā),參與競(jìng)爭(zhēng),進(jìn)而使得外商投資企業(yè)掌握主導(dǎo)權(quán),并利用這種同質(zhì)化競(jìng)爭(zhēng),迫使兩個(gè)地方政府不斷提高優(yōu)惠條件,最終導(dǎo)致“產(chǎn)業(yè)轉(zhuǎn)移租金”全部被外商投資企業(yè)獲得。同時(shí)本文也認(rèn)為產(chǎn)生“租金耗散”的根本原因在于,地方政府目標(biāo)選擇與地區(qū)發(fā)展利益并不完全一致。“租金耗散”的形式一般表現(xiàn)為地方政府對(duì)外商投資企業(yè)的各種稅收、土地優(yōu)惠條件、財(cái)政轉(zhuǎn)移支付或財(cái)政補(bǔ)貼,其缺口只能由地方財(cái)政承擔(dān),所以城市群內(nèi)部“積極競(jìng)爭(zhēng),消極合作”行為的最終利益受損者是參與競(jìng)爭(zhēng)的城市的普通居民。 為避免由“積極競(jìng)爭(zhēng),消極合作”行為所造成的社會(huì)福利損失,促使城市群內(nèi)部形成“積極合作,良性競(jìng)爭(zhēng)”的態(tài)勢(shì),本文認(rèn)為應(yīng)從以下幾個(gè)方面構(gòu)建城市群內(nèi)部競(jìng)合機(jī)制：一是建設(shè)法律基礎(chǔ)機(jī)制：推進(jìn)城市群發(fā)展公約制訂和出臺(tái)、鼓勵(lì)城市群內(nèi)部地方政府合作協(xié)議簽訂、推動(dòng)城市群發(fā)展規(guī)劃編制和實(shí)施等；二是建立內(nèi)部協(xié)調(diào)機(jī)制：未來(lái)城市群區(qū)域的管理應(yīng)在不同層面設(shè)置不同管理機(jī)構(gòu),在國(guó)家層面應(yīng)設(shè)置中央城市群統(tǒng)籌協(xié)調(diào)小組、在跨地區(qū)層面應(yīng)設(shè)置城市群綜合協(xié)調(diào)管理委員會(huì)和專業(yè)性協(xié)調(diào)委員會(huì),同時(shí)還應(yīng)該進(jìn)一步完善補(bǔ)充性協(xié)調(diào)管理組織；三是形成財(cái)政保障機(jī)制：理順中央與地方財(cái)權(quán)事權(quán)關(guān)系、建立縱向與橫向轉(zhuǎn)移支付體系、確立“稅收法定”等原則、改革財(cái)政預(yù)算體制等；四是完善激勵(lì)約束機(jī)制：應(yīng)從激勵(lì)約束的的實(shí)施主體、參與客體、環(huán)境條件、預(yù)期目標(biāo)、實(shí)施途徑等方面入手,盡快建立激勵(lì)相容的激勵(lì)約束體制。 本文以現(xiàn)有官員考核選拔體制為依據(jù),構(gòu)建晉升博弈模型,研究我國(guó)城市群內(nèi)部次區(qū)域間競(jìng)合問(wèn)題,提出了城市群內(nèi)部“積極競(jìng)爭(zhēng),消極合作”的行為推論,并加以實(shí)證研究。隨后,建立了多階段動(dòng)態(tài)博弈模型,探討城市群內(nèi)部“積極競(jìng)爭(zhēng),消極合作”行為的社會(huì)福利影響,得出了“租金耗散”結(jié)論。為促使我國(guó)城市群內(nèi)部次區(qū)域形成“積極合作,良性競(jìng)爭(zhēng)”的新秩序,以上述分析結(jié)果為依據(jù),本文從法律基礎(chǔ)、內(nèi)部協(xié)調(diào)、財(cái)政保障、激勵(lì)約束等幾方面構(gòu)建城市群內(nèi)部競(jìng)合行為機(jī)制。根據(jù)本文對(duì)我國(guó)城市群內(nèi)部次區(qū)域間競(jìng)合行為的研究,結(jié)合世界城市群治理實(shí)踐經(jīng)驗(yàn),提出了促進(jìn)我國(guó)城市群內(nèi)部各區(qū)域協(xié)調(diào)發(fā)展的政策建議,主要包括：理順政府與市場(chǎng)的關(guān)系,以市場(chǎng)為主導(dǎo),更好發(fā)揮政府宏觀調(diào)控作用；加強(qiáng)城市群區(qū)域內(nèi)基礎(chǔ)設(shè)施網(wǎng)絡(luò)建設(shè),深化內(nèi)部一體化進(jìn)程；構(gòu)建現(xiàn)代產(chǎn)業(yè)體系,加強(qiáng)區(qū)域產(chǎn)業(yè)分工；制定城市群發(fā)展規(guī)劃,實(shí)現(xiàn)區(qū)域錯(cuò)位發(fā)展；引入綠色GDP,加強(qiáng)經(jīng)濟(jì)成本核算,完善官員考核體系；打破條塊分割,設(shè)置具有權(quán)威性的區(qū)域協(xié)調(diào)管理機(jī)構(gòu)等。
[Abstract]:The comprehensive, coordinated and sustainable development of the urban agglomeration is of great strategic significance to optimizing the structure of land space development, improving the construction of the urban system, promoting the coordinated development of the regional economy and even promoting the new urbanization strategy in China. The Twelfth Five Year Plan of national economy and social development clearly points out that the future of China Urban construction must follow the objective law of urban development, take large cities as the support, focus on the middle and small cities, gradually form a large urban agglomeration with great futile effect, and promote the coordinated development of large, middle, small cities and small towns. Relying on the main function area, the layout of cities, the development of urban agglomeration and the scientific management of urbanization have been established. The important strategic choice of China's urbanization process is effective. The data show that the key role of the urban agglomeration in the national economy and social development has become increasingly prominent, and has become the basic bearing platform and the main spatial pattern of the regional economic development in our country. With a large number of economic resources gathering in the urban agglomeration area, how effective the internal areas are effective It is particularly important to allocate resources to dissolve economic conflicts and achieve coordinated development. The current management system mechanisms in China, such as performance assessment and fiscal decentralization, have promoted regional economic growth as well as regional competition, especially in a certain range of cities, and the competition is more intense. With the convergence of the industrial structure, the aggravation of the malignant competition, the reduction of regional cooperation and the decreasing of the efficiency of the allocation of resources, the development of the urban agglomeration development theory has become a severe challenge. The problem of competition and disordering in the inner subregion of the urban agglomeration and how to carry out effective mechanism design have become a major issue in the development practice of urban agglomeration.
This paper, starting with the development of the five largest urban agglomeration in the world, analyzes the development characteristics of the major urban groups in the world, focuses on the management patterns of urban agglomeration in different developed countries, and sums up the empirical practices that have certain guiding significance for the governance of urban agglomeration in China. Among the five major urban groups mentioned in this article, the author also finds regional storage. In a large number of neighbouring regions, such as the interaction of tax rate strategies among cities in the United States, the imbalance of European cities, the vicious competition in the city of London, the problem of land space development in Japan, and so on. Through in-depth study of the development and governance patterns of these urban clusters, these cities are found to be dealing with the cities. Some measures and methods will be of certain reference and Enlightenment to our country: first, give full play to the role of the market, make the market become the dominant force in the allocation of resources; two is to strengthen the regional development planning; the three is to emphasize the regional dislocation development; four is to set up special institutions, coordinate regional interests; five is appropriate. Degree adjustment of administrative division and so on.
This paper also combs the development process of several major urban groups in China and the current situation of competing behavior. In general, the inter regional competition in China can be divided into four stages: "brothers competition" before the reform and opening up, "local protectionism" in 80s, "policy competition" in the late 90s, and "all directions, more" at the present stage. The article also summarizes some of the more common urban agglomeration internal competition behavior at the present stage, including foreign investment competition, labor resources competition, development positioning and competition, tax competition, local protectionism, and so on. In the area of regional cooperation in urban agglomeration, the original economic system of our country has been broken and regional cooperation is broken. The mechanism needs to be reestablished. The regional economic and Technical Cooperation Organization (regional economic and Technical Cooperation Organization), which began in 80s, has played an important role in promoting interregional horizontal economic union. After years of development, the level of interregional cooperation in China has also been increasing. The main manifestations are: infrastructure construction, regional industrial division and cooperation, economic cooperation zone construction. In general, there are a lot of competitive behaviors and some cooperation among the inner regions of the urban agglomeration in China, but because of our country, such as the system mechanism such as the election and selection of officials, financial decentralization, and so on, make the urban agglomeration internal. The vicious competition among regions is innumerable, but there are few cooperation. For this reason, some urban groups in China have established regional coordination organizations one after another to coordinate the interregional competing behavior, such as "the mayor joint meeting of Bohai regional cooperation", "the city economic coordination meeting of the Yangtze River Delta", the "Pan Pearl River Delta 9+2" regional cooperation organization, etc. At the present stage, the inner neighbourhood of the urban agglomeration is "beggar thy neighbour", the market segmentation, and the local protectionism are still serious, and these regional coordination organizations have not realized their original intention.
In order to study the concurrence disorder between subregional groups in the urban agglomeration of China, this paper constructs a two center promotion game model within the urban agglomeration. By solving the symmetry Nash equilibrium and comparing static analysis, the "positive competition and negative cooperation" between the inner subregions of the urban agglomeration is put forward, that is, with the regional competition line. In order to improve the impact of the urban economic growth, the government competition tends to be fierce, and with the increase of the influence of inter regional cooperation on the economic growth of other cities, the cooperation of the government is more negative. In order to verify this inference, this paper uses the panel data of 10 cities such as Beijing and other cities in 2000--2011, and selects the level of regional specialization. The variables of inter - traffic convenience represent cooperative behavior, and select regional labor growth, foreign direct investment and other variables to represent competitive behavior, verify whether these 4 variables promote the economic growth of the city significantly, and select the spatial lag items of these 4 variables into the model, and test these variables to other cities of Urban Agglomeration The effect of economic growth, which is used to match the performance of government behavior, is used to verify the inference proposed in this paper. The results show that the government's behavior in capital competition, labor competition and urban transportation facilities can be well matched with the three different models of this article, while the government is in the regional division of labor. The behavior of the surface can also be matched with the empirical results of the time point fixed effect model. In general, the empirical results and the existing data analysis can support the behavioral inference of "positive competition and negative cooperation" proposed in this paper.
What are the consequences of "positive competition, negative cooperation" in the inner subregions of urban agglomeration in China? In the sixth chapter, we take two cities within the urban agglomeration to compete for foreign investment as a case base, and analyze the consequences of "positive competition and negative cooperation". A multi-stage dynamic game model involving a local government and a foreign invested enterprise has found that in the process of industrial transfer, the local government's "active competition and negative cooperation" have produced the consequences of "rent dissipation". This paper holds that the direct reason for the consequences of "rent dissipation" lies in the local administration within the urban agglomeration. The government does not undertake industrial undertaking from the perspective of regional division of labor and comparative advantage, but starts from the maximization of its own interests and participates in the competition, and then makes the foreign investment enterprises master the dominant power, and makes use of this homogenization competition to force two local governments to continuously improve the preferential conditions, and ultimately lead to the investment of "industrial transfer rent" by foreign investment. The basic reason for the "rent dissipation" is that the choice of the local government is not exactly the same as the regional development interests. The form of "rent dissipation" is generally manifested by the various taxes of local governments on foreign invested enterprises, the favorable conditions for land, the financial transfer payment or the financial subsidy. The mouth can only be borne by local finance, so the ultimate interests of the "positive competition and negative cooperation" in the urban agglomeration are the ordinary residents of the cities participating in the competition.
In order to avoid the loss of social welfare caused by "positive competition and negative cooperation", the situation of "positive cooperation and good competition" is formed in the urban agglomeration. This paper believes that the internal competition mechanism should be constructed from the following aspects: first, the construction of legal basic machine system: promoting the development and promulgation of the urban agglomeration development convention. The local government cooperation agreement within the city group is signed to promote the development planning and implementation of urban agglomeration. Two is the establishment of internal coordination mechanism: the management of the future urban agglomeration should set different management institutions at different levels, and the central urban agglomeration coordination group should be set up at the national level, and the urban agglomeration should be set up at the cross regional level. At the same time, the comprehensive coordination management committee and the professional coordination committee should further improve the supplementary coordination management organization; three is to form the financial security mechanism: straighten out the relationship between the central and local financial power, establish the vertical and horizontal transfer payment system, establish the principle of "tax legality", reform the financial budget system, and so on; four To improve the incentive and constraint mechanism, the incentive and compatible incentive and constraint system should be established as soon as possible from the aspects of the subject, the object, the environment, the expected goal and the way of implementation of the incentive constraints.
Based on the examination and selection system of the existing officials, this paper constructs a promotion game model, studies the interregional competition among the urban agglomeration in China, and puts forward the behavior inference of "positive competition and negative cooperation" within the urban agglomeration, and makes an empirical study. Then, a multi stage dynamic game model is set up to explore the "positive competition" within the urban agglomeration. In order to promote the new order of "positive cooperation and good competition" in the inner subregion of urban agglomeration in China, the new order of "positive cooperation and good competition" in the inner subregion of China's urban agglomeration is based on the results of the above analysis. This paper constructs the internal competition of Urban Agglomeration from the legal basis, internal coordination, financial security and incentive constraints. According to the study of the inter regional competing behavior in the urban agglomeration of our country and the practice experience of the world city group management, this paper puts forward the policy suggestions to promote the coordinated development of the inner regions of the urban agglomeration in China, which mainly includes: straightening out the relationship between the government and the market, taking the market as the leading role, and giving full play to the government's macro regulation and control role. We should strengthen the construction of infrastructure network in the urban agglomeration area, deepen the process of internal integration, construct modern industrial system, strengthen regional industrial division of labor, formulate urban agglomeration development planning, realize regional dislocation development, introduce green GDP, strengthen economic cost accounting, improve official examination system, break the division and set authority. Regional coordination management institutions, etc.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：西南財(cái)經(jīng)大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級(jí)別】：博士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2014
【分類號(hào)】：F299.2

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本文編號(hào)：2076167