本文關(guān)鍵詞：地方政府政績(jī)考核對(duì)上市公司盈余管理影響實(shí)證研究　出處：《石河子大學(xué)》2014年碩士論文　論文類型：學(xué)位論文

  更多相關(guān)文章： 地方政府 政績(jī)考核 上市公司 盈余管理

【摘要】：改革開(kāi)放以來(lái)，地方政府的工作模式從“命令一執(zhí)行”轉(zhuǎn)變?yōu)樨?cái)政分權(quán)，其對(duì)地方資源配置擁有政治和經(jīng)濟(jì)上的權(quán)威。上市公司通過(guò)資本市場(chǎng)進(jìn)行資源配置的功能有助于地區(qū)經(jīng)濟(jì)的發(fā)展。因此，地方政府部門從追求政績(jī)的視角出發(fā)，有動(dòng)機(jī)也有能力通過(guò)財(cái)政稅收等手段來(lái)幫助轄區(qū)內(nèi)的上市公司進(jìn)行盈余管理行為，另一方面，上市公司迫于地方政府索取政績(jī)的壓力，在正常經(jīng)營(yíng)不能完成任務(wù)的情況下，是否也會(huì)以盈余管理的方式主動(dòng)迎合政府的需求。所以，本文認(rèn)為，地方政府政績(jī)考核對(duì)上市公司盈余管理的影響這一話題值得深入探討。 本文以我國(guó)A股市場(chǎng)2007-2011年的地級(jí)市上市公司為樣本，基于相關(guān)的理論和實(shí)證分析，得出以下主要結(jié)論：以GDP增長(zhǎng)率為地方政府政績(jī)衡量指標(biāo)對(duì)企業(yè)真實(shí)盈余管理程度的確存在著顯著影響。當(dāng)?shù)胤秸媾R政績(jī)考核壓力時(shí)，上市公司更傾向于進(jìn)行采用異�，F(xiàn)金流和異�？刹倏v性費(fèi)用的方式進(jìn)行真實(shí)盈余管理活動(dòng)。一個(gè)地區(qū)的GDP增長(zhǎng)越慢，該區(qū)居民對(duì)就業(yè)、收入和福利等相關(guān)的滿意度也就越低，而這些指標(biāo)的提升大都取決于本地區(qū)企業(yè)的發(fā)展水平，期望越高壓力越大，然而，地方政府為追求政績(jī)往往會(huì)把這些期望和壓力轉(zhuǎn)移給轄區(qū)內(nèi)的企業(yè)尤其是效益較好的上市公司，若企業(yè)在該地區(qū)的經(jīng)濟(jì)影響力越低則相應(yīng)的盈余管理程度越高。進(jìn)一步考慮產(chǎn)權(quán)性質(zhì)，雖然非國(guó)有企業(yè)更有動(dòng)機(jī)進(jìn)行正向的盈余管理，但是國(guó)有企業(yè)具有更好的條件進(jìn)行盈余管理，因此綜合發(fā)現(xiàn)，兩者就進(jìn)行盈余管理的傾向性來(lái)看并無(wú)顯著差別。隨后，按政府控制層級(jí)進(jìn)一步劃分國(guó)有企業(yè)，較之中央政府控制企業(yè)而言，地方政府在面臨增長(zhǎng)壓力時(shí)，地方政府將其增長(zhǎng)壓力層層解壓至其管轄區(qū)域的地方國(guó)有企業(yè)，進(jìn)而使得GDP增長(zhǎng)率與地方企業(yè)真實(shí)盈余管理程度顯著相關(guān)。另外，由于區(qū)域經(jīng)濟(jì)發(fā)展不平衡，按東中西部行政區(qū)域進(jìn)行劃分，，經(jīng)回歸分析發(fā)現(xiàn)中部和東部地區(qū)影響更為顯著。 在此基礎(chǔ)上，本文對(duì)地方政府政績(jī)考核體系提出了規(guī)范和改進(jìn)的建議，同時(shí)認(rèn)為加強(qiáng)上市公司信息披露監(jiān)管的力度、完善相關(guān)的法律制度是控制盈余管理攫取私有收益的基本舉措。
[Abstract]:Since the reform and opening up, the local government work mode from "command execution" for the fiscal decentralization, the allocation of resources has the political and economic authority. The development of listed companies, the function of resource allocation is conducive to regional economy through the capital market. Therefore, the local government departments from the pursuit of perspective. Have the motivation and ability through the tax means to help within the jurisdiction of the listed company earnings management behavior of listed companies, on the other hand, under the local government for political pressure in normal operation can not be task conditions, will by means of earnings management initiative to meet the government's needs. So, this paper that influence of local government performance evaluation on earnings management of listed companies. This topic is worth discussing.
Based on China's A stock market listed companies in 2007-2011 city as samples, based on the theoretical and empirical analysis, the main conclusions are as follows: according to the growth rate of GDP for local government performance indicators on corporate real earnings management does exist significant influence. The local government is facing pressure performance evaluation, real earnings the management activities of listed companies are more inclined to adopt the abnormal cash flow and abnormal handling costs. An area of slower growth in GDP, residents in the area of employment, income and welfare related satisfaction is also lower, and these indicators depend mostly on local enterprises to enhance the level of development, expected the higher the pressure is, however, the local government for the pursuit of performance will tend to these expectations and pressure is transferred to the area of enterprise especially the benefit of listed companies, if the enterprise in the The higher the degree of earnings management in the economic impact of the lower accordingly. Further consideration of the nature of property rights, while non state-owned enterprises more motivation for earnings management is positive, but the state-owned enterprises have better conditions for earnings management, so that there is no significant difference between the two tendencies of view into earnings management. Then, according to the government control level are further divided into state-owned enterprises, the central government is the control of enterprises, the local government in the face of increasing pressure, the local government will increase its pressure upon decompression to its jurisdiction of local state-owned enterprises, thus making the growth rate of GDP was significantly associated with local enterprises real earnings management. In addition, due to the unbalanced development of regional economy, divided according to the administrative area of the eastern Midwest, by regression analysis found that the influence of the central and eastern regions is more significant.
On this basis, this paper puts forward some suggestions for improving and improving local government performance appraisal system. At the same time, it is considered that strengthening the supervision of information disclosure of listed companies and improving related legal systems are the basic measures to control earnings management and seize private benefits.

【學(xué)位授予單位】：石河子大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級(jí)別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2014
【分類號(hào)】：F275;D630

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